Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Daniel Flickinger, a full-time litigator at Wainwright, Pope & McMeekin, P.C. (WPM), posted conservative political commentary on his personal social media. In June 2020, he posted a controversial message about George Floyd's death. Lawrence Tracy King, a partner at King Simmons Ford & Spree, P.C. (the King law firm), sent this post to Flickinger's supervising attorney, Lonnie Wainwright, expressing concern. Wainwright and other WPM partners, who were not familiar with social media, reviewed Flickinger's posts and asked him to resign, which he did.Flickinger sued King and the King law firm for defamation, invasion of privacy, and tortious interference with a business relationship. The Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed his claims, but the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the dismissal of the tortious interference claim and remanded the case. The King defendants then moved for summary judgment, arguing there was no substantial evidence that their actions caused Flickinger's damages. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the King defendants, concluding that the WPM partners' decision to terminate Flickinger was based on their independent review of his social media posts.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and affirmed the summary judgment for the King law firm, finding that King's actions were not within the scope of his employment and did not benefit the firm. However, the court reversed the summary judgment for King, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether King's actions were a substantial factor in Flickinger's termination and whether King was justified in sending the post. The case was remanded for further proceedings. The court also upheld the denial of Flickinger's motion to compel King's cellular-telephone records and his motion to continue the summary-judgment hearing. View "Flickinger v. King" on Justia Law

Yadira Ordonez, individually and as mother and next friend of her minor daughter, S.C.O., sued Capitol Farmers Market, Inc. (CFMI) in the Montgomery Circuit Court seeking damages for injuries S.C.O. sustained from hot soup purchased at Capitol International Market. CFMI moved for summary judgment, claiming it did not operate the market. Ordonez opposed the motion and requested more time for discovery. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CFMI, and Ordonez appealed.The trial court entered summary judgment for CFMI, finding that CFMI did not operate the grocery store or the deli where the incident occurred. Ordonez argued that more discovery was needed, particularly the deposition of CFMI's owner, John Yim, to test the veracity of his statements. The trial court denied Ordonez's motion for a continuance to conduct further discovery and granted summary judgment to CFMI.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and found that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying Ordonez's motion for a continuance under Rule 56(f) to take Yim's deposition. The court noted that the health department records and other evidence raised questions about CFMI's assertions that it had no employees and did not operate the grocery store or deli. The court concluded that Yim's deposition was critical to Ordonez's opposition to the summary judgment motion. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court's summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ordonez v. Capitol Farmers Market, Inc." on Justia Law

In December 2021, Officer Shelton Davis of the Montgomery Police Department, while pursuing a fleeing suspect, collided with Madilyn Shuford's vehicle at an intersection in Montgomery. Officer Davis was responding to a woman's plea for help, who claimed a man was trying to kill her. The suspect, Eugene Osborne Jr., fled in a vehicle, prompting Officer Davis to pursue him with activated lights and sirens. During the pursuit, Officer Davis slowed down at a red light but collided with Shuford's vehicle when she pulled into the intersection.Shuford sued the City of Montgomery and Officer Davis, alleging negligence and wanton conduct, and claimed the City was vicariously liable. The City and Officer Davis moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity under § 6-5-338, Ala. Code 1975, and Ex parte Cranman. They provided evidence, including Officer Davis's affidavit and body camera footage, showing he was performing his duties with activated lights and sirens. Shuford opposed, arguing Officer Davis did not use proper signals and took unreasonable risks.The Montgomery Circuit Court denied the summary judgment motion without explanation. The City and Officer Davis petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to vacate the denial and grant summary judgment based on immunity.The Supreme Court of Alabama granted the petition, holding that Officer Davis was entitled to immunity as he was performing his law enforcement duties and exercising judgment. The court found no substantial evidence from Shuford to refute this. Consequently, the City was also entitled to immunity. The trial court was directed to enter summary judgment in favor of the City and Officer Davis. View "Shuford v. City of Montgomery" on Justia Law

