Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Hemphill Construction Company, Inc. (Hemphill) entered into a contract with the City of Jackson and subsequently subcontracted Interstate Carbonic Enterprises (ICE) for a project. Gay Lynn Harris, Jr., an owner and officer of ICE, was severely injured while working on the project in September 2020. Harris sought workers’ compensation benefits from Hemphill, but an Administrative Judge (AJ) ruled that Harris was not entitled to these benefits because he had voluntarily opted out of ICE’s workers’ compensation insurance coverage. Neither party appealed the AJ’s decision.In March 2022, Harris filed a negligence complaint against Hemphill in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County. Hemphill moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming tort immunity under the exclusive remedy provision of the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act (MWCA). The trial court agreed and granted Hemphill’s motion to dismiss. Harris appealed, arguing that tort immunity did not apply and that judicial estoppel should apply. Hemphill contended that Harris had not exhausted his administrative remedies.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and found that Harris was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his negligence suit. The court held that Hemphill was entitled to tort immunity because it had contractually required ICE to obtain workers’ compensation insurance for its employees, thus satisfying the statutory requirement to secure payment under the MWCA. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision to dismiss Harris’s negligence claim against Hemphill. View "Harris v. Hemphill Construction Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Hurricane Katrina destroyed Paul and Sylvia Minor’s home in 2005. The Minors had a homeowner’s insurance policy with United Services Automobile Association (USAA) that covered wind damage but excluded storm surge or flood damage. USAA issued payments for wind damage but not for storm surge or flood damage, leading to a dispute. The Minors claimed a total loss due to wind and demanded policy limits. In 2013, a jury awarded the Minors $1,547,293.37 in compensatory damages.The Minor Estate appealed a pretrial order granting partial summary judgment to USAA on the Minors’ bad faith claim. The Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, finding a genuine issue of material fact regarding USAA’s denial and delay of payment. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the bad faith claim. On remand, a jury awarded the Minors $10,000,000 in punitive damages and $457,858.89 in extra-contractual damages (attorneys’ fees). USAA appealed, and the Minor Estate cross-appealed the denial of its post-trial motion for additional attorneys’ fees.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and found no reversible error, affirming the jury’s award of $10,457,858.89 in damages. The court also reversed and rendered attorneys’ fees on behalf of the Estate in the amount of $4,500,000, plus post-judgment interest. The court held that the trial judge did not err in submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury and that the $10 million punitive damages award was not unconstitutionally disproportionate. The court also found no error in the jury’s award of extra-contractual damages and no errors warranting a new trial. View "United Services Automobile Association v. Estate of Minor" on Justia Law

The case involves Dr. Bryan C. Fagan, a surgeon, who called Judy Faulkner, a surgical scheduler, a vulgar name in the presence of several operating room personnel. Faulkner was not present during the incident but later heard about it from other staff members. She sued Fagan for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, claiming that the vulgarity constituted an attack on her professional abilities and was therefore slander per se.The Lee County County Court held a bench trial and ruled in favor of Faulkner on the defamation claim, awarding her $30,000 in damages, but ruled in favor of Fagan on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Fagan appealed the defamation ruling to the Lee County Circuit Court, which affirmed the County Court's decision. Fagan then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed and rendered the judgments of the lower courts, holding that the trial court manifestly erred by finding the statement defamatory.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment on different grounds. The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred as a matter of law by denying Fagan’s motion for a directed verdict. The Court concluded that name-calling, even as offensive as the term used by Fagan, is not actionable as defamation in Mississippi. The Court found that Faulkner's proof fell short of establishing a prima facie case of defamation per se, as the vulgarity did not impute a want of professional capacity. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the Lee County Circuit and County Courts. View "Fagan v. Faulkner" on Justia Law

Eason Propane, LLC, purchased a new Freightliner propane delivery truck, which caught fire due to Empire Truck Sales, LLC's negligence during repairs. The fire caused significant damage to the truck, leading to extensive business losses for Eason Propane. Eason Propane sued Empire, seeking damages for the truck's diminished value, repair costs, lost profits, and other consequential damages.The case was tried in the Lamar County Circuit Court, where the jury found Empire liable and awarded Eason Propane $263,443.39 in damages. Empire moved for a new trial on damages or a remittitur, arguing that the jury's award was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The trial court denied Empire's motion, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the jury's damages award was not manifestly unjust or so excessive as to shock the conscience. The court found that the evidence presented at trial supported the jury's findings, including the testimony of Eason Propane's experts regarding the truck's diminished value and lost profits. The court emphasized that it was within the jury's purview to weigh the credibility of the competing testimonies and evidence.The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Empire's motion for a new trial or remittitur. The jury's award of $112,698.46 for the truck's diminished value, $24,744.93 for repair costs, $120,000 for lost profits, and $6,000 for other consequential damages was affirmed. View "Stribling Equipment, LLC v. Eason Propane, LLC" on Justia Law

