Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals issuing a limited writ of mandamus and ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to determine Appellee's appropriate pre-injury visual baseline and to apply that baseline to his request for compensation, holding that the Commission has discretion to use a claimant's vision as corrected by a hard contact lens as the claimant's pre-injury visual baseline.Appellee sustained an industrial injury to his right eye and underwent three surgical procedures to address the conditions allowed under his workers' compensation claim. Appellee then sought scheduled-loss compensation under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.57. After staff hearing officer denied Appellee's request Appellee filed a mandamus action arguing that the Commission had abused its discretion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the writ was appropriate to determine Appellee's pre-injury visual baseline and to then use that baseline to determine whether the medical evidence supports an award for total loss of sight under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.57(B). View "State ex rel. Cogan v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the court of claims seeking to recover a portion of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation (BWC)'s subrogated award in this case, holding that the BWC's attempted expansion of subrogation was unlawful.The BWC allowed Lamar Thomas's workers' compensation claim for some conditions he received in an industrial accident caused by a third party but disallowed an additional claim for other conditions linked to the workplace accident based on a second opinion rendered during a medical review. When Thomas settled his personal injury case against a third-party tortfeasor, the BWC recouped through subrogation the cost of the medical review it had used to deny Thomas's additional claim. Thomas brought suit against the BWC. The court of claims denied the complaint via judgment on the pleadings. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the medical review the BWC obtained was not an expense recoverable in subrogation. View "Thomas v. Logue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying the writ of mandamus sought by Stephen Harris to order the Industrial Commission of Ohio to reverse its decision denying Harris's request for scheduled-loss compensation for the permanent partial loss of sight of both eyes, holding that there were no grounds for the writ.After the Commission denied Harris's request for scheduled-loss compensation a district hearing officer determined that the medical evidence failed to establish that Harris had sustained any loss of vision in either eye as a result of the industrial injury. Harris filed a mandamus action requesting an order directing the Commission to reverse its decision. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that some evidence existed to support the Commission's decision. View "State ex rel. Harris v. Industrial Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's partial denial of Defendant's motion for summary judgment in this dog bite case, holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed, precluding summary judgment.Defendant in this case was a deputy sheriff and K-9 handler who hosted a cookout for friends at his home. Plaintiff, who attended the cookout, was bitten by Defendant's canine partner, Xyrem. Plaintiff brought suit, asserting a common-law negligence claim and a claim under Ohio Rev. Code 955.28, which imposes strict liability for injuries caused by a dog in certain situations. The trial court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment in part, determining that Defendant was immune from liability under section 955.28(B). Defendant appealed the denial of summary judgment on the negligence claim. The court of appeals reversed, holding that, as a matter of law, Defendant was not manifestly acting outside the scope of his employment or official responsibilities during the evening of the dog bite. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that reasonable minds could differ regarding whether Defendant was manifestly acting outside the scope of his employment during the events leading up to Plaintiff's injury. View "Harris v. Hilderbrand" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court determining that Plaintiff could not recover under a commercial general-liability (CGL) insurance policy issued by United Specialty Insurance Company, holding that when a CGL insurance policy excludes coverage for injuries arising out of an "assault or battery," the subjective intent of the person who committed the assault or battery is irrelevant.Brown County Care Center, an adult care facility, contracted with United for CGL insurance. The policy excluded coverage for bodily injury arising from "any actual, threatened or alleged assault or battery." Plaintiff was living at the Center when he was attacked by another resident, who was later found by the trial court to be not guilty of felonious assault by reason of insanity. Plaintiff sued, and he and the Center entered into a settlement. Plaintiff later brought a declaratory judgment action against United to collect on the judgment. The trial court determined that Plaintiff could not recover under the policy. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the attack on Plaintiff qualified as a civil-law assault; and (2) because the policy excluded coverage for bodily injuries arising for civil assaults the trial court did not err in its judgment. View "Krewina v. United Specialty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting Appellee's requested writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to reinstate an order of its staff hearing officer denying Appellee's request for temporary total disability (TTD) compensation, holding that Appellee demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief requested and a clear legal duty on the Commission's part to provide that relief.In granting the writ, the court of appeals concluded that the Commission incorrectly applied the law of voluntary abandonment, as set forth in State ex rel. Klein v. Precision Excavating & Grading Co., 1993 N.E.3d 386. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission misinterpreted and misapplied the law of voluntary abandonment as it related to Appellant's request for TTD compensation. View "State ex rel. Quest Diagnostics, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals issuing a limited writ of mandamus directing the Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its order denying Amanda Carpenter's request for death benefits after her fiancé, Christopher McDonald, died in an industrial accident, holding that a writ of mandamus was appropriate.In denying Carpenter's request for death benefits the Commission determined that Carpenter was not McDonald's surviving spouse. In issuing its limited writ of mandamus the Tenth District concluded that Carpenter could potentially qualify for death benefits as a member of McDonald's family. The court directed the Commission to vacate its order and to determine whether Carpenter was a member of McDonald's family under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.59(D) and, if so, the extent of her dependency. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Carpenter had a clear legal right to have the Commission apply section 4123.59(D) correctly to her claim for death benefits, and the Commission had a clear legal duty to do so. View "State ex rel. McDonald v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus ordering the City of East Cleveland to satisfy a civil judgment against it won by Marilyn Conard and Charles Hunt, plus pre- and post-judgment interest, or to take steps set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 1744.06(A) for appropriating the funds necessary to satisfy the judgment, holding that mandamus relief was warranted.Conard and Hunt sued the City for injuries they received after a police vehicle collided with their vehicle. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Hunt and Conard and entered a separate order awarding prejudgment interest. Hunt and the administrator of the estate of Conard later commenced this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the City to satisfy the judgment. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that section 2744.06(A) imposed a clear legal duty on the City to satisfy the judgment rendered in favor of Hunt and Conard. View "State ex rel. Hunt v. City of East Cleveland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court declining to declare Plaintiff a wrongfully imprisoned person, holding that the court of appeals did not err in concluding that Plaintiff was not entitled to a jury trial for his wrongful imprisonment claims.Plaintiff brought this action against the state of Ohio to be declared a "wrongly imprisoned individual" under Ohio Rev. Code 2743.48(A). Plaintiff included a jury demand with his complaint, but the trial court overruled the demand. After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment for the state. The court of appeals affirmed, ruling that Plaintiff did not have a constitutional right to a jury trial in the wrongful-imprisonment action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the constitutional right to a jury trial does not attach to wrongful imprisonment actions. View "McClain v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's denial of Greenville's motion to dismiss this tort case, holding that Plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts that, if proven, demonstrate that Ohio Rev. Code 2744.02(B)(4) applied to the facts of this case.At issue was whether the absence of a fire extinguisher within a building of a physical subdivision is a physical defect such that an exception to immunity exists under Ohio Rev. Code 2744.04(B)(4). Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Greenville City Schools and other defendants (collectively, Greenville) alleging that Greenville negligently caused their injuries after a bottle of isopropyl alcohol caught fire and exploded in a science class. Greenville filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that it was immune from liability and that no exception to immunity applied. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the absence of a fire extinguisher or other safety equipment within a science classroom could be a physical defect such that an exception to immunity could exist under section 2744.02(B)(4). View "Doe v. Greenville City Schools" on Justia Law