Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Johnson suffers from severe, permanent nerve damage, which he alleges was caused by a negligently performed hip replacement surgery. He sued his surgeon, Dr. Armstrong, citing specific negligence and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. He also brought a res ipsa loquitur claim against a surgical technician who participated in the surgery. Johnson provided one expert witness, also a surgeon, to establish the elements of res ipsa loquitur. The court granted the technician summary judgment, stating that Johnson failed to present an expert witness to establish the standard of care for a technician, that the control element of res ipsa loquitur was not met, and that there was no evidence of negligence on the technician’s part. The court subsequently granted Armstrong summary judgment on the res ipsa loquitur count, leaving the count of specific negligence remaining. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court dismissed and vacated in part. The effect of the summary judgment in favor of Armstrong is to preclude Johnson from proving that Armstrong was negligent under the unique proofs of res ipsa loquitur, but the claim for negligence remains outstanding. The summary judgment order with respect to Armstrong was not a final judgment; the appellate court lacked jurisdiction. With respect to the other defendants, the elements of res ipsa loquitur were met at the time of the decision; no further expert testimony on the standard of care was required. Given that the Armstrong summary judgment was pronounced after the technician was orally dismissed from the res ipsa loquitur count, the circuit court was directed to reconsider that order in light of this opinion. View "Johnson v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

The plaintiff alleged that his wife, Dollett, was rendered a disabled person with permanent and irreparable brain damage as a proximate result of Fitness’s willful and wanton misconduct in failing to use an automated external defibrillator (AED) on Dollett in a timely fashion after she suffered cardiac arrest while exercising at one of their facilities. There was an AED and an employee trained to use it on the premises at the time of the incident. The circuit court of Will County dismissed the case with prejudice.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The Fitness facility where Dollett’s injuries occurred was covered by the Physical Fitness Facility Medical Emergency Preparedness Act (210 ILCS 74/1), which creates a private right of action based on willful and wanton misconduct in the non-use of an AED. For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff could conceivably introduce evidence establishing that Fitness’s employees’ failure to provide AED treatment to Dollett in a timely manner after she collapsed rose to the level of willful and wanton misconduct that breached the duty that Fitness owed to Dollett, thereby proximately causing her injuries. View "Dawkins v. Fitness International, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff was injured after a high-speed chase, during which officers were following a car that had been reported stolen; officers had gotten within 10 feet of the car in a parking lot and had ordered the driver out of the car at gunpoint. The driver sped off and hit the plaintiff. The Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/4-106(b), provides local public entities and public employees with absolute immunity from liability for “[a]ny injury inflicted by an escaped or escaping prisoner.”The appellate court held that the defendants, several police officers and their government employers, did not have immunity under section 4-106(b) for the plaintiff's injuries because the person the police officers were chasing was not “an escaped or escaping prisoner” within the meaning of the Act. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. A mere show of authority by police officers is not sufficient to establish physical custody. The driver’s freedom of movement was directly controlled or limited to a particular place; he was not “held in custody” in the parking lot within the plain and ordinary meaning of that phrase, and was not an “escaped or escaping prisoner” when he subsequently hit the plaintiff. View "Robinson v. Village of Sauk Village" on Justia Law

Schultz filed a wrongful death and survival action, alleging that the defendants engaged in willful and wanton conduct by refusing to dispatch 911 services, which resulted in the decedent’s (his wife) death. Schultz had called 911, asking that police stop his wife from driving because she was intoxicated. The defendants allegedly first dispatched police to the wrong location and then refused to contact police after Schultz called back. The circuit court dismissed, finding that the defendants had absolute immunity from civil liability under section 4-102 of the Tort Immunity Act and that the decedent's negligence was the sole proximate cause of her injuries and death. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the Emergency Telephone System Act (ETS), 50 ILCS 750/15.1(a), did not apply to situations in which a 911 dispatcher allegedly failed or refused to dispatch emergency services but is limited to “provid[ing] an immunity for failures within that infrastructure and technology itself” and “was not designed to supersede the immunities set forth in the Tort Immunity Act.”The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. The limited immunity of section 15.1(a) of the ETS Act governs this claim, but dismissal was appropriate because the decedent’s conduct was the sole proximate cause of her death. View "Schultz v. St. Clair County" on Justia Law

