Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a medical negligence claim brought by Janet Hild, the administrator of Scott Boldman's estate, against several medical professionals and entities, including Samaritan Health Partners and Good Samaritan Hospital. Boldman, who had multiple health issues, underwent an emergency appendectomy at Good Samaritan Hospital. Post-surgery, he became combative and removed his breathing tube, after which he soon died. Hild claimed that the anesthesia was improperly handled, causing Boldman's aggressive behavior and subsequent death. The hospital argued that Boldman self-extubated and suffered a cardiac arrest unrelated to the anesthesia.The case proceeded to a jury trial in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. The jury found that Sandra Ward, the Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist, was negligent in her care of Boldman. However, only the six jurors who found negligence were allowed to vote on whether Ward's negligence proximately caused Boldman's death. They concluded it did not. Hild filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that all jurors should have been allowed to vote on proximate cause. The trial court denied the motion.The Second District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision in part, holding that the trial court erred by not allowing all jurors to vote on proximate cause, and remanded the case for a new trial on specific issues. The hospital appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the same-juror rule applies in all negligence cases where the jury answers sequential interrogatories that separate the elements of negligence. This means the same three-fourths of jurors must concur on all elements for a valid verdict. The court reversed the Second District's decision to the extent it ordered a new trial and reinstated the jury's verdict in favor of the hospital. View "Hild v. Samaritan Health Partner" on Justia Law

The administrator of a deceased woman’s estate filed a complaint alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death against a doctor, the doctor’s employer, a hospital, and Medicare. The doctor and his employer included the affirmative defenses of insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process in their answer. Over two years later, they moved for summary judgment, arguing that the case had not commenced timely because the doctor had not been served with the complaint. The administrator opposed, claiming the doctor waived his defense by participating in the litigation. The trial court granted summary judgment, and the First District Court of Appeals affirmed.The administrator appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, urging it to overrule its decision in Gliozzo v. Univ. Urologists of Cleveland, Inc., which held that active participation in litigation does not waive the defense of insufficiency of service of process if properly raised and preserved. The Supreme Court of Ohio declined to overrule Gliozzo, reaffirming that the defense is not waived by participation in litigation if it is properly raised and preserved. The court emphasized that the burden of perfecting service lies with the plaintiff and that the rules of civil procedure govern the conduct of all parties equally.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that Dr. Ahmad properly preserved his insufficiency-of-service-of-process defense and that the administrator never perfected service of the complaint on him. Consequently, the trial court correctly dismissed the claims against Dr. Ahmad and his employer. The judgment of the First District Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Ackman v. Mercy Health W. Hosp., Inc." on Justia Law

Christopher Hildebrant, a real-estate developer, facilitated a property sale in 2011 and expected consulting fees from both the seller and the buyer. During the transaction, Hildebrant alleged that Thomas Weidman, a trustee on the Sycamore Township Board, demanded a kickback. To avoid paying, Hildebrant created a fictitious email account and sent himself an email portraying Weidman as demanding payments. This email was forwarded to another party but remained private until 2020, when Hildebrant showed it to other township officials during a separate transaction. Weidman learned of the email in November 2020 during an investigation and received a copy in January 2021.The Warren County Court of Common Pleas granted Hildebrant’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that Weidman’s defamation claim was time-barred by the statute of limitations, which began when the email was first sent in 2011. The court also ruled that Weidman’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and false-light invasion of privacy were similarly time-barred as they were derivative of the defamation claim.The Twelfth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the discovery rule applied to defamation claims when the publication was secretive or inherently unknowable. The court ruled that Weidman’s claims were not time-barred because he could not have known about the defamatory email until it was disclosed to him in 2020.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the appellate court’s decision, holding that the discovery rule applies to libel claims when the publication is secretive or inherently unknowable. The court also held that the discovery rule applies to derivative claims like IIED and false-light invasion of privacy when they are based on the same allegations as the libel claim. The case was remanded to the Warren County Court of Common Pleas for further proceedings. View "Weidman v. Hildebrandt" on Justia Law

