Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Alabama
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A wrongful-death medical-malpractice action was initiated by Donna Ratliff, representing the estate of Rhoda Gail McBride, against Dr. Frances Koe and Wills Valley Family Medicine, LLC. McBride had sought treatment for leg pain and was diagnosed with a blood clot, for which she was prescribed Coumadin, a blood thinner. McBride's daughter, Ratliff, claimed that neither she nor McBride were adequately informed about the necessity of regular blood tests to monitor the medication's effects. McBride subsequently suffered a fatal brain bleed due to "Coumadin toxicity."The DeKalb Circuit Court jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Koe and Wills Valley. However, the trial court granted Ratliff's motion for a new trial, vacating the jury's verdict. The trial court concluded that the defendants had not presented sufficient evidence to support their contributory-negligence defense, which alleged that McBride's failure to attend follow-up appointments contributed to her death.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's judgment. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the contributory-negligence defense, including testimony that McBride had been informed about the need for regular blood tests and the dangers of Coumadin. The court held that the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence and that the trial court had erred in granting a new trial. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Koe v. Ratliff" on Justia Law

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In this case, an automobile collision occurred on November 5, 2018, involving Raymond and Florence Trigger, who were struck by a truck driven by Benjamin C. Deese. Florence died at the scene, and Raymond succumbed to his injuries in January 2019. Jerald Brown, as the administrator of both estates, sued Deese for wrongful death, alleging negligence and wantonness. The jury awarded $50,000 for Florence's death and $1 for Raymond's death. Brown moved for a new trial, arguing that the $1 award was inadequate and violated equal protection principles. The Houston Circuit Court granted the motion for a new trial, and Deese appealed.The Houston Circuit Court had initially instructed the jury on negligence, wantonness, contributory negligence, and damages, including nominal damages. The jury's initial verdict awarded $0 for Raymond's death, which the court rejected, instructing the jury that a $0 award was not permissible. The jury then awarded $1 for Raymond's death. Brown's motion for a new trial argued that the $1 award was inadequate and inconsistent with the $50,000 award for Florence's death. The trial court granted the motion without stating reasons.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's order. The Court held that the adequacy of punitive damages in wrongful-death cases is not subject to review, as established in Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Street. The Court also found that the jury's verdicts were not inconsistent, as the jury was instructed, without objection, that it could award different amounts for each death. The Court concluded that the trial court exceeded its discretion in granting a new trial and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment on the jury's verdicts. View "Deese v. Brown" on Justia Law

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Lavonne S. Mottern died after receiving a contaminated intravenous injection at Princeton Medical Center, operated by Baptist Health System, Inc. (BHS). Donald J. Mottern, as administrator of Lavonne's estate, filed claims against BHS, Meds I.V., LLC (the manufacturer of the injection), and three individuals associated with Meds I.V. The claims against Meds I.V. and the individuals were settled, leaving only the claims against BHS, which included negligence, wantonness, a claim under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine (AEMLD), and a breach of implied warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).The Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed all of Mottern's claims against BHS, including the negligence and wantonness claims, which BHS conceded should not have been dismissed. BHS argued that the AEMLD and UCC claims were subject to the Alabama Medical Liability Act (AMLA) and required proof of a breach of the standard of care. The trial court agreed and dismissed these claims, leading to Mottern's appeal.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and agreed with BHS that all of Mottern's claims, including those under the AEMLD and UCC, are subject to the AMLA's standard-of-care provisions. The court held that the AMLA applies to all actions for medical injury, regardless of the theory of liability, and requires proof of a breach of the standard of care. The court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the negligence and wantonness claims and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The main holding is that the AMLA's standard-of-care provisions apply to all claims alleging medical injury, including those under the AEMLD and UCC. View "Mottern v. Baptist Health System, Inc." on Justia Law