Jason Scarborough, a police officer, was involved in a car accident with Wanda Logan while responding to an emergency call. Scarborough was driving at 79 miles per hour in a 25-mile-per-hour residential zone with his emergency lights on but no siren. Logan, who was at a stop sign, pulled out in front of Scarborough, leading to a collision. Scarborough sustained severe injuries and sued Logan for negligence, seeking over $3 million in damages. The jury found Scarborough 60% at fault and Logan 40% at fault, awarding Scarborough $1.2 million, which the trial court reduced to $480,000 to reflect Scarborough's apportioned fault.The Rankin County Circuit Court allowed the deposition of Shane Remy, an accident reconstructionist, to be read at trial despite Logan's objection that Remy had not been qualified or tendered as an expert witness. Remy's testimony was crucial in attributing fault to Logan. The jury's verdict reflected a reduction based on Scarborough's fault, but the trial court further reduced the award, leading Scarborough to file a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which was denied.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and found that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Remy's deposition without proper qualification as an expert witness. This error was not harmless, as Remy's testimony was the only evidence of Logan's fault aside from Scarborough's account. The court also found that the trial court erred in further reducing the jury's award, as the jury had already accounted for Scarborough's fault. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, dismissing the direct appeal as moot. View "Scarborough v. Logan" on Justia Law

Joel Phillip McNinch, Jr., a dementia patient with other serious health issues, was admitted to Brandon Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC in June 2019. He was later admitted to Merit Health Rankin due to combative behaviors related to his dementia. He developed a decubitus ulcer and was admitted to St. Dominic Hospital, where he died the next day. His widow, Cheryl McNinch, requested her husband's medical records from Brandon Nursing and Merit Health soon after his death and received them in mid-December 2019. She filed a complaint in January 2022, alleging negligence, medical malpractice, gross negligence, and reckless disregard, claiming that substandard care had accelerated her husband's health deterioration and led to his death.The defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Mrs. McNinch argued that the discovery rule operated to toll the statute of limitations until she received the medical records. The trial court converted the defendant’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and granted the motion without holding a hearing.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the trial court's decision, finding that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the defendants. The Supreme Court held that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Mrs. McNinch had knowledge of negligent conduct through personal observation or other means prior to or at the time of Mr. McNinch’s death. The court found that the discovery rule could operate to toll the statute of limitations when the medical records are necessary to discover the negligence. The court concluded that Mrs. McNinch exercised reasonable diligence in requesting the medical records promptly, and therefore, the complaint was filed within the statute of limitations. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "McNINCH v. BRANDON NURSING & REHABILITATION CENTER" on Justia Law

In 2009, Leverne Brent was injured while working for the Mississippi Department of Human Services (DHS) in a building owned by Madated, LCC. The Mississippi State Agencies Workers’ Compensation Trust (Trust), the carrier for DHS, provided Brent with compensation and medical expenses for her injury. In 2012, Brent and her husband sued the building owner and reached a settlement of $750,000. The DHS and the Trust intervened, claiming $358,210.77 for compensation and medical expenses paid to Brent. Brent challenged this amount, arguing that it included expenses that were not legally recoverable, such as surveillance and investigation costs. The Intervenors reduced their demand to $335,216.27, and the disputed amount was held in escrow pending further order.The trial court ordered the Intervenors to produce invoices and checks for each claimed expenditure. Brent continued to dispute the accuracy of the reduced demand and filed a motion for contempt, arguing that the Intervenors had failed to provide legitimate costs and total amount requests for reimbursement. Brent specifically challenged the reimbursement of $2,887.50 for an Employer Medical Evaluation (EME) conducted by a non-treating medical provider, arguing that this was not medical treatment. The trial court granted the Intervenors' Motion to Establish and Settle Lien, finding that the EME was a medical expense within the meaning of the Act. Brent appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and disagreed with the lower court's interpretation of the statute. The court found that the EME was not a medical expense as defined by the Workers’ Compensation Law, which requires medical treatment to be necessary and reasonable. The court ruled that the EME, conducted by a non-treating medical provider for the purpose of obtaining a second opinion, did not meet this definition. Therefore, the court reversed the judgments of the lower courts and ruled in favor of Brent, finding that she was not required to repay the $2,887.50 for the EME. View "Brent v. Mississippi Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

