Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Two employees of RGH Enterprises, Inc. (RGH), stole valuables that belonged to the Ghafarianpoors while cleaning their residence in preparation of restoration the residence. The Ghafarianpoors sought recovery under alternative theories, negligence and vicarious liability. RGH sought summary judgment in the trial court on both. The trial court granted summary judgment for RGH as to the Ghafarianpoors’ claims of negligence, but it denied RGH summary judgment as to the Ghafarianpoors’ claims of vicarious liability. Because the record revealed the employees were without actual or apparent authority to steal from the Ghafarianpoors, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the county court denying summary judgment. View "RGH Enterprises, Inc. v. Ghafarianpoor" on Justia Law

Following a back surgery, Daniel Shope continued to experience lower back pain. Shope was referred to Dr. Michael Winkelmann at NewSouth Neurospine for an evaluation. Dr. Winkelmann recommended a course of opioid medication to enable Shope to participate in physical therapy and to return to work. In January 2013, Shope signed a NewSouth Neurospine Pain Management Policy, which specifically provided that Dr. Winkelmann could stop prescribing any or all medications if Shope used any illegal substances. In May 2014, Dr. Winkelmann informed Shope that he had been noncompliant with the policy and ceased his patient-physician relationship with Shope. Shope filed a complaint against Dr. Winkelmann in November 2018 in county court. The county court granted summary judgment to Dr. Winkelmann and NewSouth, finding that the claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Two days later, Shope appealed and designated the record. That same day, Dr. Winkelmann filed a Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 59 motion to alter or amend the judgment, which requested that the trial court consider relief under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and the Litigation Accountability Act. Shope received a cost estimate from the court clerk for $4,825.20 for the designation of the entire record. Shope revised his request for only Plaintiff's pleadings. The revised estimate was $2,593.20, which Shope paid. The trial court then ruled on Dr. Winkelmann's motion; Dr. Winkelmann and NewSouth then designated the record. Based on those designations, the clerk amended the estimate of the cost of preparing the record to $4,297.50; minus Shope's prepayment, the balance was $2,052. By October 4, 2020, thirty days after the trial court had ruled on Dr. Winkelmann’s posttrial motion, Shope had not paid the balance. Shope argued that under the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure, he was only obligated to pay for the portions of the record that he designated. On October 16, 2020, Dr. Winkelmann filed a motion to dismiss Shope’s appeal due to lack of appellate jurisdiction. On October 23, 2020, Shope paid the balance of the cost bond in the amount of $2,052, plus an additional $500. That same day, he filed a certificate of compliance. On November 3, 2020, the circuit court issued an order dismissing the appeal. Shope appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court November 4, 2020. The Supreme Court found that becanse Shope failed to pay the cost bond within the time frame provided by statute, his appeal was not perfected, and the circuit court lacked jurisdiction. Therefore, Dr. Winkelmann’s motion to dismiss the appeal was appropriately granted. View "Shope v. Winkelmann, et al." on Justia Law

