Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus ordering the City of East Cleveland to satisfy a civil judgment against it won by Marilyn Conard and Charles Hunt, plus pre- and post-judgment interest, or to take steps set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 1744.06(A) for appropriating the funds necessary to satisfy the judgment, holding that mandamus relief was warranted.Conard and Hunt sued the City for injuries they received after a police vehicle collided with their vehicle. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Hunt and Conard and entered a separate order awarding prejudgment interest. Hunt and the administrator of the estate of Conard later commenced this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the City to satisfy the judgment. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that section 2744.06(A) imposed a clear legal duty on the City to satisfy the judgment rendered in favor of Hunt and Conard. View "State ex rel. Hunt v. City of East Cleveland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court declining to declare Plaintiff a wrongfully imprisoned person, holding that the court of appeals did not err in concluding that Plaintiff was not entitled to a jury trial for his wrongful imprisonment claims.Plaintiff brought this action against the state of Ohio to be declared a "wrongly imprisoned individual" under Ohio Rev. Code 2743.48(A). Plaintiff included a jury demand with his complaint, but the trial court overruled the demand. After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment for the state. The court of appeals affirmed, ruling that Plaintiff did not have a constitutional right to a jury trial in the wrongful-imprisonment action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the constitutional right to a jury trial does not attach to wrongful imprisonment actions. View "McClain v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's denial of Greenville's motion to dismiss this tort case, holding that Plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts that, if proven, demonstrate that Ohio Rev. Code 2744.02(B)(4) applied to the facts of this case.At issue was whether the absence of a fire extinguisher within a building of a physical subdivision is a physical defect such that an exception to immunity exists under Ohio Rev. Code 2744.04(B)(4). Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Greenville City Schools and other defendants (collectively, Greenville) alleging that Greenville negligently caused their injuries after a bottle of isopropyl alcohol caught fire and exploded in a science class. Greenville filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that it was immune from liability and that no exception to immunity applied. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the absence of a fire extinguisher or other safety equipment within a science classroom could be a physical defect such that an exception to immunity could exist under section 2744.02(B)(4). View "Doe v. Greenville City Schools" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of court of appeals denying a writ of mandamus sought by Waste Management of Ohio, Inc. ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to reverse its decision granting T.A.'s application for benefits, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion.Travis Gelhausen died shortly after getting into an accident while driving a truck for Waste Management of Ohio, Inc. T.A. applied for benefits on behalf of her and Gelhausen's minor daughter, S.G., for Gelhausen's loss of the use of his arms and legs before his death. The Commission granted the application. Waste Management sought a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission either to vacate its award or to limit the award. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission's award was proper. View "State ex rel. Waste Management of Ohio, Inc. v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment for employees of a children's services agency and dismissing the wrongful death action against them, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed, barring summary judgment.Appellant, the grandmother of Harmony Carsey, who was two years old when she died at her mother's home, brought a wrongful death action against employees of Perry County Children's Services (Appellees). Appellees moved for summary judgment, arguing that as children's services workers, they were immune from liability because they had not acted recklessly or wantonly or violated their duty of care. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that Appellees were immune from liability. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the conduct of one or more of the agency employees was reckless or wanton. View "Smathers v. Glass" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the compensatory-damages caps for noneconomic loss in Ohio Rev. Code 2315.18 were unconstitutionally applied to Plaintiff, who was sexually abused by Defendant when she was a child.A jury found Defendant guilty of over ninety counts of, among other things, rape and kidnapping. Thirty-four of those counts involved acts against Plaintiff. Plaintiff later filed a tort action against Defendant and asked the trial court for a declaratory judgment holding that section 2315.18 was unconstitutional as applied to her case. The jury awarded Plaintiff, inter alia, $20 million in compensatory damages for the abuse she suffered after the damages caps went in effect. The trial court denied Plaintiff's request for declaratory relief and reduced her $20 million noneconomic damages award to $250,000. The court reversed, holding that section 2315.18 is unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiff to the extent that it failed to include an exception to its compensatory-damages caps for noneconomic loss for plaintiffs who have suffered permanent and severe psychological injuries. View "Brandt v. Pompa" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision reversing the trial court's judgment for Plaintiff after denying the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant, the manufacturing company Johns Manville, holding that the court of appeals did not err in applying the relevant law when reviewing John Manville's motion for summary judgment.Plaintiff brought this action alleging that Johns Manville intentionally caused her husband to be injured while working. After the trial court denied Johns Manville's motion for summary judgment the jury found in favor of Plaintiff. The court of appeals reversed, holding that summary judgment should have been granted in John Manville's favor and that the case should not have been given to the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed after reaffirming that when reviewing a trial court's decision to deny summary judgment in cases in which a jury ultimately reached a verdict in the nonmoving party's favor, an appellate court must construe the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party when applying the law, holding that the court of appeals did not err in its review. View "Bliss v. Johns Manville" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a negligent credentialing is a separate and independent claim from medical negligence but that a negligent credentialing claim cannot proceed without either a simultaneous or prior adjudication of or stipulation to medical negligence.At issue was whether a hospital's grant of staff privileges to a physician, otherwise known as credentialing a physician, confers a duty upon the hospital that is separate and independent of the duty the physical owes to the hospital's patients. If so, the question remained whether a patient's negligent credentialing claim can proceed in the absence of a prior adjudication or stipulation that the physician was negligent in his care of the patient. The trial court in this case granted the hospital's motion for summary judgment on the negligent credentialing claim. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a negligent credentialing claim cannot proceed without either a simultaneous or prior adjudication of or stipulation that a doctor committed medical malpractice; and (2) because such an adjudication or stipulation was not present in this case, the negligent credentialing claim was properly dismissed. View "Walling v. Brenya" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus sought by Walmart, Inc. ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to reverse its decision awarding Dianna Hixson temporary total disability (TTD) compensation on the basis of State ex rel. Klein v. Precision Excavating & Grading Co., 119 N.E.3d 386 (Ohio 2018), holding that Klein applies prospectively only.Before the Supreme Court issued Klein, the Commission awarded Hixson TTD compensation. After Klein was released, Walmart, Hixson's former employer, filed this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the termination of Hixson's TTD compensation after the date notified Walmart of her retirement. The court of appeals granted the writ, concluding that the Commission abused its discretion by awarding TTD compensation for the period following Hixson's retirement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Klein does not apply retroactively and should be applied prospectively only. View "State ex rel. Walmart, Inc. v. Hixson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Heights Chiropractic Physicians, LLC, for the negligence of its employee, chiropractor Don Bisesi, D.C. even though the trial court had dismissed Plaintiff's direct claim against Dr. Bisesi, holding that Heights Chiropractic could not be held vicariously liable for Dr. Bisesi's alleged negligence.In a refiled complaint, Plaintiff claimed that Dr. Bisesi acted negligently when he applied excessive pressure to her back, causing her left breast implant to rupture and that Heights Chiropractic was liable for Dr. Bisesi's negligence. The trial court granted Dr. Bisesi's motion to dismiss on the ground that Plaintiff did not validly serve him with her refiled complaint and then granted Heights Chiropractic's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff failed timely to serve Dr. Bisesi with her refiled complaint, and because her cause of action against Dr. Bisesi had expired, her cause of action against Dr. Bisesi was extinguished by operation of law. View "Clawson v. Heights Chiropractic Physicians, LLC" on Justia Law