Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The parties in this case signed an arbitration agreement providing that arbitration would occur in accordance with the National Arbitration Forum (NAF) Code of Procedure, but the NAF became unavailable to administer its Code and the arbitration. Defendants moved the circuit court to appoint a substitute arbitrator under Section 5 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The circuit court concluded that a substitute arbitrator could not be appointed under Section 5 because the NAF Code of Procedure was integral to the parties' agreement to arbitrate and the NAF was unavailable to administer its Code. The Supreme Court reversed after considering the language of the arbitration agreement, the language of the NAF Code, and the federal policy expressed in the FAA, holding that Section 5 applied, and that absent some other defense, Section 5 required the appointment of a substitute arbitrator.

Employee received workers' compensation benefits for a neck and back injury he suffered in 2002 while working for Employer. After his benefits were discontinued in 2004, Employee sought treatment for a low back condition and petitioned the Department of Labor for workers' compensation benefits. The Department denied the petition, ruling that Employee did not prove his low back condition was related to his original 2002 work injury. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Department correctly denied workers' compensation benefits where Employee failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 2002 injury was a major contributing cause of his current low back condition.

Ethanuel Holznagel and John Cutsinger were involved in a car accident, and Holznagel died from injuries sustained in the accident. Holznagel's parents (Plaintiffs), the representatives of his estate, brought a wrongful death action against Cutsinger and his employer (Defendants). A jury trial was held and a verdict was returned for Defendants. Plaintiffs appealed the grant of Defendants' motion in limine excluding evidence of Cutsinger's marijuana use. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and granting Defendants' motion in limine.

Former students of a parochial school brought an action against the Congregation of the Priests of the Scared Heart, Inc. (PSHI) and other defendants, asserting claims of childhood sexual abuse. PSHI filed a motion to dismiss the action on the grounds that the former students failed to timely serve process on PSHI. The circuit court denied PSHI's motion to dismiss, finding (1) the former students substantially complied with the applicable service-of-process statute, and (2) service of process on PSHI was valid under S.D. Codified Laws 15-2-31. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the former students timely served PSHI in accordance with South Dakota law, and the circuit court did not err in denying PSHI's motion to dismiss.

Former students of a parochial school brought an action against the Priests of the Sacred Heart (PSH) and other defendants, asserting claims of childhood sexual abuse. PSH filed a motion to dismiss the action on the grounds that the former students failed to timely serve process on PSH. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss, finding (1) the former students substantially complied with the applicable service-of-process statute, and (2) service of process on PSH was valid under S.D. Codified Laws 15-2-31. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in denying PSH's motion to dismiss because Plaintiffs failed to direct service to PSH and therefore failed to substantially comply with South Dakota's statutory notice requirements.

Employee was prosecuted for theft from his Employer, but he was acquitted by a jury. Employee later commenced an action for malicious prosecution against Employer. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Employer, concluding (1) Employee did not establish legal causation between Employer's report of theft and the criminal prosecution, and (2) Employee failed to establish the absence of probable cause to prosecute. Employee appealed, arguing that although the decision to prosecute was made by the state's attorney and grand jury, his claim was actionable because Employer did not give full and correct information to the authorities. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err where (1) Employer's report was not the legal cause of the prosecution, and (2) Employee identified no facts suggesting that the prosecution was based on such information and that but for such information the decision to prosecute would not have been made by the prosecutor.

Employee was injured while working for Employer, a railroad corporation, by falling on snow-covered ice. Employee filed a personal injury claim under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), which permits suit against railroads for an employee's injury that results in whole or in part from the railroad's negligence. A jury returned a verdict in Employee's favor and awarded Employee $300,000 in damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in allowing evidence of drainage problems and failing to enter a judgment as a matter of law on foreseeability; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Employer's motion for a new trial; (3) the trial court did not err in permitting Employee to receive post-judgment interest from the date of the verdict until the entry of judgment; and (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting Employer a set-off on the judgment.

Cindy Tolle sued Peter Lev for damages for failing to transfer ownership of a cabin situated on land owned by the government in a national park. Tolle also sued Lev for tortious interference with a business relationship she claimed with an employer. The circuit granted granted summary judgment in favor of Lev on both claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the tortious interference claim, but (2) the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to Lev on the claim for damages for failure to transfer the cabin, as (i) the statute of frauds did not bar the claim because an email from Lev confirming his agreement to transfer ownership of the cabin to Tolle was a sufficient writing and because the cabin agreement was for the sale of personal property, not real estate, (ii) neither the doctrine of merger nor the integration clause defeated Tolle's claim to enforce the oral agreement, and (iii) the parol evidence rule did not bar Lev's email.

Employee submitted a workers' compensation claim to his Employer after suffering a reaction that some doctors attributed to work-related exposure. Employee petitioned the Department of Labor for a hearing on his workers' compensation claim. The Department denied Employee's claim, concluding that Employee failed to demonstrate that he sustained a compensable injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. The circuit court affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether Employee's efforts to prove causation were thwarted by Employer's refusal to allow collection of samples of various materials in areas around the plant and its later destruction of potential samples. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Department failed to properly consider the spoliation question and Employee was entitled to a new hearing before the Department.

Lita St. John sued Dr. Linda Peterson, alleging medical malpractice in repairing a vesicovaginal fistula. The jury entered a verdict for Peterson. St. John appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of other cases where Peterson failed to repair vesicovaginal fistulas. The Supreme Court held that the trial court misstated and apparently misapplied the balancing test of S.C. R. Evid. 403, which states that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Because it was possible that the exclusion of the evidence in all probability affected the outcome of the jury's verdict and thereby constituted prejudicial error, the Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded.