Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Lincare Inc. and one of its employees, Angela Stewart, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its denial of their motion to dismiss certain tort claims asserted against them in the complaint filed by former Lincare employee Sandra Martin and to enter an order dismissing those claims and, as to any claims not subject to dismissal, to vacate its denial of their motion to strike Martin's jury demand as to those claims and to enter an order granting that motion. Stewart was Martin's supervisor. According to the allegations in Martin's complaint, in 2014, Martin submitted a letter of resignation to Stewart. Martin alleged that she resigned because Stewart had created "a difficult work environment." Martin's action alleged a claim for workers' compensation benefits against Lincare, a claim of assault and battery against Stewart and Lincare, and a tort-of-outrage claim against Stewart and Lincare. After review of Lincare and Stewart's arguments, the Alabama Supreme Court granted their petition with respect to the trial court's failure to dismiss Martin's tort claims because those claims were subsumed under the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. The petition was denied with respect to the motion to dismiss Martin's tort-of-outrage claim against Stewart, and with respect to the trial court's failure to strike Martin's jury demand regarding her claims against Stewart. View "Ex parte Lincare Inc." on Justia Law

Consolidated appeals arose from the death of four-year-old Nevaeh Johnson in a fire that destroyed her family's mobile home in May 2011. Following Nevaeh's death, Nevaeh's mother, Latosha Hosford; Latosha's husband, Chad Barley ("Barley"); and Nevaeh's grandmother, Rhonda Hosford ("Hosford"), sued multiple parties, of note, BRK Brands, Inc. ("BRK"), the manufacturer of two smoke alarms in the mobile home at the time of the fire. The plaintiffs alleged that BRK was responsible for Nevaeh's death inasmuch as a BRK-manufactured ionization smoke alarm allegedly did not respond to smoke caused by the fire and sound an alarm in time to allow Nevaeh to escape. In appeal no. 1140899, Latosha appealed the judgment as a matter of law entered on her failure-to-warn, negligence, and wantonness claims, as well as a judgment entered on the jury's verdict following the trial of her products-liability claim brought under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine ("AEMLD"). In appeal no. 1140901, Latosha and Hosford, as co-administratrixes of Nevaeh's estate, appealed the judgment as a matter of law entered on their breach-of-warranty claim seeking compensatory damages on behalf of Nevaeh for pain and mental anguish she allegedly suffered before her death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that with respect to Latosha's AEMLD claim, she did not submit evidence identifying a safer, practical, alternative design that BRK could have used for the ionization smoke alarms purchased by Barley for use in the mobile home; accordingly, BRK was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on that claim. Inasmuch as Latosha and Hosford conceded that the Supreme Court need not consider any of the other judgments entered by the trial court if the judgment entered on the AEMLD claim was affirmed, the Court affirmed those other judgments. View "Hosford v. BRK Brands, Inc." on Justia Law

Jason Elkins and his wife Paula appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Stanley Maguire, Gabriel Collins, and Jeff Carroll. TDY Industries, LLC ("TDY"), hired Jason as a screener operator in 1998. Jason Elkins operated various pieces of machinery in the course of his employment, including a "manipulator." While he was operating the manipulator to dump powder from a drum, the manipulator rose and hit him under the chin and then descended and hit him in the head. Jason filed a workers' compensation action against TDY seeking benefits for his work-related injury. He later amended his complaint to add Paula as a plaintiff and to sue his co-workers Maguire, Collins and Carroll based upon the theory that the co-employees removed a safety device and that the removal of that safety device proximately caused Jason's injury. The trial court granted TDY's motion to dismiss counts two through five of the Elkinses' complaint as amended as to TDY. On that same day, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the co-employees as to count two of the Elkinses' amended complaint. The trial court certified the judgment as to count two as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. After the trial court entered its Rule 54(b) order, and the Elkinses appealed the summary judgment in favor of the co-employees. The Alabama Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial court: (1) for the trial court to make an interlocutory order of December 28, 2015, a final judgment as to the co-employees relative to counts three, four, and five pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.; (2) for the trial court to adjudicate the remaining claims against all parties, thus making the interlocutory order of December 28, 2015, final and appealable; or (3) for the trial court to take no action, in which event the appeal would be dismissed as being from a nonfinal judgment. View "Elkins v. Carroll" on Justia Law