In the summer of 2023, Sharonda Smith's minor child, K.S., participated in a summer program at a school operated by the Jefferson County Board of Education. On June 5, 2023, K.S. fell asleep on a bus driven by "Mr. Josh" and suffered significant emotional distress, dehydration, and other personal injuries. Smith filed a lawsuit on May 10, 2024, against the Board, "Mr. Josh," and 10 fictitiously named defendants. The Board moved to dismiss the claims against it, citing State immunity.The Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed the claims against the Board on August 1, 2024, but allowed Smith additional time to identify and serve "Mr. Josh." Smith issued subpoenas to the Board for records related to the incident, which the Board moved to quash, arguing the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The court denied the motion and ordered the Board to comply with the subpoenas. Smith later identified "Mr. Josh" as Joshua Dunn and added his estate as a defendant. The Board petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to vacate the discovery orders and dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the only named defendant in the initial complaint, the Board, was entitled to State immunity, and "Mr. Josh" was a fictitiously named defendant. The court granted the Board's petition in part, directing the circuit court to vacate its discovery orders and refrain from issuing further orders against the Board. However, the court denied the Board's request to dismiss the entire action, as the Board, a nonparty, did not demonstrate a clear legal right to such relief. View "Ex parte Jefferson County Board of Education" on Justia Law

Andrew J. Scarborough, as the administrator of the estate of Timothy John Chumney, filed a lawsuit in the Montgomery Circuit Court against Wexford Health Sources, Inc., Deora Johnson, and Shari Barfield. The case involved allegations of negligence and medical malpractice following Chumney's suicide while incarcerated. The defendants initially did not object to the venue in their Rule 12 motions or answers. However, two years after the trial was first set, they moved to amend their answers to raise the defense of improper venue and filed a motion to transfer the case to Limestone Circuit Court. The Montgomery Circuit Court agreed and transferred the case.Scarborough petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the defendants had waived their defense of improper venue by not raising it earlier. The defendants contended that the transfer was mandatory under § 6-5-546 of the Alabama Medical Liability Act (AMLA), which they claimed allowed for a venue change at any time before trial.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the defendants had indeed waived their right to challenge the venue under Rule 12(h)(1)(A) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure by not including the defense in their initial motions. The court also clarified that § 6-5-546 of the AMLA did not apply because Scarborough did not allege that the acts or omissions occurred in more than one county. Therefore, the general timing provisions of Rule 12(h)(1) remained applicable.The Supreme Court of Alabama granted Scarborough's petition and issued a writ of mandamus directing the Montgomery Circuit Court to vacate its order transferring the case to Limestone Circuit Court. View "In re: Scarborough v. Wexford Health Sources" on Justia Law

JohnsonKreis Construction Company, Inc. ("JohnsonKreis") served as the general contractor on a hotel-construction project in Birmingham, with Howard Painting, Inc. ("Howard") as a subcontractor. The subcontract agreement included an indemnity provision requiring Howard to indemnify JohnsonKreis for personal injury or death arising from Howard's negligence. Domingo Rosales-Herrera, an employee of a subcontractor working for Howard, died after falling from a window while attempting to load equipment into a trash box on a telehandler owned by JohnsonKreis. The personal representative of Rosales-Herrera's estate filed a wrongful-death lawsuit against both JohnsonKreis and Howard.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Howard and its insurers, Auto-Owners Insurance Company and Owners Insurance Company (collectively "Owners"), determining that the indemnity provision in the subcontract agreement was legally unenforceable. The court held that Alabama law does not allow for the apportionment of damages in a wrongful-death case, thus precluding proportional indemnification.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the subcontract agreement's proportional indemnity provision was legally enforceable under Alabama law. The court noted that parties may enter into agreements allowing for indemnification even for claims resulting solely from the negligence of the indemnitee. The court emphasized that such agreements are valid and enforceable if expressed in clear and unequivocal language.The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, instructing the trial court to consider the parties' evidentiary submissions and arguments regarding the interpretation and application of the disputed provisions of the subcontract agreement and the additional-insured endorsement. View "JohnsonKreis Construction Company, Inc. v. Howard Painting, Inc." on Justia Law

