Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

James Olvey was killed when his vehicle was struck head on by a vehicle driven by Donald Wright II, who was driving the wrong way on Interstate 65 ("I-65") while attempting to flee the police. James Griffin, the personal representative of Olvey's estate, sued Wright, the City of Trafford ("Trafford"), the City of Warrior ("Warrior"), and other named and fictitiously named parties, alleging that they shared responsibility for Olvey's death. Over a year later, Griffin amended his complaint to substitute Trafford police officer Dylan McCoy and Warrior police officers Stephen Scott and James Henderson ("the defendant officers") for fictitiously named defendants. The defendant officers moved to enter a judgment in their favor, arguing that the amended complaint was untimely and thus barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court denied their motion, and the defendant officers petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for mandamus relief. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court determined Griffin had ample opportunity to discover the identities of the defendant officers before filing suit - and did not follow through. Therefore, he was not able to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations, and the defendant officers were entitled to the writ of mandamus. View "Ex parte McCoy, Scott, and Henderson." on Justia Law

Harbor Freight Tools USA, Inc. ("Harbor Freight"), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Lowndes Circuit Court to vacate its order granting a motion to compel discovery in an action Thomas and Juanita Webster ("the Websters") brought against Harbor Freight and others and to enter a protective order involving the requested discovery. The Websters previously hired Randall "Bubba" Wills and Jason Little to construct and install an elevator system in their house. In November 2016, Wills repaired the elevator system. To complete the repairs, Wills purchased from Harbor Freight a "Haul Master" 4,000-pound lifting block. According to Harbor Freight, its instruction manual for the lifting block expressly stated that the lifting block should not be used to transport people in an elevator system. Despite a posted warning, Wills tested the elevator system and rode in the elevator basket with Thomas Webster after Wills had installed the lifting block and completed the repairs. In December 2016, the Websters, along with their son Robbie, were riding in the elevator basket when it fell. To the extent that Harbor Freight sought mandamus relief on the grounds that the trial court's July 16, 2020, order granting the Websters' motion to compel failed to limit discovery, the Supreme Court determined the petition for mandamus relief was premature because Harbor Freight failed to seek a protective order raising the need for those limitations on discovery after the trial court entered the order granting the Websters' motion to compel. To the extent that Harbor Freight sought mandamus relief based on the trial court's implicit denial of its motion to adopt its proposed protective order, the Court determined Harbor Freight failed to demonstrate that any information that might be disclosed by providing the requested documents warrants the protections outlined in the proposed protective order. Accordingly, Harbor Freight's petition was denied. View "Ex parte Harbor Freight Tools USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Anthony Nix, a police officer for the City of Haleyville ("the City"), and the City appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of John Myers. Myers filed suit asserting claims of negligence, wantonness, and negligence per se against Officer Nix and, based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, the City. Myers also asserted that the City had negligently and/or wantonly hired, trained, and supervised Officer Nix. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the trial court reversibly erred by providing the trial court to provide to the jury a copy of the statutes upon which the jury had been charged. Accordingly, Officer Nix and the City were entitled to a reversal of the judgment and a new trial. View "Nix v. Myers" on Justia Law

Michael Brown petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Lee Circuit Court to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., the complaint filed against him by Christopher Beamon. Brown claimed the complaint should have been dismissed on the basis that the claims asserted in the complaint were barred by the applicable statute of limitations and that the doctrine of equitable tolling was inapplicable to suspend the running of the limitations period. IN 2017, pedestrian Beamon was injured when he was struck by a vehicle driven by Brown; the accident occurred in Auburn. In 2019, Beamon filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, naming as defendants Brown and Geico Casualty Company. In that complaint, Beamon asserted state-law claims and purported to invoke the federal court's diversity jurisdiction. Despite alleging diversity jurisdiction, the complaint stated that both Beamon and Brown were citizens of Alabama. Brown answered the complaint, asserting as a defense lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In his motion to dismiss, Brown asserted the federal court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the complaint because complete diversity of citizenship was lacking between him an Beamon. Beamon moved to amend his complaint, asserting Brown was a citizen of Georgia, or alternatively, if the evidence was insufficient to support diversity jurisdiction, the court allow equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, which would allow him to refile his claims in a state court. On November 22, 2019, while the federal case was pending, but after the two-year limitations period had run, Beamon filed a second complaint, this time in the Lee Circuit Court, asserting the same claims against Brown as he had asserted in the federal court. The federal court dismissed the complaint without prejudice. The Alabama Supreme Court determined Brown did not establish a clear legal right to dismissal of the complaint filed at circuit court. "This case does not come within the exception to the general rule that a petition for the writ of mandamus is not the appropriate means by which to seek review of the merits of an order denying a motion to dismiss." View "Ex parte Michael Brown." on Justia Law

