Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals in this products-liability case concluding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendants was consistent with due process, holding that the minimum-contacts analysis requires evaluation of a defendant's contacts with the forum - Texas - as a whole.Plaintiff was injured when he used a lithium-ion battery that he bought at a store in Texas and used it to charge his e-cigarette. Although Defendants sold and distributed the batteries to manufacturers in Texas they argued that Texas courts lacked personal jurisdiction because they did not send the batteries to Texas for resale to individual consumers to use with e-cigarettes. Specifically, Defendants argued that Plaintiff's claims arose out of the use of the battery in a way Defendants never intended by an individual consumer they never targeted. The lower courts concluded that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendants was consistent with due process. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the relatedness prong of the minimum-contacts analysis does not require that the plaintiff's claims arose out of a set of facts mirroring the defendant's expectations about the course its product would follow after entering the state of Texas. View "LG Chem America, Inc. v. Morgan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals on a survival claim brought by the estate of Clark Davis against United Rentals North America, Inc., rendered a take nothing judgment on this claim, and remanded the case to the district court for a new trial on the remaining claims, holding that racial considerations impermissibly tainted the selection of the jury in the underlying trial.During jury selection, Plaintiffs' counsel stated that "the African-American female was the most favorable juror in this case," and this announced preference was consistent with Plaintiffs' peremptory strikes. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiffs, and the district court awarded $5 million to Davis's estate. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a new trial was required because counsel stated a racial preference in jury selection, the peremptory strikes were consistent with that preference, and the district court did not remedy the issue. View "United Rentals North America, Inc. v. Evans" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief in this mandamus proceeding concerning a motion to compel a medical examination under Tex. R. Civ. P. 204.1, holding that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in denying the motion.Marcos Acosta brought this action alleging that he was injured in an automobile accident caused by the negligence of Roberto Hernandez, who was working for The Sherwin-Williams Company at the time, and seeking damages for, among other things, medical expenses and physical pain. The defendants moved to compel a medical examination of Acosta by their designated expert, but the trial court denied the motion to compel the exam. The court of appeals denied mandamus relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief and directed the trial court to issue an order compelling Acosta to submit to the proposed examination, holding that the defendants showed good cause to compel a medical examination of Acosta. View "In re Sherwin-Williams Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 16.063 did not toll the running of the statute of limitations during Defendant's physical absence from Texas.At issue was whether section 16.063 applies to toll the when the defendant leaves the state for part of the limitations period but remains a Texas resident subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas amenable to service under the Texas long-arm statute. Defendant lived in Texas at the time that she was involved in a car accident with Plaintiff but subsequently moved to Massachusetts to attend school. Defendant, however, returned to Texas during breaks, maintained a Texas mailing address, and kept her Texas driver license. Plaintiff tried serving Defendant at her family's Texas home without success. When Defendant was finally served she successfully moved for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. Plaintiff appealed, challenging the court's application of Ashley v. Hawkins, 293 S.W.3d 175 (Tex. 2009), to this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that if a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas and amenable to service, she is not absent from the state under section 16.063. View "Ferrer v. Almanza" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court conditionally granted Defendants' petition for mandamus relief from the trial court's order striking their counteraffidavit served under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 18.001, holding that the trial court's order was an abuse of discretion for which Defendants lacked an adequate remedy by appeal.Plaintiff sued Defendants for negligence. At issue was the counteraffidavit and testimony of Dr. Benny Sanchez, who was retained by Defendants as an expert witness. Plaintiff moved to strike Dr. Sanchez's counteraffidavit and testimony, arguing that the counteraffidavit improperly challenged the cause of Plaintiff's injuries, not the necessity of his treatment. The trial court granted the motion. Thereafter, the trial court issued its opinion in Allstate. Defendants later brought this petition seeking a writ of mandamus and citing In re Allstate Indemnity Insurance Co., 622 S.W.3d 870 (Tex. 2021), in support of their argument that the trial court abused its discretion. The Supreme Court agreed and conditionally granted the writ, holding that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by striking Dr. Sanchez's counteraffidavit and testimony, and Defendants lacked an adequate remedy to address this error by way of appeal. View "In re Chefs' Product of Houston, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgments of the court of appeals in these companion cases brought by advocacy groups supporting legalized abortion against Defendant, who publicly advocated against legalized abortion, holding that the court of appeals properly dismissed the defamation suit but erred in permitting the companion suit to advance.Plaintiffs claimed that Defendant legally defamed them by making statements that equated abortion to murder and by characterizing plaintiffs as criminal. One court of appeals concluded that Defendant's statements were political opinions that voiced disagreement with legal protections afforded to abortion providers and dismissed the suit. The other court of appeals concluded that the statements were inconsistent with the Penal Code and permitted that defamation suit to continue. