Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant negligently struck Plaintiff’s vehicle, causing Plaintiff injuries that required medical treatment. Defendant admitted she was liable for the accident but contested the reasonable value of Plaintiff’s medical care. Before a trial on damages, Plaintiff moved to prevent the jury from hearing evidence that her providers accepted a reduced amount as payment in full. The trial court concluded that the payments were not permitted by Stanley v. Walker, in which the Supreme Court interpreted Indiana’s collateral-source statute to permit a defendant in a personal-injury suit to introduce discounted reimbursements negotiated between the plaintiff’s medical providers and his or her private health insurer, so long as insurance is not referenced. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the rationale of Stanley v. Walker applies equally to reimbursements by government payers; and (2) the trial court misinterpreted Stanley by holding that the collateral-source statute required the exclusion of accepted reimbursements from government payers. Remanded. View "Patchett v. Lee" on Justia Law

Carol Jakubowicz and her two minor sons were involved in a car accident with Ronald Williams that resulted in injuries to the Jakubowiczs. Jakubowicz filed suit on behalf of herself and her sons against Williams. More than three years after the accident, Jakubowicz filed a motion for leave to amend her complaint and add an underinsured motorist (UIM) claim against State Farm, the Jakubowiczs’ insurer, stating that she believed Williams’ insurance policy would be insufficient to cover her damages. The trial court granted Jakubowicz’s motion for leave to amend. State Farm moved for summary judgment on the UIM claim, claiming it was barred because it was filed after the three-year limitation period in Jakubowicz’s insurance policy. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the provision in the policy requiring an insured to bring suit within three years is in direct conflict with the policy’s requirement that State Farm will only pay if the underinsured motorist’s insurance has been exhausted, the policy is ambiguous and must be construed in favor of the insured. Remanded. View "State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jakubowicz" on Justia Law

Plaintiff fell and injured herself when she stepped into a hole on one of the streets in Beech Grove City, Indiana. Plaintiff subsequently filed a negligence complaint against the City. The City asserted that it was immune from liability under the Indiana Tort Claims Act’s (ITCA) discretionary function immunity provision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on a review of the designated evidence and the Court’s existing precedent, the City was not entitled to summary judgment on the question of discretionary function immunity under the ITCA because the City did not demonstrate that the challenged act or omission was a policy decision made by consciously balancing risks and benefits. View "City of Beech Grove v. Beloat" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two separate couples, brought suit seeking damages stemming from asbestos-caused diseases. Several Defendants in each case moved for summary judgment. In the first lawsuit, which led to two interlocutory appeals, the trial court denied Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. In the second lawsuit, the trial court entered summary judgment for Defendants as a final judgment. At issue in each appeal was the trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment asserting the ten-year statute of repose included in Indiana’s Product Liability Act. In all three appeals, which the Supreme Court consolidated, Plaintiffs requested reconsideration of the Court’s prior holding in AlliedSignal v. Ott. The Supreme Court (1) declined to reconsider Ott’s holdings with respect to statutory construction due to the principles of stare decisis and legislative acquiescence; but (2) concluded that the Product Liability Act’s statute of repose did not bar Plaintiffs’ claims, as the Act’s statute of repose does not apply to cases such as these where the plaintiffs have had protracted exposure to inherently dangerous foreign substances. View "Myers v. Crouse-Hinds Div. of Cooper Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought several claims against multiple defendants arising out of his incarceration for a probation violation that occurred after his term of probation had expired. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against all defendants. The court of appeals affirmed. Plaintiff sought transfer, contending that his claim against four individual probation officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 was incorrectly dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court granted transfer and reversed dismissal of Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against the individually-named probation officers, holding that Plaintiff’s complaint stated a claim for relief under section 1983 against these defendants. View "Thornton v. State" on Justia Law

Davis Security Systems, LLC hired Donnell Caldwell as a security guard for the West Calumet Complex. Before his employment, Caldwell had been romantically involved with Stacy Knighten, a resident of the Complex. While on duty, Caldwell and Knighten were involved in an altercation, and Caldwell shot Knighten in the back, paralyzing her from the waist down. Knighten filed a complaint for damages against, among others, Davis Security under the theory of respondent superior. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Davis Security on all claims. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Davis Security based on Knighten’s respondent superior claim, holding that the scope of Caldwell’s duties as an employee of Davis Security and the issue of whether in discharging his weapon Caldwell engaged in conduct consistent with his duties were matters that could not be resolved by summary disposition. Remanded. View "Knighten v. E. Chicago Housing Auth." on Justia Law