Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

During the construction of Jeff Anderson Regional Medical Center’s (“ARMC”) expansion, scaffolding built by W.G. Yates & Sons Construction Company collapsed, injuring plaintiffs David McKean, Francesco Medina, Donald Arrington, and Wayne Robertson. The trial court granted summary judgment and dismissed plaintiffs’ claims against all defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decisions of the trial court. Although the Mississippi Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals’ decision to affirm the trial court, it nevertheless granted certiorari to clarify two issues: (1) whether the Mississippi Supreme Court adopted the seven-factor test used in "Hanna v. Huer, Johns Neel, Rivers, & Webb," (662 P.2d 243 (Kan. 1983) superceded by statute, as recognized in "Edwards v. Anderson Engineering, Inc.," (166 P.3d 1047 (Kan. 2007)), to determine whether an architect’s supervisory powers go beyond the provisions of the contract; and (2) to clarify the Court’s position on the effect of an “undocumented immigrant” status on recovery for workplace injuries. View "McKean v. Yates Engineering Corp." on Justia Law

Walter Griffith, Jr., a licensed master electrician, was critically injured while attempting to attach a ten-foot piece of metal conduit to an electrical pole owned by Entergy Mississippi, Inc. (“Entergy”). Griffith later filed a complaint against Entergy, alleging grossly negligent and willful conduct and requesting compensatory and punitive damages. The trial judge ultimately granted Entergy’s motion for summary judgment, and Griffith appealed to the Supreme Court, raising three alleged errors by the trial court in its grant of summary judgment to Entergy. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Griffith v. Entergy Mississippi, Inc." on Justia Law

An employee of NTC Transportation, Inc. (“NTC”) filed petitions with the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission (“the Commission”), claiming he had suffered compensable work-related injuries on two occasions. AmFed National Insurance Co. (“Amfed”), believing NTC’s workers’ compensation coverage to have lapsed due to NTC’s failure to timely pay the premium, responded and denied both liability and coverage as to the latter injury. AmFed’s denial of coverage was litigated and culminated in a judgment rendered in NTC’s favor. Based on the applicable law and particular facts of this case, the Supreme Court found that NTC had no insurance coverage with AmFed in effect at the time of the relevant injury. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded. View "Amfed National Insurance Co. v. NTC Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

While visiting the DeSoto County Civic Center, Cynthia Crider stepped in a hole that was obscured by grass. She was attending a high-school graduation at the Civic Center, operated by the DeSoto County Convention and Visitors Bureau. At the ceremony’s conclusion, Crider exited the Civic Center and proceeded across a grassy area to her car. As she crossed, Crider stepped in a hole obscured by overgrown grass. She fell and broke her ankle. Crider sued the Bureau, alleging that it failed to maintain the grassy area in a safe condition. The Bureau moved for summary judgment, claiming it enjoyed Mississippi Code Section 11-46-9(1)(v)’s immunity from certain premises-liability claims. In granting summary judgment, the trial judge reasoned that the Bureau enjoyed discretionary-function immunity because no statute mandated that it operate a civic center and because Crider failed to show any “laws or regulations . . . which would remove the Defendants’ particular acts (or inaction) from the ‘umbrella of discretionary function immunity.’” Crider appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Crider v. DeSoto County Convention & Visitors Bureau" on Justia Law

Gay St. Mary Williams and her husband, Larry Williams, filed a complaint against William Tucker and two insurance companies. The Williamses alleged that Mrs. Williams had been severely injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by Tucker. When Tucker failed to answer, the circuit clerk entered a default. The trial court denied Tucker’s motion to set aside the entry of default and his motion for reconsideration. After a hearing, the trial court awarded damages in the amount of $2,962,984.60, plus $300,000 to Larry Williams for loss of consortium, and entered a default judgment in favor of the Williamses. Tucker appealed, arguing that the trial court’s refusal to set aside the entry of default was an abuse of discretion. Alternatively, he challenged portions of the damages award. The Supreme Court found that under a liberal standard applicable to setting aside default judgments, the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to set aside the entry of default in this case. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Tucker v. Williams" on Justia Law

After a year of bullying and intimidation by a small group of students, Yahenacy Smith was beaten and severely injured while riding the school bus home. Smith sued the Leake County School District, alleging negligence and negligence per se. The circuit court found that the school district was entitled to discretionary-function immunity and granted the school district’s motion for summary judgment. Smith appealed. Finding that the broad governmental function of the school district here was ministerial, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court for Smith to proceed with her claims. View "Smith v. Leake County School District" on Justia Law

