Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Rodriguez sued HEB for negligence, alleging that he tripped and fell over an unsecured metal plate in front of a grocery cart corral in a Brownsville HEB parking lot and sustained injuries to his knee, arm, face, neck, and shoulder. He received medical treatments, including two spinal surgeries. According to his expert witness, Rodriguez may require additional spinal surgery. While that suit was pending, Rodriguez was involved in an incident at a Sam’s Club in which he allegedly sustained head and neck injuries after a roll of artificial turf being carried by an employee fell on his head. Rodriguez has also filed suit against Sam’s Club. HEB retained an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Swan, as its medical expert. Though Swan routinely examines patients before formulating expert opinions, he did not examine Rodriguez before preparing his report. Based solely on review of Rodriguez’s medical records, Swan opined that Rodriguez suffered from a preexisting spinal condition, that his injury “was present with or without the fall,” and that “[n]othing about the MRI,” taken within a month after Rodriguez’s fall, suggested acute injury. HEB requested that Rodriguez be required to submit to a physical examination by Swan. The trial court denied HEB’s motion without explanation. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed, reasoning that Rodriguez’s condition and its cause are in controversy. View "In re H.E.B. Grocery Co, L.P." on Justia Law

Carswell’s estate alleged that CHRISTUS St. Catherine Hospital and others committed medical malpractice causing him to die in the hospital in 2004 and that the hospital took post-mortem actions to cover up the malpractice, including failing to properly notify the county medical examiner of the patient’s death and improperly obtaining the widow’s consent for a private autopsy. The jury did not find against the hospital on the malpractice claim, but found that the hospital improperly obtained the widow’s consent and awarded damages on that claim. The trial court concluded the autopsy claims were not health care liability claims and, therefore, not untimely. The court of appeals affirmed the damages award but reduced the amount of prejudgment interest and vacated discovery sanctions. The Texas Supreme Court held that the claims based on the hospital’s post-mortem actions were health care liability claims and were barred by limitations because they were not asserted until over three years after the operative facts took place. The court of appeals did not err by reversing and rendering as to the discovery sanctions. View "CHRISTUS Health Gulf Coast v. Carswell" on Justia Law

Steven Phillips was convicted of and pled guilty to several crimes. A DNA test conducted several years later excluded Phillips as the perpetrator. The trial court granted habeas relief. Thereafter, Phillips applied to the Comptroller for wrongful imprisonment compensation under the Tim Cole Act (“the Act”). The Comptroller found that Phillips was due $2 million for the time he was incarcerated. Phillips also requested compensation for child support he had failed to pay. A 1978 Arkansas divorce decree ordered Phillips to pay Cheryl Macumber child support. In 2013, Macumber sued Phillips in Texas to register and enforce the Arkansas divorce decree. The trial court rendered judgment (“the Enforcement Judgment”) for Macumber, finding she was entitled to $304,861. Phillips requested that the Comptroller pay child support compensation based on the amount awarded by the Enforcement Judgment. The Comptroller concluded that compensation owed under the Act was $25,125. Phillips petitioned for mandamus relief. The Supreme Court granted conditional relief, holding (1) the Comptroller is not bound by a court’s judgment in a child support enforcement proceeding; (2) the Comptroller’s determinations are subject to review by the Supreme Court; and (3) in this case, the Comptroller is directed to recalculate the compensation owed to Phillips under section 103.052(1)(2) of the Act. View "In re Phillips" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant for defamation. The trial court dismissed the suit under the Texas Citizens Participation Act, which provides for the award of attorney’s fees and expenses, as well as sanctions “sufficient to deter” future similar actions. The trial court granted a portion of the attorney’s fees and expenses requested by Defendant but declined to award sanctions. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and expenses but remanded for the trial court to reconsider its decision to deny sanctions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the courts below used the wrong standard in determining the attorney’s fees portion of the award. Remanded to the trial court for its determination of “reasonable attorney’s fees” under the appropriate standard. View "Sullivan v. Abraham" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a public official, sued Defendants, a politically oriented blog and its executive director, for libel. The trial court dismissed the action under the Texas Citizens Participation Act, concluding that Plaintiff had not met his burden of proving that Defendant published the alleged falsehood with “actual malice.” Plaintiff appealed, arguing that actual malice was not an element of his claim because his status in relation to the defamation was more that of a private individual than a public official. The court of appeals agreed with Plaintiff and reversed the judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that actual malice was an element of Plaintiff’s defamation claim. Remanded. View "Greer v. Abraham" on Justia Law

