Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Texas
Greer v. Abraham
Plaintiff, a public official, sued Defendants, a politically oriented blog and its executive director, for libel. The trial court dismissed the action under the Texas Citizens Participation Act, concluding that Plaintiff had not met his burden of proving that Defendant published the alleged falsehood with “actual malice.” Plaintiff appealed, arguing that actual malice was not an element of his claim because his status in relation to the defamation was more that of a private individual than a public official. The court of appeals agreed with Plaintiff and reversed the judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that actual malice was an element of Plaintiff’s defamation claim. Remanded. View "Greer v. Abraham" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Injury Law, Supreme Court of Texas
TV Azteca, S.A.B. de C.V. v. Ruiz
Petitioners in this case were Mexican citizens who broadcast television programs on over-the-air signals that originated in Mexico but traveled into parts of Texas. Respondents were residents of Texas who alleged that Petitioners defamed them in some of those television programs. Petitioners filed special appearances challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction over them. The trial court denied the special appearances. In an interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that Petitioners had minimum contacts with Texas and that the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Petitioners will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. View "TV Azteca, S.A.B. de C.V. v. Ruiz" on Justia Law
Sloan v. Law Office of Oscar C. Gonzalez, Inc.
Plaintiff sued Defendants, attorneys Eric Turton and Oscar Gonzalez and the Law Office of Oscar C. Gonzalez, alleging that they misappropriated $75,000 in trust funds that Turton received after settling a case on Plaintiff’s behalf. The jury found that all three defendants were engaged in a joint enterprise and a joint venture with respect to Plaintiff’s case and committed various torts in relation to Plaintiff. In response to a proportionate-responsibility question, the jury assigned forty percent to Turton, thirty percent to Gonzalez, and thirty percent to the Law Office. The trial court entered judgment holding all three defendants jointly and severally liable for actual damages, pre-judgment interest, additional Texas Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act damages, and attorney’s fees. Gonzalez and the Law Office appealed. The court of appeals concluded that Plaintiff could only recover for professional negligence, which amounted to $77,500 in actual damages. The court’s opinion did not address the jury’s proportionate-responsibility findings but nonetheless applied those findings in its judgment, ordering Gonzalez and the Law Firm to each pay Sloan $23,250. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred by failing to address the sufficiency of the evidence of a joint enterprise or joint venture or the legal implications of those findings. Remanded. View "Sloan v. Law Office of Oscar C. Gonzalez, Inc." on Justia Law
J&D Towing, LLC v. Am. Alternative Ins. Corp.
J&D Towing, LLC, a towing company, owned only one tow truck that was rendered a total loss when a negligent motorist collided with the truck. J&D filed a claim with American Alternative Insurance Corporation (AAIC) under an underinsured-motorist policy issued by AAIC requesting compensation for the loss of use of the truck. AAIC denied the claim. Thereafter, J&D sued AAIC seeking loss-of-use damages. The trial court entered judgment in favor of J&D. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Texas law allows loss-of-use damages for partial destruction but not for total destruction of personal property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Texas law permits loss-of-use damages in total-destruction cases. View "J&D Towing, LLC v. Am. Alternative Ins. Corp." on Justia Law
Occidential Chemical Corp. v. Jenkins
In 2006, Jason Jenkins was injured while using an acid-addition system at a chemical plant. The acid-addition was added to the plant in 1992 by Occidental Chemical Corporation. Occidental sold the plant to Equistar chemicals, L.P., Jenkins’s employer, in 1998. Jenkins sued Occidental, among other defendants, alleging that Occidental’s negligent design of the acid-addition system caused his injuries. Occidental affirmatively pled two statutes of repose. After a jury trial, the trial court rendered judgment that Jenkins take nothing, concluding that the verdict supported at least one of Occidental’s repose defenses. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Jenkins’s claim was based on Occidental’s negligent design of the acid-addition system, a theory that survived Occidental’s sale of the property and continued independently of any premises-liability claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a claim against a previous owner for injury allegedly caused by a dangerous condition of real property is a premises-liability claim, regardless of the previous property owner’s role in creating the condition; and (2) because the previous owner sold the property several years before Plaintiff’s accident and did not otherwise owe Plaintiff a duty of care, the court of appeals erred in holding Occidental liable for the dangerous condition and Jenkins’s injury. View "Occidential Chemical Corp. v. Jenkins" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Injury Law, Supreme Court of Texas
Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Bonilla
Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident that occurred when a Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) trooper ran a red light while pursuing a reckless driver. Plaintiff filed suit against DPS, relying on the Texas Tort Claims Act’s sovereign-immunity waiver. DPS filed a combined motion for summary judgment and plea to the jurisdiction, asserting that it retained immunity from suit based on the trooper’s official immunity and the emergency-response exception to the Tort Claims Act’s immunity waiver. The trial court denied DPS’s motion and plea. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding, inter alia, that DPS failed conclusively to establish the good-faith element of its official-immunity defense, and DPS’s summary judgment was incompetent to establish good faith because it failed to address whether the trooper considered alternative courses of action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals applied an inaccurate good-faith standard and erred in concluding that DPS failed to adduce evidence addressing alternatives to pursuit. Remanded. View "Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Bonilla" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Injury Law, Supreme Court of Texas
Galvan v. Memorial Hermann Hosp. Sys.
Plaintiff sued Hospital, alleging that she was injured when she slipped on water on the floor. Hospital filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that Plaintiff’s claim was a health care liability claim (HCLC), and Plaintiff failed to serve an expert report as required by the Texas Medical Liability Act. The trial court denied Hospital’s motion. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that because Plaintiff’s claim was based on an alleged departure from accepted standards of safety, it was an HCLC. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that no substantive nexus was shown to exist between the safety standards Plaintiff alleged Hospital violated the the provision of health care, and therefore, Plaintiff’s claim was not a health care liability claim. View "Galvan v. Memorial Hermann Hosp. Sys." on Justia Law
Reddic v. E. Texas Med. Ctr. Reg’l Health Care Sys.
Plaintiff, a visitor at Hospital, fell when she slipped on a floor mat in the hospital lobby. Plaintiff sued Hospital on a premises liability theory. Hospital asserted that Plaintiff’s claim was a health care liability claim (HCLC) under the Texas Medical Liability Act, and therefore, the claim must be dismissed because Plaintiff did not serve an expert report as required by the Texas Medical Liability Act. The trial court denied Hospital’s motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the floor care of the hospital lobby had an indirect relationship to the provision of health care that was sufficient to satisfy the safety prong of the Act, and therefore, Plaintiff’s claim was an HCLC. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the record did not reflect a substantive nexus between the safety standards Plaintiff claimed Hospital violated and Hospital’s provision of health care. View "Reddic v. E. Texas Med. Ctr. Reg’l Health Care Sys." on Justia Law