A Pan-Oceanic supervisor, Singh, asked Green to pick up a skid steer from Patten. Green saw that the equipment was not loaded properly, and asked that it be reloaded. Patten employees refused. Singh told Green to return with the equipment. In heavy expressway traffic, Green saw that the trailer was bouncing and stepped on the brakes. The trailer swung into McQueen's car, injuring him. Pan-Oceanic acknowledged that Green was its agent, acting within the scope of his agency. A jury ruled for McQueen against PanOceanic, but not against Green, and assessed damages of $163,227.45, finding that Pan-Oceanic had acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others. The jury subsequently awarded $1 million in punitive damages.On appeal, the court held that, when a plaintiff is injured by a company’s employee in a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff cannot maintain a claim for direct negligence against the employer where the employer admits responsibility for the employee’s conduct under respondeat superior, concluding that the jury’s findings—that Green was not negligent but Pan-Oceanic acted with aggravated negligence—were legally inconsistent, The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the award. The trial court properly instructed the jury that Green claimed Pan-Oceanic was negligent for ordering Green to take the load on the highway after it knew or should have known, that it was unsafe and for failing to reject the load to prevent it from traveling on the highway. This liability did not depend on Green’s actions. The verdicts were not legally inconsistent. View "McQueen v. Green" on Justia Law

In a March 6, 2015, vehicular collision at a Minooka truck terminal, Armstead, a semi-truck driver with Pennsylvania-based Manfredi Mushroom, was allegedly struck and injured by the semi-truck operated by Roberts, employed by NFI. Armstead filed a Pennsylvania workers’ compensation claim against Manfredi Mushroom, which led to the execution of a “Compromise and Release Agreement by Stipulation” settling the claim. Armstead then filed a negligence suit against NFI in Illinois. The circuit court determined that the Agreement included a judicial admission that prohibited Armstead from claiming injuries other than a right knee strain. The appellate court affirmed.The Illinois Supreme Court vacated and remanded for dismissal. The circuit court’s order limiting Armstead’s injury allegations resolved an issue that was ancillary to the negligence claims. Permitting an appeal from that order would promote precisely the type of piecemeal appeals Rule 304(a) was designed to discourage. After the circuit court’s improper Rule 304(a) finding that there was no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of its order, Armstead dismissed his action in the circuit court, where jurisdiction remained due to the improper Rule 304(a) finding. He failed to refile the action within one year or within the statute of limitations period, so his action remains dismissed. View "Armstead v. National Freight, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs alleged that the doctors negligently failed to recognize that Thomas was pregnant before performing elective surgery on her and administering anesthesia, pain medication, and antibiotics, resulting in irreversible injury to the fetus. Thomas was subsequently informed by another physician that the fetus would not survive to term and the pregnancy should be terminated. Thomas had a lawful, consensual abortion. Because the abortion would not have occurred but for the doctors’ negligent conduct and the injuries suffered by the fetus, plaintiffs alleged that defendants’ negligence “ultimately caused the death of” the fetus.Responding to a question certified by the trial court, the appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court held that the Wrongful Death Act, 740 ILCS 180/2.2, does not bar a cause of action against a defendant for fetal death if the defendant knew or had a medical reason to know of the pregnancy and the alleged malpractice resulted in a non-viable fetus that died as a result of a lawful abortion with requisite consent. Section 2.2 addresses only the liability of the doctor who performs the abortion, not the liability of other physicians, and does not state that abortion is a superseding cause, as a matter of law, where a physician tortiously injures a fetus in a separate medical procedure. View "Thomas v. Khoury" on Justia Law