On her father’s behalf, Debra Tarvin signed a nursing home Admission Agreement which contained an arbitration provision. After her father Caldwell Tarvin died, she brought a wrongful-death suit against the nursing home, CLC of Jackson, LLC d/b/a Pleasant Hills Community Living Center (“Pleasant Hills”). Caldwell was admitted to Pleasant Hills in August 2007, and Debra signed an Admission Agreement as Caldwell’s “Responsible Party.” Janet Terrell and Annette Tarvin also signed the Agreement as “Family Members” but Caldwell himself did not sign the Agreement. Pleasant Hills moved to dismiss the proceedings and to compel arbitration. Debra responded and argued that Pleasant Hills had waived its right to compel arbitration by participating in the litigation. Debra also argued that Pleasant Hills had “completely ignore[d] the issue of whether or not Mr. Tarvin’s family members had the legal authority to bind him to an arbitration agreement[.]” Specifically, Debra argued that there was “no legal authority, such as a power of attorney or conservatorship” by which she could bind her father to the arbitration agreement, nor could she bind him under the Uniform Healthcare Decisions Act, because “the record is devoid of any evidence” that the physicians relied upon by Pleasant Hills were Caldwell’s primary physicians. The trial court granted Pleasant Hills' motion, and Debra appealed. The relevant statutes at play here were codified as the “Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act,” Mississippi Code Section 41-41-201 to 41-41-229 (the “Act”). The Supreme Court's review of this case found that Act required determination by a primary physician that an individual lacks capacity before a “surrogate” properly can make a healthcare decision for that individual. The record here did not support a finding that a certain "Dr. Thomas" was Caldwell’s primary physician. The Court therefore reversed the trial court’s order compelling arbitration and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Tarvin v. CLC of Jackson, LLC d/b/a Pleasant Hills Community Living Center" on Justia Law

Tomeka Handy filed a complaint alleging medical negligence against Madison County Nursing Home and Madison County. Handy filed her complaint for wrongful death on October 4, 2012, individually and in her capacity as the administratrix of the estate of her mother, Willie Handy, who was a resident of the nursing home from August 25, 2008, through the date of her death on April 12, 2011. The suit was filed on behalf of all the decedent’s wrongful death beneficiaries. After the county was dismissed, the nursing home filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because Handy had not designated an expert witness. Before the summary judgment hearing, Handy filed designations of two expert witnesses. The Circuit Court of Madison County granted the motion for summary judgment because Handy had failed to produce sworn expert testimony in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Handy filed a motion for reconsideration along with expert witness affidavits, but the circuit court denied the motion for reconsideration. Handy appealed, arguing that the circuit court dismissed her case as a sanction for a discovery violation, and the harsh sanction of dismissal amounted to an abuse of discretion. Because the record established that Handy failed to meet her burden of production on summary judgment, and the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Handy’s motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court. View "Handy v. Madison County Nursing Home" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, defendants the Mississippi Transportation Commission (“MTC”) and the Mississippi Department of Transportation (“MDOT”) moved for summary judgment to dismiss the case against them on immunity grounds under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”). Christopher Adams died from injuries he sustained when his motorcycle wrecked on Interstate 10 in Jackson County. After traveling north on Interstate 110 in Harrison County, Adams merged onto an eastbound lane of I-10, where he entered a construction zone. According to the complaint, Adams inadvertently drove into a closed lane and then, when he tried to navigate back into an open lane, his motorcycle hit an uneven surface between lanes and “rotated.” Adams was thrown from his motorcycle and into traffic, where two other vehicles hit him, causing injuries from which he later died. Adams' estate raised a number of claims against defendants all sounding in negligence and relating to the condition of the road, failure to place proper warnings, and creating hazardous driving conditions. The trial judge rejected the defendants’ argument that, notwithstanding certain narrower regulations requiring specific actions, they were immune from liability because the broader function of traffic-control-device placement was discretionary. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of immunity. View "Mississippi Transportation Commission v. Adams" on Justia Law

After hearing all the evidence in a medical-malpractice trial, the jury retired to deliberate. At some point during their deliberations, they requested a copy of the jury instructions, which the bailiff provided. But instead of providing the approved set of instructions, the bailiff mistakenly provided a set that the defendants previously had proffered, which included a peremptory instruction. The jury returned a unanimous defense verdict, and the parties left the courthouse. When the trial judge discovered the instruction mistake, he called the parties back to the courthouse and later ordered a new trial. But the defendants then filed a motion to enforce the high/low settlement agreement that the parties had entered into prior to trial. The trial judge agreed with the defendants that a new trial was not allowed under the agreement and rescinded his previous order granting it. Plaintiff appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the jury verdict lacked validity, and as such, no verdict was "achieved," leaving the condition precedent to the high/low agreement unsatisfied. Furthermore, the Court found the term "appeal rights" in the agreement was not ambiguous, and nothing else in the agreement precluded a new trial. The Court therefore reversed the trial judge’s decision to void his initial order, and remanded the case with instructions to the trial court to reinstate that order, which denied a mistrial but granted a new trial. View "Reynolds v. Allied Emergency Services, PC" on Justia Law