Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Nevada
Ene v. Graham
The case revolves around a personal injury claim filed by Laura Graham against International Property Holdings, LLC (IPH) and its sole member, Ovidiu Ene. Graham sustained injuries when she tripped and fell over a sprinkler box on IPH's property. During the trial, Graham moved to assert that Ene was the alter ego of IPH, meaning he should be held personally liable for the injuries she sustained on the company's property.The district court found that Ene, as the sole member and manager of IPH, was indeed the alter ego of the company. The court based its decision on several factors: Ene had his own personal gate code to the property and used it for personal reasons without paying IPH or the property management company; Ene's father maintained a garden and a chicken coop on the property; the property's insurance was in Ene's name; and Ene remained the guarantor on the mortgage loan for the property.The Supreme Court of Nevada, however, disagreed with the district court's findings. The court clarified that the alter ego analysis for a limited liability company is the same as the analysis applied to a corporation. The court found that substantial evidence did not support the district court's determination that Ene was the alter ego of IPH. The court concluded that while Ene did influence and govern IPH, there was not a unity of interest and ownership such that Ene and IPH were inseparable. Furthermore, the court found no evidence that recognizing IPH as a separate entity from Ene would sanction fraud or promote injustice. As a result, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ene v. Graham" on Justia Law
Taylor v. Brill
In a medical malpractice case before the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, the plaintiff, Kimberly D. Taylor, sued Dr. Keith Brill and Women’s Health Associates of Southern Nevada-Martin PLLC for professional negligence. Taylor alleged that Dr. Brill breached the standard of care by perforating her uterus and bowel during a surgical procedure and failed to inform her of these complications. The jury ruled in favor of Dr. Brill and denied all of Taylor’s claims.The Supreme Court of Nevada held that in a professional negligence action, evidence of informed consent and assumption of the risk are irrelevant and inadmissible when the plaintiff does not challenge consent. The court stated that even if a plaintiff gave informed consent, it would not vitiate the medical provider’s duty to provide treatment according to the ordinary standard of care. Furthermore, evidence of a procedure’s risks must still fall within Nevada's professional negligence statute, and a case-by-case analysis is required to determine whether the evidence should be excluded due to its potential to confuse the jury.The court also held that expert or physician testimony is not required to demonstrate the reasonableness of the billing amount of special damages. The court found that the district court had abused its discretion by prohibiting non-expert evidence demonstrating the reasonableness of the charges for medical treatment received by Taylor.Finally, the court ruled that evidence of insurance write-downs is not admissible under NRS 42.021(1), as it only contemplates evidence of actual benefits paid to the plaintiff by collateral sources.Based on these errors, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, including a new trial. View "Taylor v. Brill" on Justia Law
Taylor v. Brill
The Supreme Court of Nevada ruled on a motion for disqualification of a supreme court justice in a medical malpractice action appeal. The appellant argued that Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct 2.11(A)(6)(d) required disqualification of Justice Douglas Herndon, who had been assigned the case when he was a district judge, but had not heard or decided any matters in the case before it was reassigned. The appellant argued that the rule required disqualification whenever a judge previously presided over a matter, regardless of the level of involvement.Justice Herndon and the respondents countered that he had seen no documents and performed no work on the case at the district court level, and therefore his impartiality could not be questioned. They argued that the Code of Judicial Conduct does not require disqualification in such circumstances, and that a judge has a general duty to hear and decide cases where disqualification is not required.After considering the language and context of the Code of Judicial Conduct, along with similar cases from other jurisdictions, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that to "preside" over a matter within the meaning of the disqualification rule, a judge must have exercised some control or authority over the matter in the lower court. Given that Justice Herndon had simply been administratively assigned the case and took no action during his assignment, he did not "preside" over the case in a way that mandated disqualification. The court therefore denied the motion for disqualification. View "Taylor v. Brill" on Justia Law
Sunrise Hospital v. Eighth Judicial District Court
This case revolves around a lawsuit filed by Tiffiny Grace, legal guardian of E.G., against Sunrise Hospital and Nurse Cord Olsen for professional negligence. E.G. was born prematurely at Sunrise Hospital and suffered permanent developmental damage following a cardiac arrest in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit. The hospital's Patient Safety Committee investigated the incident, which Grace sought to examine during discovery. However, Sunrise Hospital objected, asserting that the information was privileged under the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (PSQIA) and Nevada law. The district court compelled the testimony, ruling that Sunrise Hospital had waived any privilege by allowing testimony on certain privileged topics.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, however, disagreed with the lower court's interpretation. It ruled that the PSQIA provides an absolute privilege for patient safety work products that is not subject to waiver. The court explained that this privilege aims to encourage healthcare providers to identify and learn from errors without fear of legal repercussions. The court concluded that the district court erred by interpreting the PSQIA to allow for waiver of privilege and by failing to determine whether the testimony sought constituted identifiable or non-identifiable patient safety work product. Therefore, the court granted a writ of prohibition, vacated the district court's order, and directed the lower court to reconsider Grace's motion to compel in light of its interpretation of the PSQIA. View "Sunrise Hospital v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law
Igtiben v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.
