Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Amanda Rae Coon lived in Alabama but received treatment from a hospital owned by The Medical Center, Inc. in Georgia. After the hospital mishandled the remains of her stillborn baby, Coon filed this lawsuit. Among other claims, she sought to recover damages for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. The trial court ultimately entered an order granting summary judgment to the hospital. The court applied Georgia’s common-law “physical impact rule” to reject Coon’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, rather than applying case law from the Alabama courts that allows such claims based on the mishandling of human remains. Coon appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, although the seven judges disagreed about the choice-of-law analysis. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that where a claim in a Georgia lawsuit is governed by the common law, and the common law is also in force in the other state, as it was in Alabama, the common law as determined by Georgia’s courts controlled. Because the Court of Appeals reached the right result, the Supreme Court affirmed its judgment. View "Coon v. The Medical Center, Inc." on Justia Law

Bernard Norton, by and through Kim Norton, brought a wrongful death action against a number of defendants who were affiliated with a nursing home in which his wife, Lola Norton, died. Bernard claimed that negligent treatment caused Lola’s death. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration of all claims in accordance with an agreement entered into by Lola at the time she was admitted to the nursing home. The trial court granted the motion to stay and compel arbitration, and Bernard appealed, contending that, as a wrongful death beneficiary, he could not be bound to Lola’s arbitration agreement. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and found that Lola’s beneficiaries were not required to arbitrate their wrongful death claims against the defendants. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether an arbitration agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and entered into by a decedent and/or her power of attorney, which bound the decedent and her estate to arbitration, was also enforceable against the decedent’s beneficiaries in a wrongful death action. The Court found that such an arbitration agreement did bind the decedent’s beneficiaries with respect to their wrongful death claims, and, accordingly, reversed the Court of Appeals. View "United Health Services of Georgia, Inc. v. Norton" on Justia Law

Gary and Lori Steagald sued David, Cheryl, and Joshua Eason, alleging that the Easons failed to keep Joshua’s dog properly restrained, and asserting that the Easons, therefore, were liable for injuries that Lori sustained when the dog attacked her as she was visiting the Eason home.The Easons filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the Steagalds had no evidence that the Easons had reason to know the dog to be vicious or dangerous and, therefore, in need of restraint. The trial court granted that motion, the Steagalds appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that whether the Easons had knowledge that the dog had a propensity to bite another without provocation was a question for the jury, and summary judgment was the inappropriate resolution of this case. The Court of Appeals was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Steagald v. Eason" on Justia Law

Adrian Burdette was seriously injured when he fell while attempting a controlled descent from a cell-phone tower in contravention of instructions by his employer, Chandler Telecom, LLC (“Chandler”), that technicians must climb down from towers. This case presented the question of whether an employee could, in deliberate disobedience of his employer’s explicit prohibition, act in a knowingly dangerous fashion with disregard for the probable consequences of that act, and still recover workers’ compensation when injured by that disobedient act. The Supreme Court concluded that OCGA 34-9-17(a) could bar recovery in such cases. View "Chandler Telecom, LLC v. Burdette" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellee J.B. was injured when certified registered nurse anesthetist (“CRNA”) Paul Serdula sexually assaulted her in a surgical suite in the dental practice of defendant-appellant Goldstein, Garber and Salama, LLC (GGS). Serdula was hired by GGS as an independent contractor through anesthesia staffing agency Certified Anesthesia Providers; in accordance with its standard practice, that agency conducted an independent credentialing process on Serdula prior to placing him in any medical or dental facilities. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that a reasonable jury could find that a third party’s sexual molestation of J.B. was an act foreseeable by GGS, whether the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court’s denial of GGS’s motion for a directed verdict on the issue of negligence per se, and whether GGS waived any objection to the jury verdict’s apportionment of fault. Finding that appellate court misinterpreted OCGA 43-11-21.1, GGS’s motion for a directed verdict should have been granted. View "Goldstein, Garber & Salama, LLC v. J.B." on Justia Law

Appellee Marcella Fletcher was diagnosed with malignant pleural mesothelioma, which she attributed to years of laundering her father’s asbestos-dust-covered work clothing, and she sued Appellant CertainTeed Corporation, who manufactured the asbestos-laden water pipes with which her father had worked. In her complaint, she alleged, inter alia, negligent design and negligent failure to warn. Before the completion of discovery, the trial court granted CertainTeed’s motion for summary judgment, and Fletcher appealed. A majority of the Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment, concluding that CertainTeed had failed to demonstrate, as a matter of law, the absence of evidence that its product was defectively designed. The Court of Appeals also found that a jury question existed as to whether CertainTeed had a duty to warn Fletcher of the risks associated with inhaling asbestos dust. After its review, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that CertainTeed owed no duty to warn Fletcher of the possible hazards of asbestos-dust from its products, but that the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the trial court’s judgment with respect to Fletcher’s defective design claim. View "CertainTeed Corp. v. Fletcher" on Justia Law