Jill, age 42, died two days after seeking treatment at Mercy’s emergency department. A postmortem examination by the medical examiner indicated that Jill died from myocarditis resulting from sepsis; Jill’s blood cultures showed that MRSA bacteria was present in Jill’s blood. At the request of Jill’s family, Bryant performed a second autopsy and concluded that Jill’s cause of death was acute and chronic congestive heart failure due to dilated cardiomyopathy. Bryant’s report did not indicate that Jill had myocarditis or sepsis. Her estate sued for wrongful death and medical negligence, arguing that Jill died of toxic shock syndrome and sepsis caused by a retained tampon, which could have been treated by antibiotics if timely diagnosed. A jury returned a verdict in favor of all defendants.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting an argument that the circuit court abused its discretion and denied the plaintiff a fair trial by refusing to issue a nonpattern jury instruction on the loss of chance doctrine and a pattern jury instruction on informed consent. When a jury is instructed on proximate cause through a pattern jury instruction, the lost chance doctrine, as a form of proximate cause, is encompassed within that instruction. The plaintiff never alleged that Jill consented to medical treatment without being adequately informed and that the treatment injured her. The plaintiff’s proposed jury instruction did not identify any treatment Jill received or any injury she received from that treatment. View "Bailey v. Mercy Hospital and Medical Center" on Justia Law

Doe sued Parillo based on physical and sexual assaults and the violation of an order of protection. The following 30 months involved multiple delays and disputes. Parillo was sanctioned several times for failing to answer the complaint, failing to cooperate in discovery, and for his (and his attorney’s) failure to appear for scheduled hearings. In 2019, following a trial that Parillo and his attorney did not attend, a jury awarded Doe $200,000 for “Loss of Normal Life,” $200,000 for “Pain and Suffering,” $200,000 for “Emotional Distress,” $200,000 for “Future Loss of Normal Life,” and $200,000 for “Future Pain and Suffering,” totaling $1 million in compensatory damages, plus $8 million in punitive damages.In ruling on a post-trial motion, the court stated “[T]he defendant lied in an affidavit to seek a trial continuance, the defense attorneys failed to follow a well-known and well-understood circuit court rule ... and the defense attorneys and defendant abandoned the trial ... defendant’s attempt should read, ‘A Conspiracy to Undermine the Integrity of the Judicial Process—or— How Not to Get a Trial Continuance in the Law Division.’ First, lie; second, don’t follow rules; and third, if the first and second don’t work, don’t show up for trial.” The appellate court reduced Doe’s punitive damages to $1 million. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court judgments. The punitive damages award was not unconstitutionally excessive. View "Doe v. Parrillo" on Justia Law

Ittersagen brought a medical malpractice action against Advocate Medical and Dr. Thakadiyil, alleging that the defendants negligently failed to diagnose him with sepsis and treat him appropriately. A jury was sworn. More than halfway through the trial, the court received a note from a juror, who reported that he had a business relationship with “the Advocate Health Care System Endowment.” The juror, a partner in a company that handles investments, said he believed the endowment was affiliated with but separate from Advocate Medical. He explained that his connection to Advocate Medical was so attenuated that he forgot to mention it during jury selection. The juror insisted that the outcome of the trial would not affect him financially and that he could remain fair and impartial. The trial court denied Ittersagen’s request to remove the juror for actual bias or implied bias and to replace him with an alternate juror. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting an argument that the juror’s business relationship with the endowment created a presumption of bias that cannot be rebutted by claims of impartiality. The court noted the lack of evidence of the affiliation between the endowment and Advocate. The juror did not owe Advocate a fiduciary duty and did not have any other direct relationship with the defendants that would create a presumption of juror bias as a matter of law. View "Ittersagen v. Advocate Health and Hospitals Corp." on Justia Law