The Health Care Authority for Baptist Health, an affiliate of UAB Health System ("HCA"), and The Health Care Authority for Baptist Health, an affiliate of UAB Health System d/b/a Prattville Baptist Hospital (collectively, "the HCA entities"), appealed a circuit court order denying their motion to compel arbitration in an action brought by Leonidas Dickson, II. In 2015, Dickson sustained injuries as a result of an automobile accident. Following the accident, Dickson was taken to Prattville Baptist Hospital ("PBH"), where he was treated and discharged. Dickson was partially covered by a health-insurance policy issued by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc. ("BCBS"). PBH was a party to a "Preferred Outpatient Facility Contract" ("the provider agreement") with BCBS, under which the medical care rendered to Dickson in the emergency department at PBH was reimbursable. In 2017, Dickson filed a complaint to challenge a reimbursement that PBH had received in exchange for Dickson's medical treatment. Dickson's complaint also sought to certify a class of people who were insured by BCBS and who had received care at any hospital operated by HCA's predecessor, Baptist Health, Inc. ("BHI"). After the HCA entities' motion to dismiss was denied, the HCA entities filed an answer to the lawsuit, but the answer did not raise arbitration as a defense. After a year of extensive discovery (including class certification and class-related discovery), the HCA entities moved to compel arbitration on grounds that Dickson's health-insurance policy with BCBS required all claims related to the policy to be arbitrated and that the provider agreement also provided for arbitration, contingent upon the arbitration requirements of the BCBS policy. The trial court denied the motion to compel without providing a reason for the denial. After a request for reconsideration was also denied, the HCA entities appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the HCA entities waived their right to arbitration, thus affirming the trial court order. View "The Health Care Authority for Baptist Health v. Dickson" on Justia Law

Varden Capital Properties, LLC ("Varden"), appealed an interlocutory circuit court order denying Varden's motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. Alexis Reese alleges that, on October 29, 2016, she suffered a fall on real property owned or maintained by Varden. On October 29, 2018, exactly two years later, on the last day before the statute of limitations expired, Reese sued Varden, alleging negligence and wantonness. Reese did not request the circuit clerk to serve the complaint and summons by certified mail. Instead, she submitted a summons along with her complaint indicating that a private process server would be used to accomplish service. A process server served the complaint and summons at an address in Montgomery on February 6, 2019, 100 days after the complaint was filed. The address to which the materials were served was not Varden's; notwithstanding, Varden learned of the suit and appeared for the sole purpose of filing a motion to quash service. The trial court gave Reese more time to serve Varden's agent at the correct address. On June 14, 2019, Reese served Varden by certified mail by the deadline set by the trial court. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, finding that although Reese used a process server in an attempt to ensure that service was made at the correct address, she pointed to no evidence of intent, no evidence establishing when she hired a process server, and no evidence demonstrating that any steps at all were taken to discover the proper address for service. Indeed, even 100 days after filing the complaint, she simply served it at the incorrect address she had when the complaint was filed, "indicating that any effort to identify the correct address was minimal at best." View "Varden Capital Properties, LLC v. Reese" on Justia Law

Mark Caton appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of the City of Pelham ("the City"), in his action alleging retaliatory discharge against the City. In approximately 2001, he was hired as a police officer by the City. In 2004, while he was still a police officer, Caton injured his neck when he was wrestling with a suspect. Caton did not receive treatment for his neck at the time, but the pain from the injury gradually increased. In April 2006, Caton transferred from the Police Department to the Pelham Fire Department. In 2012, Caton had a vertebrae-fusion surgery. In 2015 and 2016, Caton would have periods of excruciating pain leading to unexcused absences from work. He received reprimands and suspensions. Caton would consult with multiple doctors and pain specialists for rehabilitation therapy and pain management each time he was reinjured as a result of his work. In 2016, Caton was referred to Dr. Michelle Turnley, a physiatrist at the Workplace Occupational Health Clinic located on the campus of the University of Alabama at Birmingham ("UAB"). Dr. Turnley and Caton tell differing stories of an encounter at the UAB clinic September 2016. Caton testified that he asked Dr. Turnley for pain medication for the next time his pain became too intense, but Dr. Turnley reminded Caton that on his first visit he had not signed a pain contract and he had refused to provide a urine sample, so she declined to give him pain medication. Caton denied the doctor's account, but Dr. Turnley's clinical notes described her encounter with Caton as him being "fairly aggressive requesting pain medication... he was fairly loud and refused to leave the clinic and UAB police were called. ... He did not appear to have any functional deficits. Additionally, someone in the waiting room saw him sling the door open like he was about to 'pull it off the hinges'; therefore, obviously he has no strength deficits." In October, Dr. Turnley sent Caton a letter dropping him as a patient. By November, the City terminated Caton's employment, citing in part, the visit to Dr. Turnley's office. His unemployment application was denied because of his discharge from the City for misconduct. Caton sued, alleging procedural issues with the unemployment compensation hearing, adding a retaliatory-discharge claim. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the City, finding Caton had a full opportunity to litigate his retaliatory-discharge claim at the unemployment hearing, thus he was barred from raising it again by collateral estoppel. The Alabama Supreme Court determined application of collateral estoppel did not violate Caton's right to a trial by jury, and concurred estoppel barred his retaliatory-discharge claim against the City. "Caton does not present any other reason why the trial court's judgment should be reversed. Therefore, we affirm summary judgment in favor of the City." View "Caton v. City of Pelham" on Justia Law

