Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Rita Oteka, a faculty member at The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, attended a commencement ceremony voluntarily. While walking to her car after the event, she was struck and injured by a vehicle driven by a University police officer. The University, a self-insured employer for workers' compensation, reported the injury to its third-party claims administrator. The administrator denied benefits, stating that Oteka was using her personal insurance, no medical evidence was presented, and the injury was not work-related. Oteka did not contest this denial or file a compensation claim.Oteka later sued the police officer for negligence, and the University substituted in as the defendant. The University claimed that workers' compensation benefits were the exclusive remedy for Oteka's injury, asserting for the first time that the injury was work-related. The district court denied the University's plea to the jurisdiction, and the University appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas affirmed, holding that the Division of Workers' Compensation did not have exclusive jurisdiction over the course-and-scope issue in this context.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the Division does not have exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether an injury was work-related when the issue is raised by an employer's exclusive-remedy defense and the employee's lawsuit does not depend on entitlement to workers' compensation benefits. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment, emphasizing that the Workers' Compensation Act does not provide a procedural mechanism for obtaining a course-and-scope finding from the Division without the employee first filing a compensation claim. View "THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS RIO GRANDE VALLEY v. OTEKA" on Justia Law

In April 2022, six-year-old Emory Sayre was killed by her school bus in Parker County, Texas. The bus was manufactured by Blue Bird Body Company and sold by Rush Truck Centers of Texas to Brock Independent School District. Emory's parents, Sean and Tori Sayre, filed a lawsuit in Dallas County against Rush Truck and Blue Bird, asserting various claims including strict liability and negligence. They argued that venue was proper in Dallas County due to several activities related to the bus sale occurring there.The trial court denied the defendants' motion to transfer venue to Parker or Comal County. Rush Truck and Blue Bird filed an interlocutory appeal, which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas affirmed, holding that a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred in Dallas County.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and focused on whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to entertain the interlocutory appeal. The Court held that Section 15.003(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code permits interlocutory appeals only in cases where a plaintiff’s independent claim to venue is at issue. Since the Sayres asserted identical claims based on identical facts with identical venue grounds, the trial court did not need to determine whether each plaintiff independently established proper venue. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in taking jurisdiction of the interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of Texas vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Rush Truck Centers of Texas, L.P. v. Sayre" on Justia Law

A service dog attacked a young child in a restaurant, leading the child's parents to sue several parties, including a medical doctor who had written letters for the dog's owner, stating that her service animals helped with her anxiety disorder. The parents did not dispute the doctor's diagnosis but argued that he was negligent for not verifying whether the dog was appropriately trained as a service animal, which they claimed led to their daughter's injuries.The trial court denied the doctor's motion to dismiss, which argued that the claims were health care liability claims (HCLCs) requiring an expert report. The Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that the claims did not concern the doctor's medical diagnosis or treatment and thus did not constitute HCLCs.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the claims against the doctor were not HCLCs. The court held that the doctor's failure to verify the dog's training did not involve a departure from accepted standards of medical care. Therefore, an expert report was not required. The court affirmed the lower courts' decisions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Leibman v. Waldroup" on Justia Law

Hurricane Harvey caused significant flooding in Texas in 2017. Homeowners in Matagorda County sued Tenaris Bay City Inc., a nearby pipeline manufacturing company, alleging that design defects at its facility caused flood damage to their homes. The plaintiffs claimed negligence, gross negligence, negligence per se, and negligent nuisance. The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and the court of appeals affirmed the decision.The district court directed a verdict on gross negligence in favor of Tenaris but submitted the other negligence theories to the jury. The jury found Tenaris liable on all three negligence theories, and the district court rendered judgment for $2.8 million plus interest. Tenaris appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the judgment.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case, focusing on whether the plaintiffs proved that Tenaris's negligence was the cause of the flooding. The court concluded that there was legally insufficient evidence to show that the plaintiffs' homes would not have flooded but for Tenaris's actions. The plaintiffs' expert witness admitted he had not conducted the necessary scientific analysis to determine the cause of the flooding at the specific properties. The court emphasized that in cases of catastrophic rainfall, proving causation requires reliable evidence that the defendant's actions were the but-for cause of the damage.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgments of the lower courts and rendered judgment for Tenaris, holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove that their flood damage would not have occurred without Tenaris's alleged negligence. View "TENARIS BAY CITY INC. v. ELLISOR" on Justia Law