Petitioners in this case were Mexican citizens who broadcast television programs on over-the-air signals that originated in Mexico but traveled into parts of Texas. Respondents were residents of Texas who alleged that Petitioners defamed them in some of those television programs. Petitioners filed special appearances challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction over them. The trial court denied the special appearances. In an interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that Petitioners had minimum contacts with Texas and that the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Petitioners will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. View "TV Azteca, S.A.B. de C.V. v. Ruiz" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants, attorneys Eric Turton and Oscar Gonzalez and the Law Office of Oscar C. Gonzalez, alleging that they misappropriated $75,000 in trust funds that Turton received after settling a case on Plaintiff’s behalf. The jury found that all three defendants were engaged in a joint enterprise and a joint venture with respect to Plaintiff’s case and committed various torts in relation to Plaintiff. In response to a proportionate-responsibility question, the jury assigned forty percent to Turton, thirty percent to Gonzalez, and thirty percent to the Law Office. The trial court entered judgment holding all three defendants jointly and severally liable for actual damages, pre-judgment interest, additional Texas Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act damages, and attorney’s fees. Gonzalez and the Law Office appealed. The court of appeals concluded that Plaintiff could only recover for professional negligence, which amounted to $77,500 in actual damages. The court’s opinion did not address the jury’s proportionate-responsibility findings but nonetheless applied those findings in its judgment, ordering Gonzalez and the Law Firm to each pay Sloan $23,250. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred by failing to address the sufficiency of the evidence of a joint enterprise or joint venture or the legal implications of those findings. Remanded. View "Sloan v. Law Office of Oscar C. Gonzalez, Inc." on Justia Law

J&D Towing, LLC, a towing company, owned only one tow truck that was rendered a total loss when a negligent motorist collided with the truck. J&D filed a claim with American Alternative Insurance Corporation (AAIC) under an underinsured-motorist policy issued by AAIC requesting compensation for the loss of use of the truck. AAIC denied the claim. Thereafter, J&D sued AAIC seeking loss-of-use damages. The trial court entered judgment in favor of J&D. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Texas law allows loss-of-use damages for partial destruction but not for total destruction of personal property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Texas law permits loss-of-use damages in total-destruction cases. View "J&D Towing, LLC v. Am. Alternative Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

In 2006, Jason Jenkins was injured while using an acid-addition system at a chemical plant. The acid-addition was added to the plant in 1992 by Occidental Chemical Corporation. Occidental sold the plant to Equistar chemicals, L.P., Jenkins’s employer, in 1998. Jenkins sued Occidental, among other defendants, alleging that Occidental’s negligent design of the acid-addition system caused his injuries. Occidental affirmatively pled two statutes of repose. After a jury trial, the trial court rendered judgment that Jenkins take nothing, concluding that the verdict supported at least one of Occidental’s repose defenses. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Jenkins’s claim was based on Occidental’s negligent design of the acid-addition system, a theory that survived Occidental’s sale of the property and continued independently of any premises-liability claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a claim against a previous owner for injury allegedly caused by a dangerous condition of real property is a premises-liability claim, regardless of the previous property owner’s role in creating the condition; and (2) because the previous owner sold the property several years before Plaintiff’s accident and did not otherwise owe Plaintiff a duty of care, the court of appeals erred in holding Occidental liable for the dangerous condition and Jenkins’s injury. View "Occidential Chemical Corp. v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident that occurred when a Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) trooper ran a red light while pursuing a reckless driver. Plaintiff filed suit against DPS, relying on the Texas Tort Claims Act’s sovereign-immunity waiver. DPS filed a combined motion for summary judgment and plea to the jurisdiction, asserting that it retained immunity from suit based on the trooper’s official immunity and the emergency-response exception to the Tort Claims Act’s immunity waiver. The trial court denied DPS’s motion and plea. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding, inter alia, that DPS failed conclusively to establish the good-faith element of its official-immunity defense, and DPS’s summary judgment was incompetent to establish good faith because it failed to address whether the trooper considered alternative courses of action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals applied an inaccurate good-faith standard and erred in concluding that DPS failed to adduce evidence addressing alternatives to pursuit. Remanded. View "Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Bonilla" on Justia Law