Winston Guthrie sued David Ray Fanning seeking damages for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and defamation. In August 2009, Guthrie entered a guilty plea to the charges of sodomy and sexual abuse of several minor boys, including Fanning's son ("the victim"). Guthrie was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment; that sentence was split and Guthrie served 1 year followed by 3 years' supervised probation. As a convicted sex offender, Guthrie was required to comply with all parts of the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act ("the ASORCNA"). At issue in this appeal was section 15-20A- 16(c), Ala. Code 1975, a part of the ASORCNA, which provided that "[n]o sex offender shall make any harassing communication, directly or indirectly, in person or through others, by phone, mail, or electronic means to the victim or any immediate family member of the victim." Any person who knowingly violated section 15-20A-16(c) was guilty of a Class C felony. In April 2018, Guthrie sent a letter addressed to Fanning and Fanning's wife that Fanning perceived as harassing. A district-court magistrate issued a complaint against Guthrie charging him with the offense of harassing communications, a violation of section 13A-11-8(b)(1)(a), Ala. Code 1975, which is a Class C misdemeanor. The district attorney assigned to prosecute the case determined that Guthrie should not have been charged with the misdemeanor offense of harassing communications, instead, he should have been charged with the felony offense of contacting the victim's family with the intent to harass under the ASORCNA. At that time, Guthrie also had another indictment pending charging him with two counts of failing to properly register as a sex offender as required by the ASORCNA. Guthrie entered into a plea agreement as to the ASORCNA violations, and he was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment; that sentence was split, and Guthrie was ordered to serve one year in a community-corrections program followed by four years' probation. While serving time in the community-corrections program, acting pro se, Guthrie sued Fanning seeking the damages at issue in this appeal. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Fanning in the defamation case. Finding no reversible error, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed judgment. View "Guthrie v. Fanning" on Justia Law

Law firm Petway Olsen, LLC, petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to set aside its order granting the motion filed by Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC ("MBUSA"), seeking to disqualify the firm from representing the plaintiffs in the underlying case and to enter an order allowing the firm to represent the plaintiffs. In 2017, Valisha Cartwell was driving a 1998 Mercedes ML320. As she was pulling into a parking space in front a dental office operated by Vital Smiles Alabama, P.C., the vehicle suddenly accelerated and crashed into the front of the dental office, killing a six-year-old child and injuring others. Grelinda Lee, as personal representative of the child's estate, sued Cartwell and the owner of the Mercedes ML320 (and other fictitiously named defendants) for wrongful death. An amended complaint added Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC. The second amended complaint was signed by D. Bruce Petway of Petway Olsen and included the names of other attorneys with different law firms who were also representing the plaintiffs. Both Mercedes-Benz U.S. International, Inc. ("MBUSI") and MBUSA asserted as a defense that Petway Olsen was "disqualified [from representing the plaintiffs] because one of its members [was] a former in-house attorney and general counsel for MBUSI." After review, the Supreme Court determined the trial court erred when it granted MBUSA's motion to disqualify Petway Olsen from representing the plaintiffs. The petition for mandamus relief was granted and the trial court directed to vacate its previous order granting MBUSA's motion. View "Ex parte Petway Olsen, LLC." on Justia Law

Henry Bradshaw, a defendant in a personal–injury action, petitioned for mandamus relief to direct the circuit court to vacate its order denying his motion to dismiss the claims of plaintiff, Princeton Gregory, and to enter an order dismissing Gregory's claims against Bradshaw for lack of personal jurisdiction. The parties were involved in a car accident in Mississippi. Gregory was a resident of Mobile, Alabama; Bradshaw was a resident of Florida. Bradshaw entered a limited appearance in the negligence action brought against him for the purpose of asking the court to dismiss the claims. Bradshaw argued that Gregory's complaint failed to allege that Bradshaw's contacts with Alabama were sufficient to support personal jurisdiction over him. Relying on Bradshaw's deposition testimony, Gregory filed a further response in opposition to Bradshaw's amended motion to dismiss in which he argued that Bradshaw's connection to and activities in Alabama, as described above, were sufficient to suggest that Bradshaw should have anticipated that he might be sued in Alabama or, at the very least, created a jury question on the issue of general personal jurisdiction. The trial court apparently agreed and, following a hearing, denied Bradshaw's motion to dismiss. After review of the facts entered in the circuit court record, the Alabama Supreme Court disagreed with the circuit court's conclusion, finding Bradshaw demonstrated a clear lack of general personal jurisdiction over him in connection with Gregory's claims. The Court thus granted Bradshaw's petition for mandamus relief. View "Ex parte Henry W. Bradshaw." on Justia Law