Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought a negligence action against Defendant and Defendant's employer, a motel, to recover for injuries Plaintiff sustained while staying at the motel. The parties entered a settlement agreement, but the parties disputed some terms of the agreement. Plaintiff filed a separate action against Defendant seeking specific performance and reformation of the written instrument and asking the court to add to disputed terms that Plaintiff claimed the parties agreed to but mistakenly failed to reduce to writing. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff and reformed the written agreement to require Defendant to preclude Defendant’s insurer from controlling the defense of Plaintiff’s negligence claims and to cooperate with Plaintiff in the negligence action “either by agreeing to a consent judgment or having an uncontested hearing on liability and damages.” The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment as modified, holding that there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s judgment reforming the written instrument to include the disputed terms but that the parties did not intend for Defendant to enter a consent judgment. View "Hunter v. Moore" on Justia Law

Appellant filed suit alleging that Respondents - Odessa Gun & Pawn, Charles Doleshal, and Derrick Dady - negligently sold or entrusted a gun to Appellant’s mentally ill daughter, who used the gun to kill Appellant’s husband. Appellant alleged claims for negligence, negligent entrustment, and negligence per se. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Respondents, concluding (1) Appellant’s negligence claim was preempted by the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), (2) Appellant’s negligent entrustment claim failed to state a claim, and (3) Appellant’s individual claims against Doleshal and Dady were moot. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment to the extent it precluded Appellant from proceeding with her negligent entrustment claim but otherwise affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err by entering judgment for Respondents on Appellant’s negligence claim, as the PLCAA is constitutional and preempts Appellant’s negligence claim; (2) erred in granting judgment in favor of Respondents on Appellant’s claim for negligent entrustment, as this claim is not preempted by the PLCAA and is recognized by Missouri law; and (3) erred in granting summary judgment on Appellant’s individual claims for negligent entrustment, as these claims are viable. Remanded. View "Delana v. CED Sales, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against four City of Grandview police officers alleging wrongful arrest, battery, malicious prosecution and negligence. Plaintiffs joined the City, alleging that the City was vicariously liable for the officers’ actions because the City had purchased an insurance policy that contained a provision for law enforcement liability coverage, which coverage waived the City’s rights to sovereign immunity. The City moved for summary judgment, asserting that the insurance policy disclaimed coverage for any actions that would be prohibited by sovereign immunity. The circuit court overruled the motion. Thereafter, the City sought a writ of prohibition. The court of appeals denied the writ. The City subsequently sought a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court. The Court issued a preliminary writ of prohibition that it made permanent, holding that because the insurance policy expressly disclaimed a waiver of sovereign immunity and provided coverage to the City only for those claims for which sovereign immunity has been statutorily waived, the City did not waive sovereign immunity. View "State ex rel. City of Grandview v. Hon. Jack R. Grate" on Justia Law

A few weeks before his thirty-first birthday, John Doe filed suit against the Heart of America Council of the Boy Scouts of America and the national Boy Scouts of America organization (collectively, “the Boy Scouts”), alleging that the Boy Scouts were vicariously and directly liable for childhood sexual abuse allegedly committed by Doe’s former scoutmaster against Doe. The Boy Scouts moved for summary judgment, arguing that the childhood sexual abuse statute does not provide a basis for liability for anyone other than the actual perpetrator of the abuse, that they were not directly or vicariously liable for the scoutmaster’s acts, and that Doe’s claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court denied the Boy Scouts’ motions for summary judgment. Thereafter, the Boy Scouts filed a petition for writ of prohibition asking the Supreme Court to enjoin the trial court to sustain the Boy Scouts’ motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Court issued a preliminary writ and here made that writ permanent, holding that the statutes of limitations for Doe’s claims against the Boy Scouts have expired, and, by its terms, Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.046 does not provide a cause of action for childhood sexual abuse against non-perpetrators such as the Boy Scouts organization. View "State ex rel. Heart of Am. Council v. Hon. Charles H. McKenzie" on Justia Law

The Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District (MSD) brought claims of inverse condemnation, trespass, and negligence against the City of Bellefontaine Neighbors for damages caused to MSD sewer lines during the course of a city street improvement project. The City moved to dismiss, alleging that inverse condemnation does not apply to public property and that sovereign immunity applied and had not been waived. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the City. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that MSD failed to state an inverse condemnation claim, and sovereign immunity barred MSD’s tort claims against the City. View "Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist. v. City of Bellefontaine Neighbors" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a wrongful death action alleging that the negligent chiropractic services of Defendants caused the death of their relative. Plaintiffs filed an affidavit stating that they obtained the written opinion of a qualified health care provider in support of their claims as required by Mo. Rev. Stat. 538.225. Plaintiffs later voluntarily dismissed that action. Thereafter, Plaintiffs refiled an identical petition in the same court but did not attach the affidavit to their new petition. The trial court dismissed the action without prejudice under action 538.225 because Plaintiffs failed to file the affidavit within 180 days of filing the second action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly sustained Defendants’ motion to dismiss without prejudice for Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the requirements of section 538.225. View "Lang v. Goldsworthy" on Justia Law