Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

This lawsuit arose after Diane Collins rear-ended Ja Cynta McClendon’s car. Collins designated Dr. Eugene Appel as a testifying medical expert and filed an expert witness report. Before McClendon was able to depose Appel, Collins de-designated him as a testifying expert witness. Collins moved for a protective order to prevent McClendon from deposing Appel or calling him to testify at trial. McClendon subsequently moved to designate Appel as her own expert witness. The district court granted Collins’ motion for a protective order and denied McClendon’s motion. The jury subsequently entered judgment in favor of Collins. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) after an expert report has been disclosed, a testifying expert witness cannot regain the confidentiality protections of Nev. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B) by de-designating that witness to the status of a nontestifying expert; (2) after the expert witness has lost Rule 26(b)(4)(B)’s protections, the district court has the discretion whether to allow the witness to be further deposed or called to testify at trial by an opposing party; and (3) the district court abused its discretion by basing its decision on the fact that Appel had not yet been deposed, but the error was harmless. View "McClendon v. Collins" on Justia Law

Respondents filed a personal injury suit against Appellant arising from an automobile accident. Before trial, Respondents filed a motion in limine to preclude Appellant from presenting a low-impact defense in the case. The district court granted Respondents’ motion, concluding that the result was required by Hallmark v. Eldridge. During the trial, the court sustained eight objections by Respondents to Appellant’s questions and evidence as violating the pretrial order prohibiting a low-impact defense. Following these alleged violations and violations of two additional pretrial orders, the district court struck Appellant’s answer as a sanction. The court then entered a default judgment against Appellant. The Supreme Court reversed and ordered a new trial, holding (1) the district court erred in extending Hallmark to preclude all argument of a low-impact defense; and (2) any misconduct by Appellant’s trial counsel did not rise to the level requiring the case-ending sanctions imposed by the district court under BMW v. Roth. View "Rish v. Simao" on Justia Law

Jorgenson & Koka, LLP (J&K) filed this professional negligence action against the Nevada Department of Transportation (NDOT) and real parties in interest PWREO Eastern and St. Rose LLC (collectively, PWREO) and the City of Henderson. J&K, which leased a portion of a shopping center owned by PWREO, alleging that water entered its premises on two separate occasions and that NDOT failed to prevent the flooding. PWREO filed a cross-claim against NDOT and the City. NDOT moved to dismiss the amended complaint and the cross-claim for failure to comply with the mandatory filing requirements of Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.258. The district court denied the motions. This petition for writ relief followed. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that NDOT is not a design professional as envisioned by the legislature in Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.2565(1)(a), and therefore, the requirements of section 11.258 are inapplicable to NDOT since the action would not statutorily qualify as “an action involving nonresidential construction.” View "Nev. Dep’t of Transp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

During Vivian Harrison’s divorce proceeding to Kirk Harrison, Kirk hired psychiatrist Norton Roitman to conduct a psychiatric analysis of Vivian. Without meeting with or examining Vivian, Dr. Roitman submitted to the court a written report diagnosing Vivian with a personality disorder. Vivian subsequently filed a complaint against Dr. Roitman, alleging that his statements constituted, inter alia, medical malpractice and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted Roitman’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Dr. Roitman was absolutely immune from liability for each of Vivian’s causes of action because he was a witness preparing an expert report in connection with the matter in controversy at the time he made the statements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, even if the allegations contained in Vivian’s complaint were true, Dr. Roitman's defense of absolute immunity precluded her claim. View "Harrison v. Roitman" on Justia Law

Real parties in interest (collectively, Seaver) filed a complaint against Petitioners (collectively, the Helfsteins) and against Uninet Imaging, Inc., alleging claims arising out of agreements between the Helfsteins and Seaver following Uninet’s purchase of the Helfsteins’ companies. The Helfsteisn settled with Seaver, and Seaver voluntarily dismissed their claims against the Helfsteins. Seaver later filed a notice of rescission, alleging that the Helfsteisn fraudulently induced them to settle. Meanwhile, the district court resolved the claims between Seaver and Uninet. Seaver later filed a Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to set aside the settlement agreement and voluntary dismissal, seeking to proceed on their claims against the Helfsteins. The Helfsteisn filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction over them and that the Rule 60(b) motion was procedurally improper. The district court denied the motion. The Helfsteins then filed this original writ petition asking the Supreme Court to consider whether Rule 60(b) can be used to set aside a voluntary dismissal or a settlement agreement. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that even if Rule 60(b) applied in this case, the motion was time-barred. View "Helfstein v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Cristie Anderson and her husband (together, Plaintiffs) sued Mandalay Bay Resort and Casino (Mandalay) after Alonzo Gonzalez, a Mandalay employee, raped Anderson in her hotel room at Mandalay. Plaintiffs asserted claims for negligent hiring, vicarious liability, and loss of consortium but later abandoned all claims except the vicarious liability claim. The district court granted summary judgment for Mandalay, concluding that it was not reasonably foreseeable that Gonzalez would rape Anderson. The district court also denied, as futile, Anderson’s motion to amend her complaint to add direct negligence claims against Mandalay. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under the circumstances of this case, a reasonable jury could find that Gonzalez’s criminal conduct was reasonably foreseeable; and (2) direct negligence claims against Mandalay would not be futile because a reasonable jury might find that the criminal conduct was foreseeable. Remanded. View "Anderson v. Mandalay Corp." on Justia Law