Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Wayne Farms, LLC, petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus ordering the Bullock Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Wayne Farms' motion for a change of venue and to enter an order transferring the underlying action to the Pike Circuit Court. Ben and Imogene Hicks owned and operated a chicken farm in Pike County. In April 2013, Imogene entered into an agreement in which Wayne Farms agreed to deliver flocks of broiler chicks to the Hickses' farm. Ronnie King, an employee of Wayne Farms, drove a tractor-trailer owned by Wayne Farms to the Hickses' farm to pick up a load of chickens. After the chickens were loaded, King began to drive the tractor-trailer away. Before King left the Hickses' property, the loaded trailer detached from the tractor and overturned, pinning Ben to the ground and causing him to be injured. Ben and Imogene sued Wayne Farms and King in Bullock County, alleging claims of negligence and wantonness and seeking damages for Ben's injuries. Wayne Farms moved the Bullock Circuit Court to transfer the action to the Pike Circuit Court, acknowledging that venue was proper in Bullock County but that pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens the action should have been transferred to Pike County. The Alabama Supreme Court granted the writ, concluding Wayne Farms demonstrated a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus directing the Bullock Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Wayne Farms' motion for a change of venue and to enter an order transferring the underlying action to Pike County. View "Ex parte Wayne Farms, LLC." on Justia Law

Jim Bishop Chevrolet-Buick-Pontiac-GMC, Inc. ("Jim Bishop"), appealed judgment entered on jury verdicts in favor of Michael and Tina Burden ("Burden"). In 2012, the Burdens sued General Motors, LLC, Jim Bishop, and Lynn Layton Chevrolet, Inc. ("Lynn Layton"), to recover damages for injuries they allegedly sustained as the result of a fire that occurred in a truck they had purchased from an automobile dealership owned and operated by Jim Bishop. When Jim Bishop filed its answer, also generally denying the allegations contained in the complaint and asserting certain affirmative defenses, Jim Bishop further asserted a cross-claim against General Motors alleging it had refused to indemnify Jim Bishop. The Burdens eventually entered into pro tanto settlements with General Motors, which agreed to pay them $20,000, and Lynn Layton, which agreed to pay them $32,000, as to the respective claims asserted by the Burdens against those defendants. The settlement with General Motors resolved the breach-of-warranty claims and the "Magnuson-Moss" claim. The trial court dismissed the Burdens' claims against both General Motors and Lynn Layton pursuant to joint stipulations of dismissal filed by those parties. Jim Bishop moved the trial court for a summary judgment on the Burdens' remaining claims against it, moved at the close of evidence for a judgment as a matter of law, and renewed its JML motion post-verdict. All three were denied, and the jury returned its verdict against Jim Bishop. Based on its review of the facts entered into the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in failing to grant Jim Bishop's motion for a JML and in submitting the case to the jury. Therefore, it reversed the judgment entered in favor of the Burdens on the jury's verdicts and rendered a judgment for Jim Bishop. View "Jim Bishop Chevrolet-Buick-Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. Burden" on Justia Law

James Cherry appealed the grant of summary judgment entered against him and in favor of Pinson Termite and Pest Control, LLC, and Jerry Pinson. In 2011, Cherry purchased a home. The sales contract required the seller to provide a "Wood Infestation Inspection Report (WIIR)." A termite-services contract with Pinson Termite ("termite bond") was transferrable from the seller to Cherry, but it was disputed whether the bond actually transferred to Cherry. In late 2011, Cherry began remodeling him home when he discovered extensive termite damage. A State inspector confirmed the damage and sent Pinson a letter that it had "observed findings of subterranean termite damage" that were not mentioned on the WIIR and that, although the WIIR "indicates the structure was treated by your company, ... we did not observe all mechanics of subterranean control work." The State inspector monitored Pinson's re-treatment of the house. At about the same time, Cherry and Pinson signed a contract for an extension of the termite bond. Shortly thereafter, cherry hired an attorney, who sent Pinson a letter offering to settle his claim for the re-treatment of his home. The State inspector sent Cherry a letter advising that it had supervised Pinson's re-treatment of the house and that if Cherry had any question he should contact the State within 10 days of receiving the letter. If he did not contact, the letter stated the State would "assume that the matter has been resolved." There was no record of any further contact between Cherry and State inspector. Approximately one year after the State letter, Cherry sued Pinson Pest, and Pinson alleging fraud; negligence; negligent hiring, training, and supervision; and breach of contract and seeking "equitable relief pursuant to the 'made whole' doctrine." When summary judgment was granted in favor of Pinson, Cherry appealed arguing that the trial court erred. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Pinson, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cherry v. Pinson Termite & Pest Control, LLC" on Justia Law