A jury returned a $4 million verdict in favor of Plaintiff Jana Bracewell, Administratix of the Estate of Cameron Chase Hill, in a medical negligence/wrongful-death suit against Defendants, B. Michael Weber, M.D., and The OB-GYN Group of Laurel, P.A. Defendants appealed the judgment, claiming the trial court erred by denying their posttrial motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, in the alternative, a new trial. Plaintiff cross-appealed, claiming the trial court erred by reducing the jury’s noneconomic-damages award. Dr. Weber’s partner, Dr. Robert DeSantis, was Erica Shae Hill’s primary OB-GYN throughout her pregnancy. On November 23, 2001, Hill went into labor around 2:30 a.m.; she went to South Central Regional Medical Center in Laurel, Mississippi. Dr. Weber, who was on call for Dr. DeSantis that night, managed Hill’s care throughout labor, and he delivered Cameron Chase Hill by vaginal delivery at approximately 1:10 p.m. that afternoon. Cameron and Hill were discharged on November 25, 2001. The next day, Cameron was taken to Forrest General Hospital because he was not eating. Cameron ultimately was diagnosed with hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy (HIE), a neurological injury resulting from lack of oxygen to the brain. According to Defendants, Cameron’s Forrest General Hospital records for his admission shortly after birth included a secondary diagnosis of “viral meningits – NOS.” Cameron lived only to age five. Plaintiff filed a complaint in December 2002 on behalf of Cameron, alleging negligence on the part of Dr. Weber and The OB-GYN Group of Laurel. The complaint claimed that Dr. Weber breached the applicable standard of care by failing to recognize, appreciate, and respond to the signs and symptoms of fetal distress, ischemia, and/or hypoxia during the labor and delivery of Cameron. The Mississippi Supreme Court found no error in the trial court’s decision to deny Defendants’ motion for a JNOV or a new trial. As to Plaintiff’s cross-appeal, the Court agreed that the trial court erred by reducing the jury’s noneconomic-damages award, given that this action was filed before September 1, 2004, the date the amended version of Section 11-1-60(2)(a) went into effect. View "Weber, et al. v. Estate of Hill" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, Schaffner Manufacturing Company, Inc., argued that the circuit court erred by denying a portion of its motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Schaffner contended Darius Powell’s claims of negligence, negligent hiring, retention, and supervision all fell within the ambit of the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act. Powell alleged that on December 11, 2017, Rederick Kelly and O’Derrick Clark severely injured him while in the course and scope of their employment. The trial court ruled that the claims of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Kelly and Clark were barred by the statute of limitations. However, the trial court found that Powell’s claims of “Negligence, Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision, and Vicarious Liability” against Schaffner did not fall within the scope of the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act and denied the joint motion to dismiss those claims. The Mississippi Supreme Court agreed with Schaffner that Powell’s claims of negligent hiring, retention, supervision, and general negligence for failing to provide a safe work environment were all claims of direct negligence against Schaffner. "These claims properly fall within the scope of the Act. Therefore, the Act is Powell’s exclusive remedy for those claims, and those claims should have been dismissed." View "Schaffner Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Powell" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review arose from a single-car accident involving a 2005 Santa Fe Hyundai, which had been rented by Joyce Hutton, and driven by Derek Bell on U.S. Highway 61. It was reported to the police officer that the car drifted into the median, and Bell lost control. Both Bell and Hutton were injured. Hutton filed suit against Hyundai Motor America, Hyundai Motor Company, and Bell, and Bell filed a cross-claim against Hyundai. Hutton settled her injury claims against Bell prior to trial. Bell and Hutton proceeded against Hyundai. At trial, both alleged the car was defectively designed. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged the Hyundai was defectively designed due to an exposed, unprotected component of the anti-lock braking system (ABS). Plaintiffs claimed that an unseen and never-discovered object of unknown elements and composition struck a component part, dislodging an ABS tone ring temporarily, which caused the vehicle’s computer to send erratic braking signals. The erratic signals in turn caused the ABS computer to assume that the front right wheel was not turning, which in turn caused braking to occur on the front left side. The alleged one-sided braking caused Bell to lose control before the vehicle overturned multiple times. Hyundai countered that a phantom object was never seen, found, or identified by Bell, Hutton, the state trooper who investigated the accident, eyewitnesses to the accident, Plaintiffs’ witnesses (experts or otherwise), or anyone else. Further, Hyundai argued that, assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs’ multiple-chain-reaction theory were possible, the trajectory of any object would have occurred within fifty milliseconds - a scientific, physical impossibility. After a two-week trial, the jury returned a verdict for Plaintiffs: $193,000 for Hutton and $2 million for Bell. Hyundai appealed, claiming a number of errors by the trial court. The Supreme Court the trial court committed reversible error, therefore the verdict was reversed, and judgment rendered in favor of Hyundai. View "Hyundai Motor America et al. v. Hutton et al." on Justia Law

Roxanne Watson filed two successive lawsuits against Greenwood Leflore Hospital and Dr. John Lucas III (collectively, “GLH”), alleging medical negligence. Watson’s first complaint was dismissed without prejudice because a notice of claim was not filed with the chief executive officer of the governmental entity at least ninety days before instituting suit as required by Mississippi Code Section 11-46-11(1) (Rev. 2019) of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). Watson then refiled the complaint. GLH sought dismissal of the second complaint, contending that Watson was required to provide it with a second notice of claim and that the one-year statute of limitations had expired. The trial court denied GLH’s motion to dismiss, and the Mississippi Supreme Court granted an interlocutory appeal. After review, the Supreme Court concluded Watson satisfied the MTCA’s notice requirements, affirming the trial court’s order denying the motion to dismiss. View "Greenwood Leflore Hospital et al. v. Watson" on Justia Law

