Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued Harding County for negligence after he drove into a washed-out portion of a county road and was injured. A jury returned a general verdict for the County. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the County’s admitted violation of S.D. Codified Laws 31-28-6 entitled him to judgment as a matter of law as to the County’s liability and that the court erred by allowing questions regarding assumption of the risk and contributory negligence to go to the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed the jury’s verdict, holding that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for judgment as a matter of law, as there was evidence that supported the verdict; and (2) the evidence supported the instructions given for contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. View "Stensland v. Harding County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff suffered an injury from a fall while at Black Hills Dialysis LLC’s (BHD) facility in Shannon County. Plaintiff sued BHD for her injuries. A dispute subsequently arose about whether the circuit court should summon jurors from Shannon County or neighboring Fall River County where Shannon County has no physical state court facilities and all Shannon County legal proceedings are held at the Fall River County Courthouse. The circuit court ruled that it would summon Fall River County jurors, holding that a 2009 standing order issued by the presiding judge of the Seventh Circuit stating that all Shannon County matters would be tried in Fall River County supported its resolution of the issue. The Supreme Court vacated the presiding judge’s standing order and reversed the order of the circuit court, holding (1) the presiding judge exceeded his statutory and constitutional authority in issuing the standing order, which effectively changed venue in all Shannon County cases; (2) the circuit court’s ruling on venue in this case was improper and without legal basis; and (3) under the circumstances of this case, venue was proper in Shannon County, and Shannon County jurors should be summoned and empaneled. View "Good Lance v. Black Hills Dialysis, LLC" on Justia Law

Aggregate Construction, Inc. (Aggregate) hired Aaron Swan & Associates, Inc. (Swan) to conduct sodium-sulfate soundness testing of material to be used in a construction project for the South Dakota Department of Transportation (SDDOT) for sodium-sulfate soundness testing. Aggregate later filed this action against Swan, alleging breach of contract and negligence for Swan’s alleged failure to test adequately the material. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Swan, concluding that a release executed between Aggregate and SDDOT barred the claims against Swan. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Aggregate and SDDOT executed a release that applied to the causes of action brought by Aggregate against Swan, the circuit court correctly granted summary judgment to Swan. View "Aggregate Constr., Inc. v. Aaron Swan & Assocs., Inc." on Justia Law

Megan Ruschenberg, Jessica Cornelius, and Heather Rensch (collectively, Appellants) were employees at two businesses that sold adult movies, clothing, and other sexual products. Keith Johnson was a majority owner of the businesses, and David Eliason was a minority owner and helped to manage both businesses. Each Appellant alleged that she was sexually assaulted by Eliason during her employment. Ruschenberg was allegedly raped by Eliason, which resulted in a pregnancy and an abortion. Appellants filed complaints against Eliason and the businesses (together, Defendants), alleging several causes of action. The jury returned a verdict for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants’ motion in limine to exclude evidence of Ruschenberg’s abortion or in denying Appellants’ motion for a mistrial based on Johnson’s statements at trial. View "Ruschenberg v. Eliason" on Justia Law

An employee (Isack) was injured during the course and scope of his employment with his employer. Acuity, the employer’s workers’ compensation insurer, paid workers’ compensation benefits to Isack. Isack then retained attorney John Knight for legal representation in a suit against the tortfeasor and his employer. In turn, Acuity retained an attorney to represent its statutory rights of recovery and offset in Isack’s claim. Isack and the tortfeasor’s employer reached a litigation settlement. The trial judge subsequently awarded Knight one-third of Acuity’s recovery and offset award. Acuity appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by giving Knight a thirty-three percent contingent fee from Acuity’s settlement portion because Acuity retained its own attorney to represent its interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court’s application of S.D. Codified Laws 62-4-39 and its allocation of the entire contingent fee to Knight was not clearly erroneous. View "Isack v. Acuity" on Justia Law

