Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Richard and Susan Karst sued Shur Company and Wilson Trailer Company alleging defective design and improper warnings related to Shur’s electric-tarp system that Wilson Trailer included on a grain trailer it sold to Richard. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants on the Karsts’ failure-to-warn claims and granted summary judgment to Wilson on the Karsts’ negligent-defective-design claim. After a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants on the Karsts’ remaining claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) instructing the jury on strict liability; (2) granting summary judgment on the Karsts’ improper-warnings claims; and (3) refusing to admit evidence of the warnings that were provided. View "Karst v. Shur-Co." on Justia Law

Tyler Erickson filed a petition for a protection order against Austin Earley, a fellow hunter. The circuit court found in favor of Erickson, determining that Earley’s actions constituted stalking, and granted Erickson a permanent order of protection. Earley appealed, arguing that the circuit court abused its discretion by granting the protection order and that the protection order violated his right to free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Earley’s actions constituted harassment, and therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by granting the protection order; and (2) the protection order did not violate Earley’s right to free speech because “freedom of expression does not include threatening or harassing conduct.” View "Erickson v. Earley" on Justia Law

In November 2009, Plaintiff underwent a knee-replacement surgery at Sanford USD Medical Center. The day after the surgery, when he was still hospitalized, Plaintiff fell while walking with assistance from a patient-care technician. After being discharged, Plaintiff underwent inpatient rehabilitation and outpatient physical therapy. In September 2012, Plaintiff sought additional physical therapy for the alleged effects of the injury resulting from his fall. When Sanford declined to pay for additional treatment, Plaintiff commenced this action. Sanford moved for summary judgment, asserting that Plaintiff’s action was time-barred under S.D. Codified Laws 15-2-14.1 as a medical malpractice claim. The circuit court granted the motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that he commenced his action within the three-year statute of limitations applicable to general-negligence actions and that the circuit court erred in determining his action was time barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff’s action against Sanford was one for error or mistake, and therefore, section 15-2-14.1’s two-year period of repose applies; and (2) principles of estoppel and tolling are inapplicable to a period of repose, and the continuous-treatment rule did not toll section 15-2-14.1’s period of repose under the facts of this case. View "Pitt-Hart v. Sanford USD Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Fifteen-year-old Haley Gores was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Steven Smith when Smith lost control of the vehicle. Haley was treated by Dr. Lisa Miller for injuries she received during the accident. Dawn Gores, Haley’s mother and conservator, signed a general release in exchange for a settlement with Smith and Smith’s insurer. The release did not specifically name the treating physician or clinic, but it released al other claims that might develop from the accident. Haley and Dawn subsequently filed a malpractice suit against Dr. Miller and Yankton Surgical Associates (YSA), Dr. Miller’s practice group. Dr. Miller and YSA filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the release discharged Plaintiffs’ claims against them. The circuit court granted summary judgment, concluding that, based on the language of the release, the malpractice claims were discharged as a matter of contract. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly determined that the release barred Plaintiffs’ claims as a matter of contract. View "Gores v. Miller" on Justia Law

Travis Naser died in a one-vehicle accident that occurred at a T intersection at a dead-end road. The east-west road (“268th Street”) was located in Aurora County. Lynn Foster-Naser, Travis’s wife, brought suit against Aurora County for wrongful death, alleging that the County negligently failed to maintain the double-arrow sign on 268th Street. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that Aurora Township had a statutory duty to maintain the double-arrow sign on 268th Street, and Aurora County did not assume a duty to repair or maintain the Township’s signage when it agreed to maintain the Township’s roads. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Foster-Naser failed to present sufficient probative evidence that the County’s contract agreement to provide road maintenance included an agreement to maintain and repair the Township’s roadway signage. View "Foster-Naser v. Aurora County" on Justia Law