The Town of Mosses and its chief of police Jimmy Harris, separately petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Lowndes Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor on certain claims asserted against them by Geraldine Grant Bryson. The Court consolidated their petitions for the purpose of writing one opinion. At the time of the events giving rise to this action, Bryson operated an entertainment venue known as "The Spot." Bryson described "The Spot" as a "community center for all activities." Bryson requested that the Town grant her a liquor license, but the Town's council denied her request. In 2010, Bryson rented "The Spot" to a deejay, who planned to host a "beer bash" on its premises. Approximately 200 people turned out for the event even though the entertainment portion of the event was ultimately canceled by the deejay. Although Bryson, who was at "The Spot" on the night of the event, testified that she did not see anyone consuming alcoholic beverages at the event, she acknowledged that the deejay hosting the event had brought alcohol that he planned to "give ... away [to] the community for showing support for the center." The mayor saw one of the deejay's flyers promoting the event. The mayor, in turn, notified Harris. Harris saw one of the flyers, organized a task force of officers from multiple law-enforcement agencies, and entered "The Spot," observing alcohol being consumed. Bryson was ultimately arrested for selling alcohol without a license. The charges against Bryson were later dismissed because the Town was unable to produce a witness who could testify to paying an admission to "The Spot" and drinking alcohol on the premises. Bryson sued the Town and Harris asserting claims of malicious prosecution, false arrest, false imprisonment, harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, libel, and slander. When the trial court denied the Town and Harris' motions to dismiss, they sought mandamus relief. The Alabama Supreme Court directed the trial court to vacate its order denying Harris's summary-judgment motion as to the false-arrest, false-imprisonment, and malicious-prosecution claims and to enter a summary-judgment for Harris on those grounds. To the extent Harris sought mandamus review of intentional infliction of emotional distress, harassment, libel, and slander, the petition was denied. The trial court was further directed to vacate its order denying the Town's summary-judgment motion and to enter a summary judgment for the Town as to each claim asserted against it. View "Ex parte Town of Mosses." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Florian Hinrichs was riding in the front passenger seat of a 2004 GMC Sierra 1500 pickup truck that was owned and operated by his friend Daniel Vinson when they were involved in a motor-vehicle accident. Kenneth Smith was driving under the influence of alcohol and ran a stop sign, colliding with the passenger-side door of the Sierra. The Sierra rolled over twice, but landed on its wheels. Hinrichs suffered a spinal cord injury in the accident that left him a quadriplegic. The accident occurred in Geneva County. Hinrichs alleged that his injuries were caused by the defective design of the roof of the Sierra that allowed the roof over the passenger compartment to collapse during the rollover and by the defective design of the seat belt in the Sierra, which failed to restrain him. At the time of the accident, Hinrichs, a German citizen, was a member of the German military; he had been assigned to Fort Rucker for flight training. He and Vinson were in the same training program. Vinson had purchased the Sierra at Hill Buick, Inc., d/b/a O'Reilly Pontiac-Buick-GMC and/or Hill Pontiac-Buick-GMC in Pennsylvania in 2003. He drove it to Alabama in 2006 when he was assigned to Fort Rucker. General Motors Corporation, known as Motors Liquidation Company after July 9, 2009 ("GM"), designed the Sierra. GM Canada, whose principal place of business was in Ontario, Canada, manufactured certain parts of the Sierra, assembled the vehicle, and sold it to GM in Canada, where title transferred. GM then distributed the Sierra for sale in the United States through a GM dealer. The Sierra ultimately was delivered to the O'Reilly dealership for sale. Finding that the trial court properly concluded it lacked general nor specific jurisdiction over GM Canada, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of GM Canada from this case. View "Hinrichs v. General Motors of Canada, Ltd." on Justia Law

Sabrina Jackson, as the administratrix of the estate of Tony Lewis, Jr., deceased, filed a verified petition requesting preaction discovery from defendants the City of Montgomery ("the City") and QCHC, Inc., a/k/a Quality Correctional Health Care ("Quality"). Lewis was being held in the Montgomery municipal jail when he died unexpectedly on the night of January 12, 2015, or the early morning hours of January 13, 2015. Petitioner believed jail authorities and health care personnel were negligent and deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of Lewis, and thereby denied him treatment needed to save his life, if said treatment had been administered promptly. The petition also alleged that Lewis was given some medication by the health care personnel, which may have caused him to stop breathing, and that this act "may have amounted to negligent malpractice and/or deliberate indifference." The circuit court granted the preaction discovery petition, but the defendants applied for mandamus relief. The Supreme Court granted the petitions and issued the writs, finding that Jackson could not establish that she was unable to bring an action or that preaction discovery was necessary to preserve evidence in her case. View "Ex parte QCHC, Inc., a/k/a Quality Correctional Health Care." on Justia Law

