Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

An Illinois attorney, employed by the Property Tax Appeal Board (PTAB) from 2000 to 2020, filed a defamation lawsuit against Sun-Times Media Holdings, LLC, and Tim Novak. The lawsuit stemmed from articles published in February and October 2020, which alleged that the attorney pressured PTAB staff to reduce property taxes on Trump Tower due to political motivations. The articles claimed the attorney was under investigation for these actions, which the attorney contended were false and damaging to his reputation.The Cook County Circuit Court denied the defendants' first motion to dismiss, finding that the attorney had adequately pled the falsity of the statements and special damages. The court also found that the fair report privilege and actual malice were questions of fact. The court dismissed the intentional infliction of emotional distress count but allowed the defamation and false light claims to proceed.Defendants then filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing the lawsuit was a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) under the Illinois Citizen Participation Act. The circuit court denied this motion, finding the defendants failed to show the lawsuit was solely based on their protected political speech activities and that the attorney's claims were meritless and retaliatory.The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the circuit court's decision, applying the Sandholm v. Kuecker test. The appellate court found that the defendants did not meet their burden to show the articles were published in furtherance of their rights to participate in government and that the attorney's lawsuit was solely based on these rights.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment, holding that the articles did not constitute acts in furtherance of government participation and thus were not protected under the Citizen Participation Act. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Glorioso v. Sun-Times Media Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a wrongful-death lawsuit filed by the executors and an independent administrator of the estates of deceased residents of a nursing home, Geneva Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC, doing business as Bria Health Services of Geneva. The plaintiffs allege that Bria negligently and willfully failed to control the spread of COVID-19, leading to the deaths of the decedents between March and May 2020. The complaints assert that Bria's failure to quarantine symptomatic staff and residents and to implement effective hygiene and equipment procedures caused the decedents to contract COVID-19 and die from related complications.The Kane County Circuit Court denied Bria's motions to dismiss the negligence claims but allowed Bria to file a motion to certify a question for interlocutory appeal. The certified question was whether Executive Order 2020-19 provided blanket immunity for ordinary negligence to healthcare facilities that rendered assistance to the State during the COVID-19 pandemic. The appellate court modified the question to clarify that the immunity in question derived from section 21(c) of the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Act and answered the modified question affirmatively, stating that Bria would have immunity from negligence claims if it could show it was rendering assistance to the State during the pandemic.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and agreed with the appellate court's modification of the certified question. The court held that Executive Order 2020-19, which triggered the immunity provided in section 21(c) of the Act, grants immunity for ordinary negligence claims to healthcare facilities that rendered assistance to the State during the COVID-19 pandemic. The court affirmed the appellate court's judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court to determine whether Bria was indeed rendering such assistance. View "James v. Geneva Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves Paul Passafiume, as the independent administrator of the estate of Lois Passafiume, who filed a professional negligence complaint against Daniel Jurak, D.O., and others, alleging wrongful death and survival actions due to negligent care leading to Lois's death in 2014. The case proceeded to a jury trial, where the plaintiff sought damages for loss of material services beyond his remarriage in 2015.In the Grundy County circuit court, the defendants filed a motion in limine to limit the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert witness, economist Stan Smith, regarding the loss of material services to the period before the plaintiff’s remarriage. The court denied this motion, allowing evidence of loss of material services beyond the remarriage. The jury awarded the plaintiff $2,121,914.34 in damages, later reduced due to contributory negligence. The defendants' posttrial motion for a new trial or remittitur was denied, leading to an appeal.The Appellate Court, Third District, affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that a plaintiff’s remarriage does not limit damages for loss of material services in a wrongful death action. The defendants then appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois.The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the appellate court's judgment, holding that in a wrongful death claim under the Wrongful Death Act, a plaintiff’s remarriage does not affect the recoverable damages for the loss of a decedent’s material services. The court overruled previous appellate decisions that had incorporated material services into loss of consortium claims, which terminate upon remarriage. The court maintained that material services remain a separate element of pecuniary damages under the Act, unaffected by remarriage. View "Passafiume v. Jurak" on Justia Law

A condominium resident suffered serious injuries due to a gasoline leak from an underground storage tank owned and operated by a gas station located over a mile away. The resident filed a lawsuit against the owners and operators of the gas station, alleging common-law negligence and liability based on the violation of Illinois environmental statutes and regulations governing underground storage tanks. The resident passed away during the course of the litigation, and her daughter was appointed as a special representative to continue the action.The Cook County circuit court dismissed the statutory claims, and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal. The courts held that the statutes at issue did not create private statutory rights of action, express or implied. The plaintiff appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that there was no express private right of action under the Leaking Underground Storage Tank Program (LUST Program) provisions of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act. The court also concluded that implying a private right of action was not necessary to provide an adequate remedy for violations of the statute. The court noted that the plaintiff's common-law negligence claim, based on the same acts and omissions that she alleged violated the LUST Program of the Act, was a sufficient remedy. Therefore, it was not necessary to imply a private right of action. View "Rice v. Marathon Petroleum Corp." on Justia Law

In a lawsuit between two competitors in the shipping logistics industry, Project44, Inc. and FourKites, Inc., Project44 alleged that FourKites agents sent defamatory emails to Project44's chief revenue officer and two members of its board of directors. FourKites argued that there was no publication to a third party because the emails were sent to members of the corporation who were, in effect, the corporation itself. The Cook County circuit court agreed with FourKites and dismissed Project44's complaint for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the decision, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois affirmed the decision of the appellate court, holding that there is publication to a third party when an allegedly defamatory statement is communicated to a member of a corporation’s executive leadership team. It was determined that a corporation has a distinct reputation from that of its management-level employees and an interest in protecting that reputation among its employees and the public at large. Therefore, defamatory statements made to corporate employees, even those with the power to act on behalf of the corporation, can harm the corporation’s business reputation among those employees. Communication of a defamatory statement regarding the corporation to these employees establishes the publication element for a defamation action brought by the corporation against the party that publishes the statement. View "Project44, Inc. v. FourKites, Inc." on Justia Law