Renaissance Medical Foundation (the Practice) is a nonprofit health organization certified by the Texas Medical Board. The Practice employed Dr. Michael Burke, a neurosurgeon, to provide medical services to its patients. Rebecca Lugo brought her daughter to Doctors Hospital at Renaissance for brain surgery performed by Dr. Burke. The surgery resulted in permanent neurological damage to Lugo’s daughter. Dr. Burke later expressed that a retractor used during the procedure migrated into the child’s brainstem, causing the injury. Lugo filed a lawsuit alleging negligence by Dr. Burke and sought to hold the Practice vicariously liable for his actions.The trial court denied the Practice’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that it could not be held vicariously liable for Dr. Burke’s negligence because it did not control the manner in which he provided medical care and that Dr. Burke was an independent contractor. The court concluded that Dr. Burke’s employment agreement granted the Practice sufficient control over him to trigger vicarious liability. The court authorized a permissive interlocutory appeal of the ruling.The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that Dr. Burke was an employee of the Practice under traditional common-law factors and was acting within the scope of his employment when the alleged negligence occurred. The Practice then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court of Texas.The Supreme Court of Texas held that a nonprofit health organization may not be held vicariously liable if exercising its right of control regarding the alleged negligence would interfere with its employee physician’s exercise of independent medical judgment. The court concluded that the Practice did not conclusively demonstrate such interference and affirmed the denial of the Practice’s motion for summary judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "RENAISSANCE MEDICAL FOUNDATION v. LUGO" on Justia Law

Ireille Williams-Bush, a 35-year-old woman, was taken to Medical City Arlington Hospital with symptoms indicative of a pulmonary embolism. However, she was diagnosed with a non-ST-elevated myocardial infarction and admitted under that diagnosis. The consulting cardiologist did not screen her for a pulmonary embolism. She was discharged in stable condition but died three days later from clotting in her heart and lungs. Her husband, Jared Bush, sued the hospital and associated physicians for negligence, focusing on the hospital's failure to have adequate protocols to ensure proper diagnosis and treatment.The trial court initially found the expert report by Dr. Cam Patterson, which supported Bush's claims, to be adequate. However, the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas reversed this decision, deeming the report conclusory regarding causation and dismissing the claims against the hospital with prejudice. The appellate court held that the expert's opinions did not sufficiently explain how the hospital's policies could have influenced the medical decisions made by the physicians.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the expert report adequate. The court concluded that Dr. Patterson's report provided a fair summary of the standard of care, the hospital's breach, and the causal relationship between the breach and Williams-Bush's death. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "BUSH v. COLUMBIA MEDICAL CENTER OF ARLINGTON SUBSIDIARY, L.P." on Justia Law

Pamela McKenzie was shopping at a Walgreens in Houston in 2019 when she was detained on suspicion of shoplifting. A Walgreens employee called the police, suspecting McKenzie was the same person who had stolen from the store earlier that day. After reviewing surveillance footage, the police determined McKenzie was not the thief and released her. McKenzie claimed that other Walgreens employees had agreed she was not the thief, but the employee called the police anyway. She sued Walgreens for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, gross negligence, respondeat superior liability for employee negligence, and negligent hiring, training, and supervision (NHTS).The trial court denied Walgreens' motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), which allows for early dismissal of legal actions based on the exercise of free speech. A divided Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the trial court erred by not dismissing McKenzie’s claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, gross negligence, and vicarious liability for employee negligence. However, it held that the NHTS claim was not subject to dismissal under the TCPA because it was not entirely based on the employee’s exercise of free speech rights.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the TCPA does apply to McKenzie’s NHTS claim. The court concluded that McKenzie failed to meet her evidentiary burden to avoid dismissal, as she did not provide clear and specific evidence for each essential element of her NHTS claim. Consequently, the court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment in part and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, specifically for the dismissal of McKenzie’s NHTS claim. The remainder of the Court of Appeals' judgment was left undisturbed. View "WALGREENS v. MCKENZIE" on Justia Law