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A Florida resident, Sheri Sawyer, acting as the personal representative of her deceased son Thomas's estate, filed a product-liability lawsuit against Cooper Tire & Rubber Company in the Mobile Circuit Court. The case arose from a fatal single-vehicle accident in Mobile County, Alabama, where a tire manufactured by Cooper Tire allegedly experienced tread separation, causing the vehicle to crash. The tire was purchased in Alabama by Barbara Coggin, the mother of the driver, Joseph Coggin, both Alabama residents.Cooper Tire moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Alabama courts lacked specific personal jurisdiction over it due to insufficient suit-related contacts with Alabama. Sawyer countered that Cooper Tire's extensive business activities in Alabama, including the sale, distribution, and advertising of the tire model in question, established sufficient contacts. While the motion was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, which held that specific personal jurisdiction could exist even without a direct causal link between the defendant's forum activities and the plaintiff's claims.The Mobile Circuit Court granted Cooper Tire's motion to dismiss, concluding that Sawyer failed to show that Cooper Tire sold, distributed, or marketed the specific tire model in Alabama within three years before the accident. The court also noted that neither Sawyer nor her son were Alabama residents, reducing Alabama's interest in providing a forum for the case. Sawyer appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the lower court's decision, applying the analytical framework from Ford. The court held that Cooper Tire's sale, distribution, and advertising of the tire model in Alabama "related to" Sawyer's claims, establishing specific personal jurisdiction. The court also found that the trial court's focus on the timing of Cooper Tire's contacts and Sawyer's residency was not dispositive. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Sawyer v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Company" on Justia Law

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Catalina Estillado died from injuries sustained in a workplace accident at ABC Polymer Industries, LLC. Her spouse, Crescencio Pablo, filed a wrongful-death claim against her coworkers, Dean Leader and William Durall, alleging their willful conduct caused her death by removing a safety guard from the machine involved. The Jefferson Circuit Court found in favor of Pablo, awarding $3 million in damages. Leader and Durall appealed.The circuit court determined that the machine was originally manufactured with a safety gate interlocked with a limit switch, which was later removed. The court concluded that Durall had effectively "removed" the safety device by not reinstalling it and by training employees to bypass it. The court also found that Durall knew injury was likely from this removal and that the removal was not part of a modification that rendered the safety device unnecessary.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It found that while the machine was originally manufactured with the safety device, there was no evidence that Durall knew the safety gate should be interlocked with a limit switch when he inspected and installed the machine. The court also noted that instructing employees to bypass a safety device does not equate to its removal under § 25-5-11(c)(2), referencing the precedent set in Williams v. Price. Additionally, Durall had left ABC Polymer before Estillado was hired and did not train her.The court concluded that Pablo failed to prove Durall willfully and intentionally removed the safety device. Consequently, the judgment against Durall was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. The appeal by Leader was dismissed due to his bankruptcy discharge. View "Leader v. Pablo" on Justia Law

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Keith Edward Myers posted a negative online review about the legal services provided by Jerry M. Blevins. Blevins, representing himself, sued Myers in the Elmore Circuit Court for defamation per se, invasion of privacy, wantonness, and negligence, seeking damages and injunctive relief. The court sealed the case record and, after unsuccessful attempts to serve Myers, allowed service by publication. Myers did not respond, leading to a default judgment awarding Blevins $500,000 in compensatory damages, $1.5 million in punitive damages, and a permanent injunction against Myers.Myers later appeared in court, filing motions to unseal the record and set aside the default judgment, arguing improper service and venue, among other issues. The trial court unsealed the record but did not rule on the motion to set aside the default judgment. Myers filed for bankruptcy, temporarily staying proceedings, but the bankruptcy case was dismissed. Myers then filed a notice of appeal and a renewed motion to stop execution on his property, which the trial court granted, staying execution pending the appeal.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. The court dismissed Myers's direct appeal as untimely regarding the default judgment and premature concerning the Rule 60(b) motion, which remained pending in the trial court. The court also dismissed Myers's challenge to the sealing of the record, noting that the trial court had already unsealed it, rendering the issue moot.Blevins's petition for a writ of mandamus to vacate the trial court's order quashing writs of execution was also dismissed as moot. The Supreme Court's resolution of the direct appeal allowed trial court proceedings, including Blevins's execution efforts, to resume, thus granting Blevins the relief he sought. View "Myers v. Blevins" on Justia Law