Keneisha Kendrick appeals from a summary judgment entered against her and in favor of the City of Midfield ("the City") and one of its police officers, Joseph Wordell, in her action for damages based on personal injuries she sustained as a result of a car accident. Wordell had been dispatched in response to a domestic-disturbance call; he was traveling south on Highway 11 in his City-owned, police-outfitted Ford Crown Victoria automobile. Wordell testified that, upon receiving the dispatch, he turned on his emergency lights and siren and began proceeding toward the scene of the domestic disturbance. Kendrick was on her way to work and was traveling eastward on Woodward Road toward Highway 11 in a Ford Freestyle sport-utility vehicle owned by her mother. Kendrick was planning to turn left onto Highway 11. The front of Kendrick's vehicle collided with the right front passenger side of Wordell's vehicle. The impact of the crash rendered Kendrick unconscious. The impact of the collision caused Wordell's vehicle to veer across the median and two lanes of traffic in the opposite direction on Highway 11 and to collide head-on with a third vehicle. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded there remained disputed facts in the record, for which granting summary judgment was inappropriate. The Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kendrick v. City of Midfield" on Justia Law

South Alabama Brick Co., Inc., d/b/a Riley-Stuart Supply Co. ("SAB"), appealed a Circuit Court's judgment in the amount of approximately $12.6 million in favor of J. Gregory Carwie, as temporary conservator of Benito Perez, who suffered catastrophic injuries when he fell through a skylight in the roof of a warehouse owned and operated by SAB. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the condition at issue here was a preexisting condition of SAB's facility. SAB hired an independent roofing contractor, Cooner Roofing, with previous experience repairing the roof of that facility, to make repairs determined by that contractor to be necessary and appropriate. Under the circumstances of this case, SAB was not legally responsible for warning Cooner Roofing's employees of the risks of working on that roof. Because of the Court's disposition of the issue of liability, it did not reach SAB's arguments relating to the damages awarded against it. View "South Alabama Brick Co., Inc. v. Carwie" on Justia Law

Rock Wool Manufacturing Company ("Rock Wool") petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court ("the circuit court") to vacate its order denying Rock Wool's motions to dismiss a complaint filed against it by Palmer and Jessie Cason, and to enter a new order dismissing the Casons' complaint. This matter started over Palmer Cason's work as a furnace operator for Rock Wool. A furnace exploded and he suffered injuries. At some point before the explosion, Rock Wool had caused certain safety equipment called "explosion doors" to be removed from the furnace Palmer was operating. The "explosion doors" had the capacity at least to mitigate injury to the operator in the event of an explosion. Rock Wool persuasively argued that the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act applied here to bar the Casons' claims against it; thus, Rock Wool demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief sought. View "Ex parte Rock Wool Manufacturing Company." on Justia Law

Defendants Hubbard Properties, Inc., and Warrior Gardens, LLC filed a petition for a writ of mandamus requesting that the Alabama Supreme Court direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion for a summary judgment and to enter a summary judgment in their favor on the ground that the action filed against them was a nullity. Louis Chatman was married to Carolyn Chatman and was a resident of the Warrior Gardens Apartments, which defendants owned and operated. In 2011, there was a fire in the apartment where Louis resided. He was not able to escape and ultimately died in the fire. Louis' estate sued defendants, alleging that as a proximate result of the defendants' negligence and/or wantonness, Louis suffered injuries that resulted in his death. The estate filed a motion to substitute parties, seeking to substitute herself for the administratrix of the estate. The trial court granted the motion, then subsequently granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court found that the administratrix had been appointed 15 days before Carolyn filed the wrongful death action. Therefore, Carolyn was without authority to file suit. Because she lacked authority, she could not substitute herself with the administratrix and proceed with the case. The Supreme Court granted the writ. View "Ex parte Hubbard Properties, Inc. and Warrior Gardens, LLC." on Justia Law

