Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Nevada
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The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint for failure to attach an affidavit of merit after concluding that her allegations sounded in professional negligence, holding that remand for further proceedings was required.At issue in this case was the relationship between Nevada's professional negligence statutes, Nev. Rev. Stat. Ch. 41A, and Nevada's elder abuse statute, Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.1395, and the statutes' application to claims against skilled nursing home facilities. The district court concluded that Plaintiff's allegations sounded in professional negligence, which claims require Plaintiffs to include an affidavit of merit as part of their complaint, and then dismissed the complaint for failure to attach such an affidavit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) on the face of Plaintiff's complaint it was unclear whether the gravamen of her claims sounded in professional negligence rather than elder abuse; and (2) remand was required for further factual development before such a determination can be reached. View "Yafchak v. South Las Vegas Medical Investors, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that the district court erred in denying Appellant's motion to compel arbitration and refusing to submit the arbitrability determination under the circumstances of this case to an arbitrator.Plaintiffs sued Airbnb, Inc. for wrongful death and personal injury alleging that Airbnb's services had been used by a party's host to rent the house where a shooting occurred, resulting in a fatality. Airbnb moved to compel arbitration, arguing that Plaintiffs had agreed to Airbnb's Terms of Service during the registration process for their accounts. The district court denied the motion to compel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the Federal Arbitrability Administration governed the enforcement of arbitration agreement at issue, and because the agreement delegated the arbitrability question to an arbitrator, the district court erred in deciding the arbitrability question. View "Airbnb, Inc. v. Rice" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief in this challenge to a district court order reinstating a claim against a cigarette manufacturer under the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act (NDTPA), holding that mandamus relief was not warranted.Plaintiffs brought filed suit against Petitioner, a cigarette manufacturer, alleging civil conspiracy and a violation of the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act (NDTPA). The district court granted Petitioner's motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiffs were not consumer fraud victims under Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.600(1) because they never used Petitioner's products. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiffs were not consumer fraud victims under the statute. The district court then granted reconsideration, concluding that the earlier dismissal order was erroneous. Petitioner then brought this petition, arguing that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the deceptive trade practices claim against Petitioner because they never used Petitioner's products. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. View "R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. District Court" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of mandamus in this tort action, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the scheduling order, reopening discovery, and granting a motion to substitute.At issue in this case was the standard for substituting an expert witness after the close of discovery. Lamont Compton brought this complaint against Petitioners seeking damages for injuries received from a motor vehicle accident. Compton designated Dr. Jeffrey Gross as his expert, after which Dr. Gross pleaded guilty to conspiracy in a federal case. The district court subsequently granted Compton's motion to substitute Dr. Raimundo Leon for Dr. Gross. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court concluded that hte district court properly granted the motion, holding that Nev. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4)'s good cause test, in combination with relevant local rules, provides the standard governing when a district court may modify a scheduling order. View "Torremoro v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellants' complaint on several alternative grounds and denying Appellants' motion to amend, holding that this appeal was foreclosed as far as it concerned the district court's dismissal ruling.Appellants filed a complaint alleging wrongful death and negligence against several defendants, but certain defendants were never served. The "Genting defendants" moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing, among other things, that the district court could not exercise general or specific personal jurisdiction over them and that the complaint should be dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The district court dismissed the complaint under Nev. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), (5) and (6) and the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellants' appeal of the dismissal of the complaint suffered from a fatal procedural flaw; and (2) the district court was within its discretion in denying the motion to amend. View "Hung v. Berhad" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting a motion for relief from a default judgment under Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) and (6), despite the fact that the motion was filed more than fourteen months after service of written notice of entry of default, holding that the district court abused its discretion in granting Rule 60(b) relief.Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that he was attacked by security guards on Defendant's premises and that Defendant was negligent in its duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition. Default was later entered against Defendant. Over fourteen months later Defendant filed a motion to set aside the judgment and stay execution on the ground of mistake or excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1) and any other reason justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6). The district court found sufficient ground for relief under both rules. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this Court had jurisdiction over this appeal; (2) Rule 60(b)(6) may not be used as a subterfuge to circumvent the time limits that apply to a request for relief based on Rule 60(b)(1); and (3) the district court abused its discretion in granting relief under Rule 60(b)(6). View "Vargas v. J Morales Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant's request for a declaration that Nev. Rev. Stat. 42.021 precluded Respondent from recovering its workers' compensation payments from Appellant's medical malpractice settlement proceeds, holding that the statute applies only to situations in which a medical malpractice defendant introduces evidence of a plaintiff's collateral source benefits.Appellant brought this action against Respondent asserting claims for declaratory and injunctive relief and claiming that Nev. Rev. Stat. 42.021(2) prohibited Respondent from asserting a lien against her settlement proceeds and seeking an injunction requiring Respondent to continue paying her workers' compensation benefits. The district court denied Appellant's motion for partial summary judgment and granted Respondent's Nev. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) motion, concluding that section 42.021's plain language applied only to actions where third-party payments were introduced into evidence and did not apply to cases that settled before trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plain language of sections 42.021(1) and (2) prohibits a payer of collateral source benefits from seeking reimbursement from a medical malpractice plaintiff only when the medical malpractice defendant introduces evidence of those payments. View "Harper v. Copperpoint Mutual Insurance Holding Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court on a defense verdict in this personal injury case, holding that Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief on any of their claims of error.Plaintiffs Gavin Cox and Minh-Hahn Cox sued David Copperfield, both individually and through his corporation, for negligence and other tort claims for injuries that Gavin allegedly suffered at a magic show. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in the proceedings below and that Plaintiffs failed to show reversible error. View "Cox v. MGM Grand Hotel, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court denied relief in this original petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion by denying Petitioner's motion and dismissing her complaint as to the party whom she failed timely to serve.Petitioner filed a complaint against Mark Thomas Anderson and his employer, Thor Development, LLC, alleging various tort claims arising out of a motor vehicle accident. After the expiration date of the Nev. R. Civ. P. 4 service period, Petitioner filed two motions to enlarge time for service. The district court granted the first motion but denied the second, finding that the motion was untimely. The court then dismissed Petitioners' complaint. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's subsequent request for relief, holding that Emergency Directive 009 did not toll the 120-day service period established by Rule 4(e), and therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's second motion to enlarge time. View "Cervantes-Guevara v. District Court" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court granted in part an interlocutory writ petition arising from a personal injury action in which Petitioner asserted that the district court improperly ordered that certain videos and reports were protected from disclosure as "work product" under Nev. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), holding that remand was required.Specifically, Petitioner argued that the district court erred in concluding that three surveillance videos and two related reports created by Petitioner's insurance company's investigators were subject to discovery and not protected from disclosure. The Supreme Court held (1) the first two videos and related report were not protected work product because their production was not directed by Petitioner's counsel; and (2) because the district court did not analyze whether the third video and accompanying report, which constituted work product, may nonetheless be discoverable upon a showing of substantial need and undue hardship further proceedings were required. View "Keolis Transit Services, LLC v. District Court" on Justia Law