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Defendant properly invoked the Texas Citizens Participation Act and that Plaintiffs failed to adduce evidence of defamation in response. View "Dickson v. Afiya Center" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's judgment rejecting Defendants' requests to apply a settlement against the award against it and to pay the future damages in periodic payments, holding that the lower courts erred. Jo Ann Puente underwent gastric-bypass surgery and developed complications, leading her to a debilitating brain disorder. Puente, who died while this appeal was pending, and her family sued several healthcare providers, seeking damages. Puente settled with certain defendants prior to trial. After trial, the jury entered judgment for Plaintiffs. The remaining defendants (Defendants) moved for a settlement credit, arguing that the $3.3 million settlement should reduce Puente's recovery. The trial court rejected that argument, granted credit of $200,000 for the settlement, and denied Defendants' motion for periodic payment of the award for future medical expenses. The court of appeals largely affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Chapter 33 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code required a credit for the settlement; and (2) the Texas Medical Liability Act required the trial court to order that at least some of the future damages be paid periodically. View "Virlar v. Puente" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Plaintiffs' claim against the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) alleging premises liability based on the condition of a construction zone, holding that Plaintiffs failed to establish a waiver of sovereign immunity under the Tort Claims Act.On a late while traveling through a roadway construction site, Plaintiffs - a motorcyclist and his wife - collided with a vehicle that crossed into their lane. Plaintiffs sued several parties, including TxDOT, alleging that the demarcation of opposing travel lanes with painted yellow stripes and buttons instead of concrete barriers, a condition called for in the project's traffic-control plan, created an unreasonably dangerous condition, causing their injuries. TxDOT filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. The court of appeals reversed and dismissed for want of jurisdiction, ruling that TxDOT retained its immunity from suit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to create a fact issue regarding an essential element of their premises-defect claim: the existence of an unreasonably dangerous condition. View "Christ v. Tex. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

In this dispute over an arbitration clause within a contract, the Supreme Court held that the minor children who joined Plaintiffs, their parents, in bringing this action seeking damages for construction defects in their home may be compelled to arbitrate along with their parents on the basis of direct-benefits estoppel.Plaintiffs, Tony and Michelle Ha, signed a purchase agreement with Taylor Woodrow Communities-League City, Ltd. to build a home in Texas. The agreement included an arbitration provision. The Has sued both Taylor Woodrow Communities-League City, Ltd. and Taylor Morrison of Texas, Inc., for negligent construction and other claims, alleging the home developed significant mold problems due to construction defects. Plaintiffs' second amended petition named both Tony and Michelle and their three children. Taylor Morrison moved to compel arbitration, but the trial court denied the motion as it pertained to Michelle and the children. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that when a family unit resides in a home and files suit for factually intertwined construction-defect claims concerning the home, a nonsignatory spouse and minor children have accepted direct benefits under the signatory spouse’s purchase agreement such that they may be compelled to arbitrate through direct-benefits estoppel. View "Taylor Morrison of Texas, Inc. v. Ha" on Justia Law

In this dispute over an arbitration clause within a contract, the Supreme Court held that the minor children who joined Plaintiffs, their parents, in bringing this action seeking damages for construction defects in their home may be compelled to arbitrate along with their parents on the basis of direct-benefits estoppel.Plaintiffs, Jack and Erin Skufca, signed a purchase agreement with Taylor Woodrow Communities-League City, Ltd. to build a home in Texas. The agreement included an arbitration provision. Plaintiffs sued both Taylor Woodrow Communities-League City, Ltd. and Taylor Morrison of Texas, Inc., for construction defects and fraud, alleging that less than a year after they moved in, the home developed mold issues that caused their minor children to be ill. The petition listed Jack and Erin as plaintiffs individually, as well as Erin as next friend of the couple's children. Taylor Morrison moved to compel arbitration, but the trial court denied the motion as it pertained to the children. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the minor children sued based on the contract and were subject to its terms, including the arbitration clause. View "Taylor Morrison of Texas, Inc. v. Skufca" on Justia Law