Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In this negligence action, The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal from the order of the trial court denying Defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that the appeal was forfeited.Plaintiff was injured when she slipped and fell in Defendant's restaurant. Plaintiff sued Defendant for negligence. After the trial court denied Defendant's motion for summary judgment, Defendant timely moved to certify the order for interlocutory appeal. The court of appeals accepted the interlocutory appeal, but Defendant did not timely file a notice of appeal. The court of appeals reversed the denial of the summary judgment motion without addressing the untimeliness of the notice of appeal. The Supreme Court granted transfer and dismissed the appeal, holding that the appeal was untimely and that there was no extraordinarily compelling reasons to restore the forfeited appeal. View "Cooper's Hawk Indianapolis, LLC v. Ray" on Justia Law

In this case involving an agreement to arbitrate, the Supreme Court reiterated the elements of equitable estoppel required for an outside party not contemplated by the agreement to enforce an arbitration clause against a signatory and reversed the trial court's determination that a third party could compel arbitration, holding that none of the traditional elements of equitable estoppel were satisfied.Jane Doe's legal guardian (Guardian) arranged for Jane to live at Carmel Senior Living (CSL) and initialed an arbitration agreement. Guardian later filed a complaint against CSL; its management company, Spectrum; and one of its employees, claiming that the employee had sexually abused Jane and that CSL and Spectrum (together, CSL) were vicariously liable. Guardian later amended the complaint to add Certiphi Screening, the company CSL had hired to run background checks on new employees. The defendants demanded arbitration. The trial court granted the motions to compel arbitration, concluding that the agreement covered CSL and that equitable estoppel mandated arbitration of Guardian's claims against Certiphi. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Certiphi did not meet the requirements of equitable estoppel. View "Doe v. Carmel Operator, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the determination of the trial court that Jane Doe could compel her legal guardian (Guardian) to arbitrate her claims against it and affirmed the trial court's order compelling Guardian to arbitrate as to the remaining defendants, holding that this Court declines to adopt any alternative theories to the doctrine of equitable estoppel.After Jane had been living at Carmel Senior Living (CSL) for a few months, Guardian filed a complaint against CSL, CSL's management company and one of its employees, and Certiphi Screening, the company CSL had hired to run background checks on new employees, alleging that Jane had been sexually abused. The trial court granted CSL's and Certiphi's motions to compel arbitration under the arbitration agreement in the residency contract, determining that the agreement covered CSL under and agency theory and that equitable estoppel mandated arbitration of Guardian's claims against Certiphi. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Certiphi was not one of the third-party beneficiaries provided for in the arbitration agreement and could not meet the requirements of equitable estoppel; and (2) this Court declines to endorse any alternative equitable estoppel theories. View "Doe v. Carmel Operator, LLC" on Justia Law

In this insurance dispute stemming from a fatal car collision, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Insurer, holding that the decedent's estate was entitled to summary judgment on the issues of whether the decedent was an "insured person" and the availability of $25,000 in further UIM coverage under the decedent's parents' Allstate policy.Shelina Glover died in a car accident. The insurers of the two responsible drivers paid policy limits, and Glover's estate received separate settlements for underinsured-motorist (UIM) coverage from Glover's own carrier and from that of Glover's husband, who was driving the vehicle on the day of the accident. The Estate requested further UIM coverage under Glover's parents' Allstate policy. The trial court granted summary judgment for Allstate, concluding that the policy's offset and anti-stacking provisions barred the Estate from recovery because the amount the Estate received from other insurers exceeded the limits under the policy. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) Glover was an "insured person" under the policy; and (2) the Estate's UIM settlements were not offset against the policy's UMI limit, and therefore, the Estate had an additional $25,000 UIM coverage available to it under the Allstate policy. View "Glover v. Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting Defendants relief from a default judgment, holding that the trial court's assessments of the parties' credibility and demeanor were sufficient to establish at least "slight evidence" of excusable neglect.Plaintiff sued Defendants alleging that certain statements Defendants made constituted defamation and false reporting. Because Defendants did not enter appearances or respond to the complaint the trial court granted default judgment to Plaintiffs. The trial court granted Defendants' motion for relief from the default judgment, concluding that Defendants were sincerely confused about their obligation to respond. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings, holding that the trial court's fact-sensitive judgments showed that Defendants were entitled to relief. View "Riddle v. Cress" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court awarding Plaintiff $40,000 in this personal injury action, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving a failure to mitigate instruction.Plaintiff brought this action alleging negligence and respondeat superior against Defendants claiming that a vehicle accident caused a preexisting tumor in his eye to swell in size. At the conclusion of the evidence, Defendants asked for a jury instruction on failure to mitigate damages. The trial court gave the requested instruction. The trial court awarded Plaintiff $40,000. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the mitigation instruction was unsupported by the evidence. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving a failure to mitigate instruction. View "Humphrey v. Tuck" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Appellant's motion requesting reinstatement of his lawsuit against Franklin Township Community School Corporation, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant's motion for reinstatement.Nine days before the applicable statute of limitations expired, Appellant filed a negligence lawsuit against the School. The court dismissed the complaint after Appellant failed to respond to the School's motion to dismiss. Months later, Appellant filed three documents requesting reinstatement of his case. The trial court summarily denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's request was in actuality an impermissible collateral attack on the trial court's dismissal order, and therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion. View "Smith v. Franklin Township Community School Corp." on Justia Law

In this negligence action, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court in favor of Defendant, holding that a juror should have been struck for cause based on bias and that there was prejudice because Plaintiff, the party objecting to the juror, was forced to exhaust her last peremptory challenge and accept and objectionable juror.The estate of Kandace Pyles brought a negligence claim against various medical providers, including Defendant. The juror in this case stated that he did not want to serve as a juror, that he had a favorable impression of doctors, and that he would not be able to assess noneconomic damages. Plaintiff moved to strike the juror for cause, and the trial court denied the motion. Plaintiff used her final peremptory challenge on the juror. After a trial, the jury found that Defendant was not negligent. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the trial court's decision to deny Plaintiff's for-cause challenge was illogical and that a new trial was appropriate. View "Clark v. Mattar" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court denying Cavanaugh's Sports Bar & Eatery's motion for summary judgment as to Eric Porterfield's complaint alleging negligence after a sudden fight in the bar's parking lot at closing time left him seriously injured, holding that, under the facts of this case, Cavanaugh's owed no duty to protect Porterfield from the parking lot brawl.In his complaint, Porterfield alleged that Cavanaugh's breached its duty to protect him when Cavanaugh's had experienced criminal activity for years prior to the attack on Porterfield. Cavanaugh's filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that it owed no duty to Porterfield because the incident was unforeseeable. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Cavanaugh's had no duty to protect Porterfield because no evidence showed that Cavanaugh's knew the fight was impending. View "Cavanaugh's Sports Bar & Eatery, Ltd. v. Porterfield" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court awarding summary judgment in favor of Indiana State Trooper Martin Benner and dismissing Plaintiff's claim against Benner in his personal capacity after the two were involved in an accident, holding that, although there was some evidence that Trooper Benner was not in strict compliance with State Police policy at the time of the accident, this was not enough to place him "clearly outside" the scope of his employment.At the time of the accident, Trooper Benner was off duty but was operating his state issued police commission, as allowed under the State Police policy. The trial court awarded summary judgment for Benner, concluding that although Benner was off duty he was otherwise in substantial compliance with State Police policy in operating his commission and was therefore not clearly outside the scope of his employment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Benner was acting clearly outside the scope of his employment. View "Burton v. Benner" on Justia Law