This case arose from a wrongful death and professional negligence action brought by Linda F. Smith, the mother of Kamario Mantrell Smith, an inmate who died after unsuccessful heart surgery and subsequent complications. The defendants were Christopher L. Igtiben, M.D., Dignity Health, and related entities. Smith filed her complaint on November 22, 2022, alleging that the defendants' failure to recognize her son's sickle cell anemia before ordering a CT scan with contrast ultimately led to his death. Dr. Igtiben filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the applicable statute of limitations under NRS 41A.097(2) had expired. The district court denied the dismissal motion.The Court of Appeals of Nevada found that Smith had been placed on inquiry notice of potential professional negligence and wrongful death claims when she received her son's medical records in January 2020. Accordingly, NRS 41A.097(2) required her to file any professional negligence or wrongful death action within one year from that date. Because Smith did not file her complaint until November 2022, the statute of limitations had expired, and the district court should have dismissed the complaint as untimely. As a result, the court granted the writ of mandamus and directed the clerk to issue a writ instructing the district court to dismiss the complaint. View "Igtiben v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct." on Justia Law
Abbott v. City of Henderson
In September 2019, Kathryn Abbott was assisting her child on a slide at Vivaldi Park in Henderson when she slipped and fractured her leg in multiple places. Abbott and her husband, Andrew Dodgson-Field, sued the City of Henderson, alleging negligence arising from premises liability and loss of consortium, respectively. The City of Henderson claimed immunity under Nevada's recreational use statute, NRS 41.510, and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, finding the City of Henderson immune from suit.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that NRS 41.510's protections can apply to any premises, superseding a previous ruling that limited the statute's application to "rural, semi-rural, or nonresidential" property. The court determined that Abbott was engaged in a "recreational activity" as defined by the statute when she was injured, as walking and assisting a child playing on a playground is similar to the enumerated activities listed in the statute. The court also concluded that Abbott failed to present evidence to establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the City of Henderson willfully or maliciously failed to guard or warn against a dangerous condition. Therefore, the City of Henderson was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the district court correctly granted summary judgment in its favor. View "Abbott v. City of Henderson" on Justia Law
Aguilar v. Lucky Cab Co.
In a personal injury case, Alejandro Lopez Aguilar, the appellant, had filed a lawsuit against Lucky Cab Co. and Adugna Demesash, the respondents. Before trial, Lucky Cab made an offer of judgment to Aguilar for a lump sum of $150,001, explicitly stating that this amount did not include prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs incurred to date. Aguilar accepted the offer. Lucky Cab sent Aguilar both a check for $150,001 and a stipulation and order for dismissal. However, Aguilar did not process the check or consent to the dismissal, arguing that Lucky Cab had not fully paid the offer amount as it had not yet paid any costs or prejudgment interest. The district court granted dismissal with prejudice, concluding that Lucky Cab was entitled to dismissal once it tendered payment within the stipulated window. Aguilar appealed.The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court’s decision. The high court clarified that when an offer of judgment explicitly excludes costs, expenses, interest, and attorney fees, it promises two sums if accepted: (1) the principal amount for the claim(s), specified in the offer; and (2) a separate amount for costs, expenses, interest, and attorney fees that would be recoverable if a judgment were entered based on that offer. Consequently, under Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure (NRCP) 68(d)(2), an offeror cannot obtain dismissal unless they pay both the principal offer and the additional allowance for costs, expenses, interest, and attorney fees. In this case, Lucky Cab did not pay the pre-offer costs and interest that were promised and that Aguilar would be entitled to as a prevailing party. The case was remanded for the district court to determine the amount of awardable pre-offer costs and interest that Lucky Cab must pay to obtain dismissal. View "Aguilar v. Lucky Cab Co." on Justia Law
Taylor v. Brill
In a medical malpractice lawsuit, Kimberly Taylor claimed that Dr. Keith Brill breached the accepted standard of medical care by causing damage during her surgery. The Supreme Court of Nevada found that the lower court had made several errors during the trial. Firstly, the lower court should not have allowed any evidence or argument regarding Taylor's informed consent or assumption of risk, as Taylor's consent was uncontested and such information was irrelevant to determining whether Dr. Brill had conformed to the accepted standard of care. Secondly, the lower court should not have prohibited Taylor from presenting non-expert evidence to show that the costs of her medical damages were reasonable. The Supreme Court also found that the lower court should not have allowed evidence of insurance write-downs, as these did not create any payable benefit to Taylor. Finally, the lower court was wrong to limit the scope of Taylor's closing argument. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and remanded the case for further proceedings, including a new trial. View "Taylor v. Brill" on Justia Law
Sabater v. Razmy
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing the underlying tort action for failure to timely effect service of process, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a request for enlargement of time to serve and dismissing the action.Appellants sued Respondent for personal injuries following a car collision. Because Appellants failed to serve the summons and complaint on Respondent within 120 days the district court issued an order to show cause, and the summons and complaint were served. Respondent moved to quash the service of process and to dismiss the complaint. The district court denied Appellants' untimely motion for an extension of time to serve process and granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly denied Appellants' untimely motion for an extension of time and properly dismissed the case under Nev. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2). View "Sabater v. Razmy" on Justia Law
Olvera v. Wynn Las Vegas
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appeals officer limiting the reopening of Appellant's claim to the lumbar spine and affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant's petition for judicial review, holding that the appeals officer properly determined that the reopening of Appellant's claim was warranted only as to the lumbar spine.Although Appellant was previously treated for injuries to several parts of her body, including her head and back, she sought to reopen her claim due to the worsening condition of her lumbar spine. The appeals officer ordered that Appellant's claim be reopened for the lumbar spine only, and Appellant sought judicial review. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appeals officer properly limited the reopening of the claim to the lumbar spine. View "Olvera v. Wynn Las Vegas" on Justia Law