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The case involves a wrongful-death action initiated by Veronica Edwards and Corey D. Hatcher, Sr., following the death of Corey Demills Hatcher, Jr. The deceased died from injuries sustained when his vehicle collided with horses on a road. The plaintiffs sued the owners of the horses, Kimberly Johnson Crowder and Carole A. Phillipsen, as well as Southern Sportsman Hunting Lodge, Inc., its owners, and the McCurdy Plantation Horse Association, which hosted a trail ride on Southern Sportsman's property. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to use proper fencing to corral the horses, leading to the accident.The Lowndes Circuit Court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court determined that the plaintiffs' wrongful-death claim was the exclusive remedy available under Alabama Code § 3-5-3(a), which provides a cause of action against livestock owners who knowingly or willfully place their animals on a public highway. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to produce substantial evidence to support their claim that the defendants knowingly placed the horses on the highway.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court's judgment. The court clarified that § 3-5-3(a) creates a cause of action that did not exist at common law, rather than shielding certain defendants from liability. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to present substantial evidence that the defendants knowingly placed the horses on the highway, as required by § 3-5-3(a). Therefore, the plaintiffs could not pursue any cause of action against the defendants. View "Edwards v. Crowder" on Justia Law

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In this case, an automobile repair technician, Donijah Virgo, was injured when his stalled vehicle was hit by a car driven by Heather Michelle Roberts while he was attempting to push it across a road. Virgo sued Roberts for negligence, but the Mobile Circuit Court granted Roberts a partial summary judgment, dismissing Virgo's counterclaim. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the lower court's decision.In October 2020, Virgo was diagnosing a mechanical problem in a Crown Victoria automobile. The car stalled on a road, and he moved it into a median left-turn lane. After waiting for about 10 minutes for traffic to clear, Virgo attempted to push the car across the road, during which Roberts's vehicle collided with it, resulting in major damage and serious injuries to Virgo.Roberts sued Virgo for negligence and wantonness and sought uninsured motorist benefits from GEICO Casualty Company. Virgo filed a counterclaim alleging negligence on Roberts's part. After settling the claim against GEICO, Roberts moved for a summary judgment on Virgo's counterclaim, which the circuit court granted.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court concluded that Virgo failed to present substantial evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding his counterclaim, and thus, the circuit court did not err in granting a summary judgment in favor of Roberts. View "Virgo v. Roberts" on Justia Law

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In this case from the Supreme Court of Alabama, the court held that the Majestic Mississippi, LLC ("Majestic") and Linda Parks did not owe any duty of care to the passengers on a charter bus that crashed en route to Majestic's casino. The bus was chartered by Linda Parks, a resident of Huntsville, to transport herself, family members, friends, and acquaintances from Huntsville and Decatur to the casino. The bus was owned by Teague VIP Express, LLC, a separate entity. As a result of the accident, Betty Russell, an occupant of the bus, was killed, and other occupants, including Joseph J. Sullivan and Rachel W. Mastin, were injured. Felecia Sykes, as administrator of the estate of Russell, and Sullivan and Mastin, sued Majestic and Parks on various theories of negligence and wantonness.The court found that Majestic did not have a duty to provide accurate weather information to the passengers. The court also found that Majestic did not have a duty to conduct due diligence on the bus company before allowing it to transport patrons to its casino. Moreover, Parks did not have a duty to ensure the safety of the bus passengers. The court further held that no joint venture existed between Majestic, Parks, and Teague VIP Express.Thus, the court affirmed the lower court's decision granting summary judgments in favor of Majestic and Parks. View "Sykes v. Majestic Mississippi, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Alabama granted a writ of mandamus to Triad of Alabama, LLC, doing business as Flowers Hospital, in a personal-injury lawsuit filed by Voncille and Don Askew. The Askews sued Triad after Voncille fell and sustained serious injuries at the hospital while undergoing treatment for COVID-19. In response, Triad asserted an affirmative defense of civil immunity under the Alabama COVID-19 Immunity Act (ACIA). The Askews moved to strike this defense, arguing that their claims were related to the hospital's failure to maintain safe premises and not to any health emergency related to COVID-19. The trial court granted the Askews' motion, prompting Triad to petition the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus.The Supreme Court found that Triad was entitled to immunity under the ACIA as Voncille's injury occurred in connection with her treatment for COVID-19 at the hospital. The court held that any claim that arises from or is related to COVID-19 falls under the immunity provisions of the ACIA, rejecting the Askews' argument that the Act's immunity provisions only apply to claims expressly related to exposure or contraction of COVID-19 or efforts to prevent its spread. Therefore, the court directed the trial court to vacate its order striking Triad's affirmative defense under the ACIA. View "Ex parte Triad of Alabama, LLC" on Justia Law