Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

While driving a farm tractor down a county road, Defendant John Fuks turned unexpectedly and struck Plaintiff John Walter's motorcycle as Plaintiff was trying to pass on the right. At trial, Defendant asserted that Plaintiff was driving under the influence of alcohol at the time and was barred from recovering based on contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. A jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff. On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court erroneously instructed the jury on the presumptions applicable only to criminal prosecutions for DUI. Also, Plaintiff's repeated violations of the court's in limine order, improperly disclosing that Plaintiff was not prosecuted for DUI, unfairly suggested to the jury that law enforcement officials had effectively resolved the issue whether plaintiff was driving under the influence. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Walter v. Fuks" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Wayne and Sandra Masloskie sued real estate agent G. Pat Baldwin and Century 21 American Real Estate Inc. on a number of causes of action including actual fraud. Baldwin and Century 21 moved for summary judgment, arguing that all causes of action were barred by statutes of limitation governing realtor malpractice. The circuit court granted summary judgment dismissing all claims. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their cause of action for fraud. Because that cause of action was subject to a longer statute of limitations, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded that portion of the judgment.

Claimant-Appellant Megan Peterson worked at a nursing home owned by The Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society (Good Samaritan). Claimant alleged that she sustained a work-related injury to her back when assisting a resident with a wheelchair. Good Samaritan denied the claim. Two doctors, who testified by deposition, disagreed whether Claimant suffered a work-related injury and whether employment was a major contributing cause of her back condition. The Department of Labor (Department), after considering the depositions and Claimant's medical records, determined that she failed to prove she sustained a compensable work-related injury. The Department also determined that Claimant failed to prove that her employment remained a major contributing cause of her condition and need for treatment. The circuit court affirmed. On de novo review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court concluded that one of the doctor's opinions was sufficient to meet Claimant's burden of proving that her employment caused a work-related injury and that was and remained a major contributing cause of her back condition and need for treatment.

Sometime after he lit his pilot light, Darrick Van Dyke's home burned down from a propane explosion. The fire spread, destroying Marguerite Cashman's home next door. Cashman brought suit against Van Dyke, alleging negligence, strict liability, and res ipsa loquitur. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Van Dyke, ruling that Cashman failed to present any evidence that Van Dyke acted negligently, that lighting a pilot light was an abnormally dangerous activity, or that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment to Van Dyke.

Rachelle Hunter received a loan from Highmark Federal Credit Union to purchase a home and property. A flood damaged the home a few years later, and Hunter had no flood insurance. Hunter filed suit against Highmark, arguing that Highmark was negligent in failing to warn her to purchase flood insurance and in failing to purchase the insurance at her expense. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Highmark. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Hunter's negligence claim failed as a matter of law because she could not show that Highmark owed her a duty, and accordingly, summary judgment was appropriate.

After witnessing Blair Hamilton accidentally kill himself in October 2009, Lyndon Hart in August 2011 filed a petition to extend time to file a creditor's claim against Hamilton's Estate for the negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress caused by the actions of Hamilton. The circuit court denied the petition. Hart appealed and served his notice of appeal only on the Estate's attorney. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Estate's motion to dismiss the appeal for failure to serve notice of appeal on all the heirs was denied, as in this case, the heirs were not parties in a creditor's claim against an estate; and (2) because Hart did not present or file a claim, the Court could not reach the merits of Hart's argument on appeal that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to extend time to file a creditor's claim.

James Cornelius initiated a declaratory judgment action against National Casualty Company to determine whether a policy of insurance issued by National Casualty to Cornelius's employer, Live Line Maintenance, provided uninsured motorist coverage to Cornelius for injuries he sustained while occupying a vehicle owned by Live Line. The circuit court granted National Casualty's motion for summary judgment, finding that Cornelius could not recover uninsured motorist benefits. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment for National Casualty because Cornelius presented evidence to support his claim that there was a casual connection between Live Line and Live Line's proprietor's alleged negligent maintenance of the work vehicle and the accident that caused Cornelius's injuries.

Minority shareholders (Plaintiffs) brought this action against minority shareholders (Defendants), individually and as officers or directors of Multi-Community Cooperative Dairy (MCC Dairy). Plaintiffs' amended complaint alleged six causes of action, including oppression and/or unfairly prejudicial conduct toward minority shareholders, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference, and restraint of trade or commerce. The circuit court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the amended complaint. The court also granted Defendants' motion for sanctions on the ground that Plaintiffs and their counsel had abused the discovery process. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court id not err as a matter of law in granting summary judgment, as there was no support that Defendants engaged in any wrongdoing; and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ordering sanctions against Plaintiffs for abuse of discovery in refusing to attend depositions scheduled by Defendants.

Patrick Kendall suffered a work-related injury while working at John Morrell and Company, a self-insured employer. Morrell initially accepted Kendall's workers' compensation claim, but because Kendall later missed a number of physical therapy and doctor's appointments, Morrell later denied all further benefits relating to the injury. Almost three years later, Kendall filed a petition with the state Department of Labor requesting additional benefits for the injury. The Department granted summary judgment in favor of Morrell, concluding that the petition was barred by the statute of limitations. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that all of Kendall's claims for benefits were procedurally barred by the statute of limitations in S.D. Codified Laws 62-7-35.

Jill Robinson and Chelsey Ewalt were involved in a car accident. Robinson sued Ewalt and attempted service of process a few days before the three-year statute of limitations expired, but Ewalt could not be located. Ewalt was eventually served almost one month after the statute of limitations had expired. The circuit court granted Ewalt's motion for summary judgment, finding that the statute of limitations barred Robinson's claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a factual question about where Ewalt resided was material because it would determine whether the statute of limitations barred Robinson's claim under S.D. Codified Laws 15-2-31 or whether a sixty-day extension period applied; and (2) because a material question of fact remained, the circuit court's granting of summary judgment was improper. Remanded.