A suspected shoplifter with an outstanding arrest warrant shot two police officers at a retail store, killing one and injuring the other. The officers were attempting to arrest the suspect at the request of an off-duty officer working as a security guard for the retailer. The deceased officer's parents and the injured officer sued the security guard, the retailer, and the security company.The trial court dismissed the claims against the security guard under the Tort Claims Act, finding his actions were within the scope of his employment as a police officer. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of the retailer and the security company. The plaintiffs appealed.The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas reversed in part, holding that a jury could find the security guard's conduct before the warrant check was outside the scope of his police duties. The court affirmed the dismissal of claims based on the warrant check and subsequent conduct but found fact issues precluded summary judgment on other claims against the retailer.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the security guard's conduct was within the scope of his employment as a police officer, entitling him to dismissal under the Tort Claims Act. The court also adopted the public-safety officer's rule, limiting the duties owed to officers injured by the negligence that necessitated their response. Applying this rule, the court found no evidence that the retailer breached its duty to warn the officers of a known, dangerous condition. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment dismissing the claims against the security guard and granting summary judgment for the other defendants. View "SEWARD v. SANTANDER" on Justia Law

Two Texas lawyers, Michael A. Pohl and Robert Ammons, represented out-of-state clients in personal injury cases filed outside Texas. The clients, from Louisiana and Arkansas, alleged that they were solicited by individuals on behalf of the lawyers, which led to the signing of legal-services contracts. The clients later sued the lawyers in Texas, seeking to void the contracts under Texas Government Code Section 82.0651(a), which allows clients to void contracts procured through barratry, and to recover fees and penalties.The trial court dismissed all claims, granting summary judgment in favor of the lawyers. The clients appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that Section 82.0651(a) applied because part of the lawyers' conduct occurred in Texas. The court also rejected the lawyers' arguments regarding limitations and res judicata and allowed Reese's intervention in the case.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that Section 82.0651(a) does not extend to the nonresident clients' claims because the core conduct targeted by the statute—solicitation of a legal-services contract through barratry—occurred outside Texas. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment to the extent it allowed the clients to proceed with their claims under Section 82.0651(a) and rendered judgment that they take nothing on those claims. However, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment regarding the breach of fiduciary duty claims and remanded those claims to the trial court for further proceedings. View "POHL v. CHEATHAM" on Justia Law

An employee, Sharon Dunn, was injured while working as an emergency-department nurse for East Texas Medical Center Athens (ETMC Athens), a nonsubscriber to the Texas workers’ compensation program. Dunn alleged that an emergency medical technician (EMT), who was not employed by ETMC Athens, negligently pushed a stretcher into her, causing a serious back injury. Dunn initially sued the EMT and his employer, but those claims were dismissed due to her failure to timely serve an expert report as required by the Texas Medical Liability Act. Dunn then amended her pleadings to assert negligence claims against ETMC Athens.The trial court granted ETMC Athens's motion to designate the EMT and his employer as responsible third parties under the Texas proportionate-responsibility statute. However, eleven months later, Dunn moved to strike the designations, arguing that her suit was an action to collect workers’ compensation benefits, to which the proportionate-responsibility statute does not apply. The trial court granted Dunn’s motion, and the court of appeals denied ETMC Athens’s petition for mandamus relief.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by striking the designations. The court held that the proportionate-responsibility statute applies because Dunn’s negligence claim against ETMC Athens is not an action to collect workers’ compensation benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The court also held that the Act does not prohibit nonsubscribing employers from designating responsible third parties and that there was sufficient evidence of the third parties’ responsibility. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas conditionally granted ETMC Athens’s petition for mandamus relief, ordering the trial court to vacate its order striking the designations. View "IN RE EAST TEXAS MEDICAL CENTER ATHENS" on Justia Law