A fire broke out at Victor Young's property in Yazoo City, Mississippi, and spread to Kenneth Hampton's property. The Yazoo City Fire Department struggled to extinguish the fire due to a lack of tank water and difficulty connecting to a nearby fire hydrant. As a result, Young's property was completely destroyed, and Hampton's property was significantly damaged. Hampton, who was not physically injured during the fire, suffered a cardiac event and subsequent stroke three days later. Hampton and Young sued Yazoo City, alleging negligence and reckless disregard in failing to provide the necessary knowledge and equipment to fight fires, failing to properly train and supervise its firefighters, and failing to adequately maintain its fire hydrant system.The Yazoo County Circuit Court denied Yazoo City's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the questions of the city's immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) for property damage and personal injury liability could not be answered without additional discovery. The city appealed this decision, arguing that it was immune from both property damage and personal injury liability under the MTCA.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the lower court's decision. The court found that Yazoo City was immune from property damage liability because the plaintiffs did not allege that the city acted with reckless disregard for the safety and well-being of any person, as required by the MTCA. The court also found that the city was immune from personal injury liability because Hampton's claim linked the property damage to his personal injury, but did not argue that the fire department acted in reckless disregard of his safety and well-being. The court concluded that Yazoo City was immune from both property damage and personal injury liability under the MTCA, and therefore, the lower court improperly denied the city's motion for summary judgment. View "Yazoo City v. Hampton" on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of Mississippi, two interlocutory appeals were consolidated, both arising from the same wrongful-death lawsuit. Beverly Butts, on behalf of the wrongful-death beneficiaries of John Albert Hemphill, Sr., alleged that four years prior to Hemphill's death, Dr. Reese Lindsey failed to remove part of a bladder catheter, leading to recurring infections and ultimately Hemphill's death. Additionally, she claimed that the staff at Greenwood Leflore Hospital, where Lindsey treated Hemphill, provided substandard care.Regarding Lindsey, the court found that he had not been lawfully served with process. Despite multiple summons, Butts failed to comply with the Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4, which outlines the requirements for serving process. As a result, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Lindsey, leading the Supreme Court to reverse the trial court's decision and render judgment dismissing Lindsey from the lawsuit.Concerning the Hospital, the court found that Butts had failed to provide the necessary medical expert testimony to support her medical negligence claim against the Hospital. Despite her argument that the Hospital's summary judgment motion was preemptive as no scheduling order had been set, the court noted that a defendant can file for summary judgment at any time. Given Butts's failure to present necessary expert testimony, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of summary judgment and rendered judgment in favor of the Hospital. View "Lindsey v. Butts" on Justia Law

The case involves a wrongful death claim by Leslie Smith, representative of the estate of Marcus D. Smith, against Rosalinde Minier, representative of the estate of Ingeborg Steiner, and Werner Enterprises, Inc. The claim arises from a multi-vehicle accident, including a tractor-trailer operated by Marcus D. Smith, a tractor-trailer owned by Werner Enterprises, and a personal vehicle operated by Ingeborg Steiner. Marcus Smith suffered a cervical fracture and multiple rib fractures, was prescribed Lortab (a combination of hydrocodone and acetaminophen), which he overdosed on, leading to his death from liver failure. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on the wrongful-death claim, finding that Marcus Smith's death from acetaminophen-induced liver failure was not foreseeable as a proximate cause of the original automobile accident. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, finding a genuine issue of material fact regarding the foreseeability of Marcus Smith's death.The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reversed the judgment of the Jackson County Circuit Court. The Court held that the foreseeability of a particular injury and the presence of an intervening or superseding cause are questions for the fact finder, in this case, the jury. The Court found that a genuine issue of material fact remains regarding the foreseeability of Marcus Smith's death from liver failure due to acetaminophen toxicity. Therefore, the grant of partial summary judgment by the trial court was improper, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Smith v. Minier" on Justia Law