Ten-month-old Kimimila Win Sunny Sarah Iron Cloud (Kimi) died while being cared for Jolyn Erickson. Kelly Laughlin was present when Kimi died from positional asphyxiation in her car seat. Prudence Millea, as special administrator for Kimi’s estate, brought a negligence action against Erickson and Laughlin for Kimi’s death. Default judgment was entered against Erickson, and the circuit court granted summary judgment for Lauglin, concluding that he had no legal duty to Kimi. Millea appealed, arguing (1) Laughlin interfered in Kimi’s care by instructing Erickson to place Kimi in her car seat and in the bedroom, and Laughlin had influence over Erickson such that she deferred to him in providing care for Kimi; and (2) therefore, Laughlin assumed a legal duty to provide reasonable care for Kimi. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Laughlin had no legal duty to care for Kimi. View "Millea v. Erickson" on Justia Law

While responding to an emergency, Tim Bauman, a volunteer firefighter for the Chester Fire Department, activated his hazard lights and sped toward the fire station. While crossing an intersection, Bauman’s vehicle collided with a vehicle driven by Areyman Gabriel. Both Gabriel and his passenger were injured. Gabriel sued Bauman and Chester Fire, alleging that Bauman’s conduct was willful, wanton, and reckless and that Chester Fire negligently trained Bauman and inadequately equipped Bauman’s vehicle. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the circuit court did not err when it used the Supreme Court’s definition of “willful and wanton misconduct” from South Dakota’s repealed guest statute to rule as a matter of law that Bauman did not act willfully, wantonly, or recklessly; (2) the circuit court properly granted summary judgment for Bauman; and (3) the circuit court erred when it granted summary judgment to Chester Fire on Gabriel’s negligent training and equipment claims based on the immunity in S.D. Codified Laws 20-9-4.1. View "Gabriel v. Bauman" on Justia Law

Steven Thomas & Sons (T&S), LLC did excavation and soil compaction work for an addition to a school building in the Kimball School District. The School District was later informed that problems in the building caused by settling issues were due to negligently performed work by T&S. The School District brought suit against T&S and other defendants. T&S’s commercial general liability insurer, Employers Mutual Casualty Company (EMC) withdrew from contributing to T&S's defense, asserting that the policy excluded coverage for continuous or progressive property damage that occurred before the effective date of the policy, and the problems to the building were observed before the 2007 policy date. In 2005 and 2006, T&S was insured by AMCO Insurance Company. Ultimately, AMCO paid defense costs and indemnified T&S for its share of the arbitration award in favor of the School District. AMCO subsequently brought a declaratory judgment action against EMC seeking a ruling that EMC had a joint duty to defend T&S and a declaration that EMC’s policy exclusion was void as against public policy. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of EMC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that EMC’s exclusion did not violate public policy. View "AMCO Ins. Co. v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co." on Justia Law

Jonathan Quinn and his family were residential tenants of Barker & Little, Inc., when Quinn’s daughter was diagnosed with lead poisoning, Quinn sued Barker & Little for the injuries his daughter sustained from the high concentrations of lead in the leased premises. Barker & Little tendered the claim to Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers) and Truck Insurance Exchange (Truck). Farmers declined to defend Barker & Little under the applicable insurance policies. After a trial, the circuit court rendered judgment for Quinn. Quinn then asserted standing to bring all claims against Farmers and Truck that otherwise could have been brought by Barker & Little. Farmers and Truck moved for summary judgment on the basis of exclusions in the applicable policies. The circuit court granted the motion, concluding that Farmers had no duty to defend or indemnify Barker & Little in the underlying action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed that precluded summary judgment in this case. View "Quinn v. Farmers Ins. Exch." on Justia Law

After Mary Lou Fox died, Plaintiff, Mary Lou's daughter and the administratrix of Mary Lou's estate, sued Mary Lou's former husband, Robert Fox. Plaintiff alleged that Mary Lou jointly owned 960 acres of farmland with Robert, that Robert deprived Mary Lou of her ownership interest in the land, and that Plaintiff was thereby deprived of an inheritance from Mary Lou. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Robert, concluding that Mary Lou had no ownership interest in the 960 acres. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that each cause of action brought by Plaintiff failed because Mary Lou had no claim to a right of ownership in the 960 acres and Plaintiff had no authority supporting her claims. View "Niesche v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law