Michael Berkheimer experienced severe medical issues after a chicken bone became lodged in his throat while eating a "boneless wing" at a restaurant. He sued the restaurant, its food supplier, and a chicken farm, alleging negligence, breach of warranty, and other claims. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants, stating they were not negligent as a matter of law. Berkheimer appealed, arguing that the court focused on the wrong question by determining whether the bone was natural to the boneless wing.The Twelfth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court concluded that the presence of a bone in the boneless wing was something a reasonable consumer could have anticipated and guarded against. The court applied a blended analysis, considering both whether the bone was foreign to or natural to the food and whether a consumer could reasonably expect its presence.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and upheld the lower court's decision. The court reaffirmed the analysis from Allen v. Grafton, which blends the "foreign-natural" test and the "reasonable-expectation" test. The court concluded that there was no breach of duty because a reasonable consumer could have expected and guarded against the presence of a bone in the boneless wing. The court emphasized that the label "boneless wing" was a description of the cooking style, not a guarantee of the absence of bones. Therefore, the judgment of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Berkheimer v. REKM, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Ohio dealt with a case involving the plaintiff, who was acting both individually and as the executor of an estate, and the defendants, which included a medical center and various medical professionals. However, the opinion provides very little information about the specific facts of the case or the legal issues at stake. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals, relying on the authority of a prior case, Everhart v. Coshocton Cty. Mem. Hosp. The case was then remanded back to the Court of Appeals to consider arguments that it had previously declined to address. The specific nature of these arguments, and the reasons for the Court of Appeals' initial refusal to consider them, are not provided in the opinion. As such, the precise holding of the Supreme Court of Ohio in this case cannot be determined from the available information. View "Davis v. Mercy St. Vincent Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals. The case involved a dispute between Ewing, in her capacity as executor of an estate and personal representative of the deceased's next of kin and beneficiaries, and UC Health along with other defendants. The court did not provide detailed facts or legal conclusions in its decision. Instead, it simply stated that it was reversing the judgment of the lower court based on the authority of a separate case, Everhart v. Coshocton Cty. Mem. Hosp. Since the court does not elaborate on the details of the case nor the reasons for its decision, the exact holding in this case isn't clear from the opinion provided. View "Ewing v. UC Health" on Justia Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of Ohio, the court considered whether a derivative claim for loss of parental consortium could proceed even when the primary medical negligence claim, on which it was based, was barred by the statute of repose. The appellants, Mr. and Mrs. McCarthy, had filed a medical negligence claim against Dr. Lee and associated medical practices, alleging negligent care in the treatment of Mrs. McCarthy's condition. The claim was dismissed due to the statute of repose. Subsequently, the McCarthys filed a separate claim on behalf of their three minor children for loss of consortium due to the treatment of Mrs. McCarthy's condition. The medical providers moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that it could not stand alone as it was a derivative claim of the previously dismissed medical claim. The trial court granted the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the children's derivative claim for loss of parental consortium could not exist when the principal claim on which it was based was extinguished by the statute of repose. The court explained that the statute of repose operates as a substantive bar to a claim, extinguishing both the remedy and the right. Therefore, when a principal claim is extinguished, no other claim derived from it can exist. The court affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss the children's derivative claim for loss of parental consortium. View "McCarthy v. Lee" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, the main issue was whether the four-year medical-claims statute of repose, set forth in R.C. 2305.113(C), applies to wrongful-death claims based on medical care. The facts of the case involved Todd Everhart, who had been involved in a car accident in 2003 and was subsequently transferred to Coshocton County Memorial Hospital. Despite finding an abnormality in his chest x-rays, the doctors did not inform him about it. Nearly three years later, Everhart was diagnosed with advanced-stage lung cancer and died two months later. His wife, Machelle Everhart, filed a lawsuit against the hospital and the doctors involved, alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death due to their failure to inform Mr. Everhart of his lung condition.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the broad definition of "medical claim" clearly and unambiguously includes wrongful-death claims based on medical care. Therefore, the four-year medical-claims statute of repose applies to such claims. The court ruled that the Tenth District Court of Appeals erroneously held otherwise and thus reversed its decision. The court remanded the case to the Tenth District Court of Appeals to address Mrs. Everhart's remaining assignment of error. View "Everhart v. Coshocton Cty. Mem. Hosp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus requiring the Industrial Commission of Ohio to award him a scheduled award of permanent partial disability (PPD) compensation under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.57(B) for the loss of the use of his right hand, holding that the court of appeals correctly denied the writ.Appellant was injured during the course of his employment as a laborer when he fell from a roof onto concrete below. A district hearing officer granted Appellant's request for scheduled-loss compensation, but a staff hearing officer vacated that order on appeal. The court of appeals denied Appellant's ensuing complaint for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that some evidence supported the commission's decision denying Appellant's request for compensation for the loss of the use of his right hand, and the commission did not abuse its discretion. View "State ex rel. Block v. Industrial Commission of Ohio" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals in this dispute arising out of environmental-cleanup and remediation work at two Superfund sites in Bronson, Michigan, holding that Restatement (Second) 193 does not govern the choice-of-law analysis for bad faith claims.Scott Fetzer Company filed this action asserting a breach of contract claim against certain insurance companies, including Travelers Casualty and Surety Company, alleging breaches of certain insurance contracts. Fetzer also asserted a tort claim against each company, arguing that they had acted in bad faith when handling his claims. As to Travelers, an administrative judge concluded that Ohio law applied to a discovery dispute concerning Scott Fetzer's bad faith claim. The court of appeals affirmed, determining that Ohio law governed the bad-faith discovery dispute because the cause of action was a tort. In affirming, the court applied the choice-of-law rules set forth in section 145 of the Restatement. Travelers appealed, arguing that section 193 governs the choice-of-law analysis for bad faith claims because they arise out of insurance contracts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly ruled that the choice-of-law analysis applicable to a bad-faith claim as provided by section 145. View "Scott Fetzer Co. v. American Home Assurance Co." on Justia Law