Defendant Kelly Lucas applied for mandamus relief, requesting that the Alabama Supreme Court direct Shelby Circuit Court to vacate its December 7, 2015, order denying her motion for a summary judgment and to grant the motion. This application arose out of the court case surrounding two related automobile accidents in 2011: in the first, Megan Gragg failed to stop her vehicle and allowed the front bumper of her vehicle to collide with the rear bumper of Diana McKee's vehicle. Shortly thereafter, in the second accident, Lucas failed to stop her vehicle and allowed the front bumper of her vehicle to collide with the rear bumper of Gragg's vehicle, which then collided with the rear bumper of McKee's vehicle a second time. All three drivers spoke with the law enforcement officer who responded after the accidents, and the officer later completed two accident reports. McKee sued Gragg, alleging negligence and wantonness in connection with the accidents. Lucas filed an answer to the amended complaint. She denied McKee's allegations and also asserted affirmative defenses, including the expiration of the statute of limitations. After review of the trial court record, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that Lucas met her burden for mandamus relief, and that the Circuit Court erred in denying her motion for summary judgment. The Court therefore granted Lucas' application and issued the writ. The Circuit Court was directed to vacate its order and enter summary judgment in Lucas' favor. View "Ex parte Kelly Martin Lucas." on Justia Law

Regions Bank appealed a circuit court order denying its motion to compel arbitration. In October 2011, Mary Rice opened both a savings account and a checking account with Regions. Rice opened each account by signing a one-page signature card indicating that she was agreeing to certain terms. Among other things, the signature cards referred to a Deposit Agreement, the terms of which contained the arbitration clause at issue here. In March 2015, Rice sued Regions, alleging that Regions was liable for a fall she suffered on Regions' premises. Regions filed a motion to compel arbitration, citing the arbitration provision in the deposit agreement. Rice opposed the motion to compel arbitration, arguing that her claim was beyond the scope of the arbitration provision in the Deposit Agreement. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the arbitration clause at issue clearly and unmistakably delegated questions of substantive arbitrability of matters between the parties to the arbitrator. Pursuant to the delegation provision, the arbitrator had to resolve the disputed issue whether Rice's claim is arbitrable under the arbitration provision. View "Regions Bank v. Rice" on Justia Law

CVS Pharmacy, L.L.C. ("CVS"), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Montgomery Circuit Court to dismiss the complaint of the plaintiff Mildred Scott, as untimely filed. Scott filed a complaint asserting negligence and wantonness claims against CVS after she slipped and fell in a CVS store while shopping. Scott did not pay a filing fee when she filed the complaint; she filed an "Affidavit of Substantial Hardship," indicating that she was unable to pay the filing fee. The circuit court entered an order purporting to declare Scott indigent and to waive the filing fee. On that same day, the summons against CVS was issued, and CVS was served with the summons and complaint. A few days after the complaint was served, the circuit court entered an order reversing its earlier order, and denying Scott's affidavit of substantial hardship. Several days after this, Scott paid the filing fee. CVS moved to dismiss Scott's complaint on the ground that the applicable two-year statutory limitations period had expired without the payment of the filing fee or the approval of Scott's affidavit of substantial hardship. The circuit court denied CVS's motion to dismiss. Finding that the circuit court erred in this dismissal, the Supreme Court granted CVS' writ application. View "Ex parte CVS Pharmacy, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Once Upon a Time,LLC ("OUAT"), appealed by permission a circuit court decision denying OUAT's motion seeking a summary judgment on the third-party complaint filed against it by Chappelle Properties, LLC ("Chappelle"). Chappelle owned a building in Birmingham containing at least two commercial retail spaces. Chappelle and OUAT entered into a commercial lease agreement in which Chappelle agreed to lease one of the commercial retail spaces to OUAT. The agreement contained an indemnity clause. Deborah Anderson worked for OUAT as a sales clerk. In late 2011, the OUAT retail space was flooded with contaminated water. Certain items of OUAT's inventory were moved from the OUAT retail space to Chappelle's vacant commercial retail space. Although Anderson was not working on the day of the incident, in the days following she counted inventory that had been moved to the vacant retail space. In late 2013, Anderson filed a complaint alleging that she had suffered a bacterial infection caused by her handling the allegedly contaminated OUAT inventory stored in the vacant retail space following the flood of the OUAT-leased retail space. In 2014, Chappelle filed a third-party complaint against OUAT and its managers that sought, among other things, indemnification pursuant to the indemnity clause in the agreement. OUAT alleged that the indemnity clause in the agreement did not cover the claims asserted by Anderson in her complaint. After review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order denying OUAT's summary-judgment motion. The Court held that the indemnity clause should not have been interpreted to include incidents occurring in the vacant retail space. View "Once Upon a Time, LLC v. Chappelle Properties, LLC" on Justia Law