Earnest Charles Jones was severely injured by a bull on August 27, 2018, and was transported by helicopter to the University of South Alabama Hospital. During the transport, flight nurse Bryan Heath Wester allegedly removed a nasal-gastro tube from Jones's throat, causing further injuries. Nearly two years later, Ovetta Jones, on behalf of Earnest, filed a lawsuit against Wester and Air Evac EMS, Inc., alleging negligence and wantonness related to the care provided during the transport.The Dallas Circuit Court initially reviewed the case, where the Joneses filed their complaint on August 24, 2020. The complaint focused on the removal of the nasal-gastro tube by Wester. Nearly four years later, the Joneses amended their complaint to include new allegations that Wester had stolen and replaced ketamine with saline solution the day before the transport, and that other flight nurses failed to detect this and properly treat Earnest's pain. Air Evac moved for summary judgment, arguing that the amended complaint was time-barred and did not relate back to the initial complaint. The trial court denied the motion.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the amended complaint did not arise from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the initial complaint. The amended complaint introduced entirely new facts and allegations, including actions by different individuals on a different day. Consequently, the amended complaint could not relate back to the initial complaint and was time-barred under the applicable statutes of limitations and repose. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted Air Evac's petition for a writ of mandamus, directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the summary judgment and to enter an order granting the motion. View "Ex parte Air Evac EMS, Inc." on Justia Law

Joyce Pates filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Community Health Systems, Inc. (CHSI), Affinity Hospital, LLC, d/b/a Grandview Medical Center, Dr. John Kirchner, and Southlake Orthopaedics Sports Medicine and Spine Center, P.C. Pates alleged that after injuring her ankle and undergoing surgery performed by Dr. Kirchner at Grandview Medical Center, she experienced complications leading to an infection and ultimately the amputation of her right leg.The Jefferson Circuit Court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss, which argued that Pates's claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations under the Alabama Medical Liability Act (AMLA). The court reasoned that Pates's injury began when she was informed of the need for amputation, thus starting the statute of limitations from that point.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that Pates's claims were indeed barred by the AMLA's statute of limitations. The court found that Pates's injuries, including signs of infection and the need for hardware removal, were evident by November 2020. Therefore, the statute of limitations began at that time, and Pates's complaint filed in February 2023 was outside the two-year limit. The court granted the petitions for writs of mandamus, directing the trial court to dismiss Pates's claims against the defendants. View "Ex parte Affinity Hospital, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2020, Sarah E. Martin was injured in a car accident involving an 18-wheel tractor-trailer driven by Charles Streeter, an employee of Al-Amin Brothers Transportation, LLC. Martin sued the LLC, several individuals, and 18 fictitiously named defendants. In January 2023, Martin settled with the original defendants, agreeing to release them and related parties from any claims arising from the accident. Subsequently, Martin amended her complaint to add PEI Ohio, Inc. and Premium Transportation Group, Inc. (the corporations) as defendants, alleging various negligence and breach of contract claims.The Jefferson Circuit Court enforced the settlement agreement in favor of the corporations, dismissed Martin's third amended complaint, and awarded attorney fees to the corporations. Martin filed a fourth amended complaint, which remains pending. The circuit court certified its orders as final under Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., and Martin appealed both the enforcement of the settlement and the attorney fee award.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in certifying the orders as final under Rule 54(b). The court found that the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims were closely related, the need for review might be mooted by future developments in the circuit court, and there was a possibility of having to consider the same issue again, particularly regarding attorney fees. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed Martin's appeals, emphasizing the preference to avoid piecemeal litigation and the need for a final judgment on all pending claims before appellate review. View "Martin v. PEI Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

Adam P. Harrington was injured on February 15, 2018, while using a swing rope to transfer from an offshore gas platform to a transport vessel. Harrington, employed by Skelton's Fire Equipment, Inc., was inspecting fire-suppression equipment on Exxon's platform. Due to rough seas, Harrington mistimed his swing and fractured his leg. His medical expenses were covered by Skelton's workers' compensation insurer.Harrington sued Exxon for maritime negligence and wantonness in the Mobile Circuit Court. Before trial, the court granted Harrington's motion to exclude evidence of his medical expenses being paid by the workers' compensation insurer. The jury found Exxon liable for $1,500,000 in damages, reduced by 10% for Harrington's fault, resulting in a $1,350,000 judgment. Exxon's postjudgment motion for a new trial, arguing the exclusion of evidence was erroneous, was denied.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. Exxon argued that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the workers' compensation payments, citing Alabama Code § 12-21-45. However, the court held that substantive maritime law, which includes the collateral-source rule, applied. This rule prevents the reduction of damages by amounts received from third parties, such as insurance. The court found that applying § 12-21-45 would conflict with maritime law.Exxon also claimed that Harrington's expert witness opened the door to admitting evidence of the workers' compensation payments. The court disagreed, stating that the expert's testimony did not justify introducing such evidence under the doctrine of curative admissibility.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Harrington and dismissed Harrington's conditional cross-appeal as moot. View "Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Harrington" on Justia Law