Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant's request for a declaration that Nev. Rev. Stat. 42.021 precluded Respondent from recovering its workers' compensation payments from Appellant's medical malpractice settlement proceeds, holding that the statute applies only to situations in which a medical malpractice defendant introduces evidence of a plaintiff's collateral source benefits.Appellant brought this action against Respondent asserting claims for declaratory and injunctive relief and claiming that Nev. Rev. Stat. 42.021(2) prohibited Respondent from asserting a lien against her settlement proceeds and seeking an injunction requiring Respondent to continue paying her workers' compensation benefits. The district court denied Appellant's motion for partial summary judgment and granted Respondent's Nev. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) motion, concluding that section 42.021's plain language applied only to actions where third-party payments were introduced into evidence and did not apply to cases that settled before trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plain language of sections 42.021(1) and (2) prohibits a payer of collateral source benefits from seeking reimbursement from a medical malpractice plaintiff only when the medical malpractice defendant introduces evidence of those payments. View "Harper v. Copperpoint Mutual Insurance Holding Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court on a defense verdict in this personal injury case, holding that Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief on any of their claims of error.Plaintiffs Gavin Cox and Minh-Hahn Cox sued David Copperfield, both individually and through his corporation, for negligence and other tort claims for injuries that Gavin allegedly suffered at a magic show. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in the proceedings below and that Plaintiffs failed to show reversible error. View "Cox v. MGM Grand Hotel, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied relief in this original petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion by denying Petitioner's motion and dismissing her complaint as to the party whom she failed timely to serve.Petitioner filed a complaint against Mark Thomas Anderson and his employer, Thor Development, LLC, alleging various tort claims arising out of a motor vehicle accident. After the expiration date of the Nev. R. Civ. P. 4 service period, Petitioner filed two motions to enlarge time for service. The district court granted the first motion but denied the second, finding that the motion was untimely. The court then dismissed Petitioners' complaint. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's subsequent request for relief, holding that Emergency Directive 009 did not toll the 120-day service period established by Rule 4(e), and therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's second motion to enlarge time. View "Cervantes-Guevara v. District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part an interlocutory writ petition arising from a personal injury action in which Petitioner asserted that the district court improperly ordered that certain videos and reports were protected from disclosure as "work product" under Nev. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), holding that remand was required.Specifically, Petitioner argued that the district court erred in concluding that three surveillance videos and two related reports created by Petitioner's insurance company's investigators were subject to discovery and not protected from disclosure. The Supreme Court held (1) the first two videos and related report were not protected work product because their production was not directed by Petitioner's counsel; and (2) because the district court did not analyze whether the third video and accompanying report, which constituted work product, may nonetheless be discoverable upon a showing of substantial need and undue hardship further proceedings were required. View "Keolis Transit Services, LLC v. District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the district court erred in dismissing Appellant's complaint alleging that EMTs wrongfully denied him medical treatment after concluding that Appellant's claims were barred by the public duty doctrine, Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.0336, and the Good Samaritan statute, Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.500(5).In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants negligently misdiagnosed him and negligently denied him medical treatment because he was homeless and uninsured. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that, as a matter of law, Defendants could not be held liable for damages based on the public duty doctrine or the Good Samaritan statute. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order to the extent it dismissed Plaintiff's claims based on misdiagnosis but reversed it to the extent it dismissed claims based on socioeconomic discrimination, holding that a failure to render medical assistance or to transport a patient to the hospital based solely on their socioeconomic status may qualify as an affirmative act exempted from the public duty doctrine and as gross negligence, which would render the Good Samaritan statute inapplicable. View "Porchia v. City of Las Vegas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court and appeals officer that Employee was incapacitated from earning "full wages" and therefore denying Employer and its insurer's petition for judicial review, holding that there was no error.At issue was whether Employee's inability to earn overtime due to his industrial injury amounted to being incapacitated from earning "full wages" such that he could seek to reopen his claim more than one year after its closing. The appeals officer concluded (1) Employee was incapacitated from earning full wages for the time specified under Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.400(1); (2) that Employee had satisfied the statute's period of incapacitation; and (3) therefore, Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.390(5) permitted Employee to submit an application to reopen his claim more than one year after it had closed. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the term "full wages" as used in section 616C.400(1) may include payments for overtime; and (2) substantial evidence supported the appeals officer's findings in this case. View "City of Henderson v. Wolfgram" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a pet store may not be held liable under tort law where a dog adopted at the store through an adoption event conducted by an independent charitable organization later attacks and injures an individual if the pet store did not assume a duty of care or have an agency relationship with the charitable organization that conducted the adoption event.James Todd was attacked by a dog adopted by his wife two days before from an independent pet-rescue organization holding an adoption event at a PetSmart store. The Todds sued PetSmart, among other defendants, for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and respondent superior. The district court denied PetSmart's motion for summary judgment, holding that PetSmart owed a duty to the Todds as a matter of law. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus sought by PetSmart, holding that PetSmart did not owe a duty of care to the Todds as a matter of law and that there was no genuine issue of fact regarding any alleged agency relationship between PetSmart and the charitable organization. View "PetSmart, Inc. v. District Court" on Justia Law

In this case brought by the parents of a victim of the Route 91 Harvest Festival massacre against the manufacturers and distributors of the AR-15 rifles the gunman used the Supreme Court held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.131 provided the gun manufacturers and distributors immunity from the claims asserted against them under Nevada law.Plaintiffs brought this suit in Nevada's federal district court alleging wrongful death, negligence per se, and negligent entrustment. The federal district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss the negligent entrustment and negligence per se claims but denied it as to the wrongful death claim. The federal court then reconsidered its dismissal of the negligence per se claim and certified three questions of law to the Supreme Court. In response, the Supreme Court held that section 41.131 provided the gun companies immunity from the wrongful death and negligence per se claims asserted against them under Nevada law. View "Parsons v. Colt's Manufacturing Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Defendant's anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint alleging slander and conspiracy, holding that Defendant failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his alleged communication leading to the civil complaint was made in good faith.At issue was how the district court at step one of the anti-SLAPP evaluation should proceed when Defendant denied making the alleged statement. The district court used Plaintiff's version of the alleged defamatory statement during its step-one analysis and then denied the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's denial that he made the alleged statement was irrelevant to step one of the anti-SLAPP analysis; (2) Defendant's alleged statement did not constitute a nonactionable opinion; and (3) the district court correctly denied Defendant's anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss. View "Spirtos v. Yemenidjian" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court determining that a proceeding before a citizen review board does not warrant tolling the statute of limitation under this Court's holding in State, Department of Human Resources v. Shively, 871 P.2d 355 (Nev. 1994), or under equitable tolling principles, holding that the district court did not err.Appellant filed a citizen complaint with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) Citizen Review Board (CRB) after an adverse encounter with LVMPD police officers. The CRB recommended additional officer training. Appellant later filed a civil complaint against LVMPD and the two officers (LVMPD respondents), claiming battery, false imprisonment, and negligence. The district court dismissed the case, concluding that the complaint was time-barred and that equitable considerations did not favor tolling. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Shively did not provide grounds for tolling the statute of limitations, and Appellant failed to establish grounds for equitable tolling. View "Wilson v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dep't" on Justia Law