In the aftermath of her divorce from ex-Methodist minister Andrew Johnson, Kim Miller sued not only Johnson but also his employer, the Mississippi Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church (MUMC). Miller also sued fellow MUMC minister Susan Woodard. Her claims against Johnson were aimed at his risky extramarital sexual behavior, which led to Johnson contracting HIV and later infecting Miller with the virus. Miller based her claims against MUMC and Woodard on her allegation that, had the conference and the fellow minister followed United Methodist policy and procedure, they would have discovered Johnson’s behavior and remedied it or warned Miller before she contracted HIV. The question before the Mississippi Supreme Court on interlocutory appeal was whether she established a wrong for which she could legally recover. After review, the Court found "it is clear that Miller seeks to hold MUMC and Woodard legally accountable for failing to follow religious doctrine and procedure. Under the First Amendment, this Court has no authority to consider and enforce religious standards. Thus, MUMC and Woodard are entitled to summary judgment." The Court found Miller’s claims against her ex-husband, Johnson, were not barred by the First Amendment. Still, Johnson insisted he was entitled to summary judgment based on a mutual release in Miller and Johnson’s divorce settlement. The Court found Johnson did not pursue his affirmative defense based on the release for more than two and a half years. By that time, the trial court deemed this defense waived. And after review, the Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Johnson summary judgment on this basis. The trial court's orders denying MUMC’s and Woodard’s motions for summary judgment were reversed; the order denying Johnson’s motion for summary judgment was affirmed and Miller’s claims against Johnson remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Woodard v. Miller" on Justia Law

At issue before the Mississippi Supreme Court in this interlocutory appeal was whether the trial court erred by finding cause to grant a 120-day extension of time to serve process on Progressive Gulf Insurance Company. Plaintiffs, Jaswinder Kaur, Harvinder Singh, Karanveer Kamboj, and Gurdev Kamboj, were occupants of a vehicle that was involved in a collision with a vehicle operated by Mary Orebo and owned by Cassandra Mann. Plaintiffs’ vehicle had uninsured-motorist coverage provided by Progressive Gulf Insurance Company. Each Plaintiff filed a separate suit against all three Defendants on the eve of the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations. Progressive contended that difficulty locating other Defendants, the owner and driver of the vehicle, was not adequate cause. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in that decision. However, all parties agreed that the circuit court erred by refusing to dismiss the suits of three of the Plaintiffs who failed to seek extensions of time to serve process on Progressive before the end of the original 120-day period. View "Progressive Gulf Insurance Company v. Kaur, et al." on Justia Law

The crux of this interlocutory appeal was whether Plaintiffs, complaining of personal injury and property damage as a result of the alleged improper use of an oil-disposal well, had to exhaust their administrative remedies before the Mississippi State Oil and Gas Board (MSOGB) prior to proceeding on their common-law claims in the circuit court. Because the Mississippi Supreme Court determined the MSOGB could provide no adequate remedy for the Baucums’ personal-injury and property-damage claims, the Baucums were not required to exhaust administrative remedies before proceeding in the circuit court. View "Petro Harvester Oil & Gas Co., LLC, et al. v. Baucum" on Justia Law

Stacie Murray was driving home from work in the northbound lane on Highway 35 in Scott County, Mississippi. Kevin Parker, while in the course and scope of his employment with James Gray d/b/a Gray Trucking (Gray), was driving a fully loaded log truck in the southbound lane. The two vehicles collided. Murray sued Parker and Gray alleging she suffered personal injuries and property damage as a result of Parker’s negligence. The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review centered on whether allowing cross-examination of an expert witness with the accident report and a judicial opinion from another case amounted to reversible error. The Court also considered whether cumulative error required a new trial. James Hannah testified for Murray as an expert in accident reconstruction. Hannah testified that he visited the accident scene about two months after the accident and found a “gouge mark” in the highway that, in his opinion, indicated the area of impact. Hannah admitted that the highway patrolman who investigated the wreck, Trooper Greg Lucas, did not find or photograph a gouge mark. Hannah also admitted that he did not know whether the gouge mark was actually caused by the collision. Gray and Parker filed a pretrial motion to exclude Hannah’s testimony and opinions regarding the alleged gouge mark. They argued that Hannah’s testimony was based on “mere speculation” and was neither relevant nor reliable. But the trial court denied the motion and allowed Hannah to testify about the gouge mark. Over Murray’s objections, defense counsel cross-examined Hannah regarding the Uniform Crash Report (UCR) (i.e., the accident report) that Trooper Lucas prepared after the accident. The jury returned a nine-to-three verdict in favor of Gray and Parker. Murray filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. The Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals properly concluded that “[b]ecause Trooper Lucas was not qualified as an expert in accident reconstruction, his opinions on the paths of the subject vehicles and fault did not satisfy Rule 803(8)’s trustworthiness requirement. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the UCR’s narrative and diagram.” Further, the Court of Appeal properly concluded the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the cross-examination of Hannah because “it had no relevance to the present case and yet created a risk of unfair prejudice, misleading the jury, and confusing the issues.” The Court found Murray was entitled to a new trial. View "Murray v. James Gray d/b/a Gray Trucking" on Justia Law