The Alabama Department of Corrections ("the DOC"); Cheryl Price, former warden of Bibb Correctional Facility; Dwayne Estes, former assistant warden of the facility; and Captain John Hutton, a correctional officer at the facility, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Montgomery Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion for a summary judgment and to enter a new order granting the motion on the ground that they were entitled to immunity. The suit against defendants arose over the stabbing death of Tyus Elliot, who was allegedly killed by another inmate. Based on the evidence presented, the Supreme Court concluded defendants were entitled to immunity from all claims. Accordingly, defendants have shown a clear legal right to the relief sought, and the circuit court was directed to enter a summary judgment in their favor. View "Ex parte Alabama Department of Corrections et al." on Justia Law

PNC Bank, National Association, and Sonja Moore-Dennis separately appealed a Circuit Court order denying their motion to compel arbitration as to Joseph Franklin's claims against them. Franklin had three bank accounts with the predecessor bank to PNC Bank, RBC Bank (USA), before RBC Bank merged with PNC Bank. Shortly before the merger, PNC Bank, in January 2012, allegedly mailed a welcome letter and a PNC Bank Account Agreement. The account agreement did not contain an arbitration provision. Tamara Franklin, Franklin's niece came to to visit one day. Tamara noticed a document that she thought was a bank statement from PNC Bank. After looking at the document, Tamara was concerned that Franklin owed money to PNC Bank. Franklin said he did not owe PNC Bank any money but that Tamara could call his financial advisor, Sonja Moore-Dennis, if she had any concerns. Franklin alleged that Moore-Dennis was a PNC Bank agent or employee at this time; PNC Bank denies that it had ever employed Moore-Dennis. After investigating the matter, Franklin and Tamara came to the conclusion that Moore-Dennis had been stealing funds from Franklin's accounts. Additionally, it appeared to Franklin and Tamara that Moore-Dennis had created an online banking profile for Franklin but had set up the profile so that account notifications were sent to her e-mail address. Franklin, who is elderly, did not have Internet access or an e-mail address and did not know how to use online banking. Franklin sued PNC Bank and Moore-Dennis alleging fraud, suppression, breach of fiduciary duty, and various forms of negligence and wantonness. PNC Bank moved to compel arbitration, raising the terms of the account agreement as grounds for its motion. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s order, finding that the Bank and Moore-Dennis failed to prove that Franklin received the account agreement or accessed a specific web page that contained the arbitration provision as described in the account agreement. View "Moore-Dennis v. Franklin" on Justia Law

Cathy Trimble and Ida Longmire petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Perry Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor on certain claims asserted against them by Crystal Lewis, individually and by and through her mother and next friend, Mary Lewis. In October 2012, Crystal was a 12th-grade student at Francis Marion High School. The school system was covered by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which generally required a school district to provide reasonable accommodations to assist any child deemed to have a "disability" as that term is defined by the Act. Crystal had a medical condition that required the Perry County public school system to provide her with certain special accommodations. Longmire was an English teacher at Francis Marion High School and also served as committee-member secretary for the school's Section 504 special-accommodations meetings. Longmire prepared an updated report of the special accommodations required by Section 504 intended to inform particular teachers of the 504 accommodations for specific students. Longmire placed a copy of the report in sealed envelopes, which were to be hand delivered to the teachers. Longmire asked Trimble, acting principal of the school, about distributing the envelopes. Trimble assigned a student office aide the task of delivering the envelopes to the teachers. Rather than delivering the envelopes as instructed, the student office aide opened one of the sealed envelopes and read about Crystal's medical condition. She shared that information about Crystal's medical condition with other students. Crystal commenced this action against Longmire, Trimble, the student office aide, the Perry County Board of Education, "Francis Marion High School," and other school administrators. In her complaint, Crystal alleged that she has faced ridicule, harassment, and bullying as a result of the dissemination of her confidential medical information. She asserted claims of negligence, wantonness, nuisance, breach of contract, and invasion of privacy against each defendant and claims of negligent hiring, training, and supervision against all the defendants except the student office aide and Longmire. Longmire and Trimble moved for a summary judgment on the ground that they were entitled to State-agent immunity as to all claims asserted against them by Crystal. The Supreme Court determined that Longmire and Trimble were entitled to State-agent immunity. The trial court was ordered to vacate its order denying the motion for a summary judgment filed by Longmire and Trimble and to enter a summary judgment in their favor. View "Ex parte Trimble & Longmire" on Justia Law