Iselda Moreno, wife of Rudy Robles, received liposuction, buttock augmentation, and abdominoplasty surgery performed by Dr. Patricia Yugueros of Artisan Plastic Surgery, LLC on June 24, 2009. Moreno went to the ER experiencing abdominal pains. Five days after the surgery, she died. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the appellate court was correct in holding that deposition testimony of an organizational representative taken under OCGA 9-11-30(b)(6) could be admitted into evidence at trial under OCGA 9-11-32(a)(2), without regard to the rules of evidence governing admissibility of expert testimony. Finding that the Court of Appeals erred, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Yugueros v. Robles" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Stanley Cottrell, Jr. appealed the grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) and earlier grants of directed verdicts in this action alleging defamation and related torts, and potentially implicating the constitutionality of portions of the Georgia Computer Systems Protection Act (“GCSPA”) in favor of five defendants: Glenn and Marian Crocker (“Crockers”), Hugh Johnson (“Johnson”), Peggy Smith (“Peggy”), and Karen Smith (“Karen”). This matter arose out of some online postings and other communications by Defendants about Cottrell. For a number of years, Cottrell participated in a number of solo running exhibitions with a Christian evangelical emphasis, some of which have been portrayed in the media, and was subsequently involved in various multi-level marketing endeavors, executive leadership positions, and motivational speaking. Cottrell’s notoriety grew along with media controversy relating to his character, which questioned the authenticity and integrity of his claims and achievements. The Crockers worked for Cottrell planning two running exhibitions; Johnson was a long-time friend of Cottrell’s who came to know some women with whom Cottrell was involved outside of his marriage; Peggy is one of the women with whom Cottrell had an extra-marital affair; and Karen is Peggy’s daughter-in-law. Karen located and contacted several people she believed had information about Cottrell, including the Crockers and Johnson. Karen and her husband created a “WordPress” blog and posted stories based on this information, which portrayed Cottrell as having a long history of misrepresentation and deception for personal gain. Karen sent emails to a “list serve” group criticizing Cottrell and sharing links to the Blog posts, and Peggy sent messages to multiple Cottrell Facebook “friends” along the same lines. Cottrell sued, primarily alleging defamation and several associated claims (invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of the GCSPA). After review of Cottrell's arguments on appeal of the JNOV, the Supreme Court concluded JNOV was indeed warranted in this case, and affirmed the trial court's judgments. View "Cottrell v. Smith" on Justia Law

In March 2012, 91-year-old Bucilla Stephenson died at the end of a two-week stay at Doctors Hospital of Augusta, LLC (“Hospital”). In May 2013, Jacqueline Alicea, Bucilla's granddaughter, acting as the administratix of her grandmother’s estate, sued defendants the Hospital and Dr. Phillip Catalano. Alicea alleged among other things that they intubated her grandmother and put her on a mechanical ventilator, which prolonged her life when she was in a terminal condition and caused her unnecessary pain and suffering, contrary to her advance directive for health care and the specific directions of Alicea, her designated health care agent. The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing among other things that OCGA 31-32-10 (a) (2) and (3), a part of the Georgia Advance Directive for Health Care Act, gave them immunity from liability. The trial court rejected the immunity argument and denied summary judgment. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the portion of the order denying immunity. The Supreme Court then granted Defendants’ petition for certiorari to review that aspect of the Court of Appeals’ decision. After review, the Court concluded the appellate court skipped over one important point: "[t]he correct analysis makes it even clearer, however, that the Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment based on their claim of immunity under OCGA 31-32-10 (a) (2) and (3), and we therefore affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment as to that issue." View "Doctors Hospital of Augusta v. Alicea" on Justia Law

Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. was a textile manufacturer, and in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it produced dryer felts at a manufacturing facility in Waycross. Some of the pipes and boilers in that facility were insulated with material containing asbestos, and Scapa used yarn containing asbestos in some of its manufacturing processes. Between 1967 and 1973, Roy Knight worked on multiple occasions at the Waycross facility as an independent contractor. Almost forty years later, Knight was diagnosed with mesothelioma. After his mesothelioma was diagnosed, Knight and his wife sued Scapa, claiming that Scapa negligently exposed him to asbestos at the Waycross facility and caused his mesothelioma. The case was tried in front of a jury, which returned a verdict against Scapa and awarded more than $4 million in damages to the Knights. The trial court entered a judgment upon that verdict, and Scapa appealed. At trial, the Knights bore the burden to establish not only that one of their experts, Dr. Abraham, was qualified and that his testimony was reliable, but also that his testimony would be helpful to the jury. His ultimate opinion as to causation, however, was not limited to any meaningful estimate of exposure to asbestos at the Waycross facility (whether qualitative or quantitative), and it instead invited the jury to find that causation was established by any exposure at all. In that respect, the Supreme Court concluded the testimony did not “fit” the pertinent causation inquiry under Georgia law, and it should have been excluded by the trial court, acting as gatekeeper, because it could only serve to confuse the jury on the issue of causation. "And given that Dr. Abraham’s opinion 'went to the heart' of the dispute about the extent of exposure and causation, 'the erroneous admission of the opinion requires that we reverse the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the trial court’s judgment.'" View "Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Knight" on Justia Law