Dorothy and Harlan Smizer were seriously injured when a vehicle driven by Christina Drey collided with the Smizers’ vehicle. The Smizers brought suit against Christina alleging negligence and seeking to recover compensatory and punitive damages. The circuit court granted the Smizers’ motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of Christina’s negligence and granted Christina’s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages. The court also granted Christina’s motion for sanctions under S.D. Codified Laws 15-6-11(c), concluding that the Smizers did not conduct a reasonable investigation in law or fact to support their claim for punitive damages and that the Smizers improperly sought punitive damages to attempt to leverage a settlement of their negligence claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it held that the Smizers had no basis in law or fact to assert their claim for punitive damages and brought their claim for an improper purpose. View "Smizer v. Drey" on Justia Law

David Zerfas swerved to avoid a deer carcass in his lane of travel and lost control of his vehicle. Zerfas died after his vehicle was hit by oncoming traffic. Zerfas’s wife, Stacey, sought uninsured motorist benefits with their automobile insurance company, AMCO Insurance Company, alleging that an unidentified driver left the deer carcass in the lane of travel, which caused Zerfas to lose control of his vehicle. AMCO denied Stacey’s claim on the grounds that Stacey would not legally be entitled to recover damages from the unidentified driver. Stacey subsequently brought a breach of contract action against AMCO. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of AMCO, concluding that the unidentified driver did not have a legal duty to Zerfas to remove the carcass or warn of its existence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no common law or statutory duty existed between the unidentified driver and Zerfas, and therefore, the circuit court did not err in granting AMCO summary judgment. View "Zerfas v. AMCO Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was admitted to the intensive care unit at the Sanford USD Medical Center (Hospital) after being struck in the throat and head during an altercation. Plaintiff insisted on leaving the Hospital against medical advice. After Plaintiff left the Hospital, he brutally assaulted his neighbors. Plaintiff pleaded guilty to multiple charges related to the assault but was found not guilty by reason of mental illness. Plaintiff later brought this suit against the Hospital, alleging that the Hospital negligently failed to assess his mental condition after he insisted on leaving against medical advice, which made him a danger to himself and others. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Hospital on the grounds that S.D. Codified Laws 34-12C-7 applied, which provides good faith immunity to health care providers who follow a patient’s direction for his or her own health care, and that Plaintiff alleged no facts alleging bad faith. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly found that section 34-12C-7 applies and that there was no disputed issue of material fact that the Hospital acted in good faith. View "Klein v. Sanford USD Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Harding County for negligence after he drove into a washed-out portion of a county road and was injured. A jury returned a general verdict for the County. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the County’s admitted violation of S.D. Codified Laws 31-28-6 entitled him to judgment as a matter of law as to the County’s liability and that the court erred by allowing questions regarding assumption of the risk and contributory negligence to go to the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed the jury’s verdict, holding that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for judgment as a matter of law, as there was evidence that supported the verdict; and (2) the evidence supported the instructions given for contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. View "Stensland v. Harding County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff suffered an injury from a fall while at Black Hills Dialysis LLC’s (BHD) facility in Shannon County. Plaintiff sued BHD for her injuries. A dispute subsequently arose about whether the circuit court should summon jurors from Shannon County or neighboring Fall River County where Shannon County has no physical state court facilities and all Shannon County legal proceedings are held at the Fall River County Courthouse. The circuit court ruled that it would summon Fall River County jurors, holding that a 2009 standing order issued by the presiding judge of the Seventh Circuit stating that all Shannon County matters would be tried in Fall River County supported its resolution of the issue. The Supreme Court vacated the presiding judge’s standing order and reversed the order of the circuit court, holding (1) the presiding judge exceeded his statutory and constitutional authority in issuing the standing order, which effectively changed venue in all Shannon County cases; (2) the circuit court’s ruling on venue in this case was improper and without legal basis; and (3) under the circumstances of this case, venue was proper in Shannon County, and Shannon County jurors should be summoned and empaneled. View "Good Lance v. Black Hills Dialysis, LLC" on Justia Law