In the case of Clark Alave v. The City of Chicago, the plaintiff, Clark Alave, filed a complaint against the City of Chicago after he was injured when his bicycle struck a pothole. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the city did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care under section 3-102(a) of the Tort Immunity Act. The court based this decision on the lack of any affirmative physical manifestations, such as signs or pavement markings, that the city intended for the roadway to be used for bicycling. The court also considered the Divvy bicycle rental station located nearby, but found that this station only indicated that the city permitted, not intended, bicycling on the roadway. The court therefore concluded that the plaintiff was not both a permitted and intended user of the roadway, and thus the city owed him no duty of care. The court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint. View "Alave v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Guiracocha and his son, Cristopher, filed an uninsured motorist (UM) claim against Direct Auto, stemming from a hit-and-run incident where 14-year-old Cristopher was struck by a vehicle while riding his bicycle. They asserted Fredy was the named insured under an automobile insurance policy issued by Direct Auto and that UM coverage applied to Cristopher based on his status as a “relative” under the policy. Direct Auto denied coverage because Cristopher was not an occupant of a covered vehicle at the time of the accident and sought a declaratory judgment. The circuit court granted Direct Auto summary judgment.The appellate court reversed, holding that a provision in an automobile insurance policy that limits UM coverage to insureds occupying an insured automobile violates the Illinois Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/143a). The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Section 143a states that an insurance policy cannot be “renewed, delivered, or issued for delivery” in Illinois unless it provides coverage to “any person” for injuries “arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle.” A bicyclist injured by an uninsured motorist vehicle is a “person” who suffered injuries arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of “a motor vehicle.” The injured person’s status as an occupant of a vehicle is irrelevant. View "Galarza v. Direct Auto Insurance Co." on Justia Law

When he was 17 years old, Donald incurred a cervical cord injury, which left him quadriplegic. To reduce Donald’s involuntary muscle spasms, Dr. Espinosa implanted a Medtronic SynchroMed II Infusion System, a programmable pump that delivered doses of baclofen into the intrathecal space of Donald’s spine. The pump was managed by SIU Neurology and required regular refills. A routine refill went wrong, resulting in holes in the pump. Donald died days later.In a wrongful death action, the appellate court affirmed the denial of the plaintiff’s motion under the Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/2-402, to convert a respondent in discovery (Dr. Bakir) to a defendant. Bakir, a pulmonary critical care specialist, was Donald’s supervising physician in the ICU.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The plaintiff attached a certificate of merit in which a doctor opined that, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Dr. Bakir deviated from the standard of care. The affidavit may not have stated the specific standard of care from which Dr. Bakir deviated, but it did provide the court with sufficient information about what Dr. Bakir failed to do based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty—timely recognize that Donald suffered from baclofen withdrawal syndrome, timely order treatment, and timely administer that treatment. The trial court mistakenly required evidence that would establish more than a reasonable probability that the defendant could be liable. View "Cleeton v. SIU Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

Duniver, lost his leg during a 2017 workplace accident. In 2019, Duniver filed a personal injury lawsuit seeking recovery from multiple defendants. Weeks later, Duniver filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection and failed to disclose the personal injury lawsuit, answering “no” when asked whether he was suing anyone. He then checked “[y]es” in response to a question asking if he had “Other contingent or unliquidated claims of every nature, including counterclaims of the debtor and rights to set off claims.” Duniver listed: Workman’s Comp. On another form, he checked “[y]es” in response to: “Within 1 year before you filed for bankruptcy, were you a party in any lawsuit, court action, or administrative proceeding,” A collections action filed against Duniver was listed, but the personal injury case was not included.The defendants argued judicial estoppel prohibited Duniver from pursuing his personal injury lawsuit and that Duniver lacked standing to sue them where the injury claim belonged to the bankruptcy estate. Duniver then filed amended bankruptcy schedules disclosing his personal injury case. The bankruptcy case was dismissed. The circuit court granted the defendants summary judgment, finding Duniver “blatantly deceived” the bankruptcy trustee and that any claim would have to be pursued on behalf of the bankruptcy estate. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. Duniver had standing and the evidence failed to show an intent to deceive or mislead. View "Duniver v. Clark Material Handling Co." on Justia Law

Quiroz was inside the underground subway tunnel connecting CTA stations when he fell from a recessed catwalk authorized for CTA personnel and injured himself. The area near the tracks where he fell was lit. At least two trains passed without incident. He was allegedly visible on security cameras. Another train struck Quiroz in the tunnel, causing his fatal injuries.Quiroz’s estate filed a wrongful death action, asserting that, having discovered Quiroz in a position of peril, the CTA owed him a duty of care and violated that duty by failing to notify train operators of his presence and by failing to stop train service, or, alternatively, that failure to keep a lookout for persons in the tunnel and to monitor the security cameras in real-time was willful and wanton. The CTA argued that, because Quiroz was a trespasser, it owed no duty to protect him from the open and obvious danger of a moving train.The circuit court dismissed the complaint. The appellate court reversed, finding the allegations that Quiroz was a discovered trespasser in a position of peril sufficient to establish a legally recognized duty under section 337 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Section 337 does not apply to an open and obvious danger and no further duty was owed under the circumstances. The CTA is not an insurer of a trespasser’s safety; its focus must be on ensuring mass transit. View "Quiroz v. Chicago Transit Authority" on Justia Law