Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals as to attorney's fees in this case concerning whether Defendant, a condominium association, was entitled to attorney's fees after obtaining a take-nothing judgment on claims by Plaintiff, a unit owner, the Supreme Court held that the fee award was authorized by Tex. Prop. Code 82.161(b).Plaintiff sued Defendant for, among other things, fraud, civil conspiracy, breach of contract, and negligence. Defendant filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment and requested attorney's fees. The trial court granted Defendant's motion on twelve declaratory issues. After a trial, the court granted judgment for Defendant and awarded attorney's fees. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment for Defendant but reversed the award of attorney's fees. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Defendant was a prevailing party under Tex. Prop. Code 82.161(b) and was thus entitled to reasonable attorney's fees. View "Sunchase IV Homeowners Ass'n v. Atkinson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment in this case brought under Chapter 95 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, holding that because the landowner conclusively established that Plaintiff was adequately warned of the dangerous condition, the trial court properly granted summary judgment.Plaintiff was working as a power lineman for OTI Energy Services when he was injured while working to de-energize part of an energized power line and transformer. Plaintiff sued SandRidge Energy, which hired OTI, for negligence, alleging that SandRidge could not establish a defense under Chapter 95 because it exercised control over the manner in which he performed the work, knew of the dangerous condition, and failed adequately to warn him of that condition. The trial court granted summary judgment for SandRidge. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiff had raised a fact issue as to whether SandRidge failed to provide an adequate warning. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the evidence conclusively established that Plaintiff was fully aware of the dangerous condition that caused his injury; and (2) therefore, the trial court properly granted summary judgment. View "SandRidge Energy, Inc. v. Barfield" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Texas Workers' Compensation Act (TWCA) does not affect the enforceability of an additional-insured provision under the Texas Anti-Indemnity Act (TAIA).A general contractor's employee injured in an accident obtained a negligence judgment in Texas state court against the subcontractor that operated the crane (Berkel) and the company that leased the crane (Maxim). Berkel was an indemnity and Maxim was an indemnity for TAIA purposes because Berkel had provided Maxim with coverage as an additional insured. After the injured worker settled with Maxim, Maxim unsuccessfully sought reimbursement from Berkel's insurer (Zurich). The court of appeals reversed the judgment against Berkel, concluding that Berkel and the injured worker were "statutory co-employees" of the general contractor under the TWCA, and therefore, the TWCA provided the worker's exclusive remedy. In a separate suit in federal court, Maxim and Zurich disputed over whether the additional-insured coverage was enforceable. The Supreme Court answered a certified question by holding that the word "employee" in Tex. Ins. Code 151.103 bears its common meaning, which is not affected by whether the indemnity and injured employee are considered co-employees for purposes of the TWCA. View "Maxim Crane Works, LP v. Zurich American Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals holding that the City of San Antonio was not immune from suit under the Texas Tort Claims Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 101.001-101.109, for injuries arising from the use of law enforcement vehicles, holding that the court of appeals erred.Plaintiff was injured when he was riding his motorcycle behind a police officer's vehicle but three lanes over and the car in front of him braked. Plaintiff sued the City, alleging that the officer was negligent in turning on his emergency lights. The trial court concluded that the City failed to prove that the officer was entitled to official immunity, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed Plaintiff's claims against the City for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the City made the necessary showing that its officer acted in good faith. View "City of San Antonio v. Riojas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the trial court granting the City of San Antonio's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint alleging that their injuries arose from a police officer's vehicular pursuit of a fleeing suspect who crashed into their car, holding that the court of appeals erred.After Plaintiffs sued the City pursuant to section 101.021 of the Texas Tort Claims Act the City filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing that the officer's actions were too attenuated from Plaintiffs' injuries and that the officer's actions were not reckless and did not violate applicable laws or ordinances. The trial court granted the plea to the jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the City's immunity was waived. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs' claims were barred by sovereign immunity. View "City of San Antonio v. Maspero" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's judgment against a utility in this personal injury action, holding that a limitation of liability provision in a utility tariff approved by state regulators barred the utility's liability for damages suffered by a residential customer's houseguests.The tariff at issue provided that the utility "shall not be liable for any damage or loss" in the limited circumstance where damage or loss is "caused by the escape of gas" from the residence's housepiping or appliances. Plaintiffs in this case were injured in precisely that way while they were houseguests at the home of one of the utility's residential customers. The trial court and court of appeals concluded that the liability limitation was applicable only to damage or loss sustained by the utility's customer and therefore, the tariff's liability limitations did not apply to Plaintiffs' negligence claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the filed-rate doctrine, the liability limitation plainly and expressly precluded the utility's liability for Plaintiffs' damagers and appleid to them as "consumers" of the utility's gas services. View "CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp. v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that, at least where specific jurisdiction is asserted, Tex. R. Civ. P. 120a discovery need not relate exclusively to jurisdictional issues without touching on merits issues.The parties in this suit concerning water leaks from plastic pipe made of cross linked polyethylene failed to agree on the scope of two corporate representative depositions, and so the trial court granted a motion to compel the depositions on a list of thirty topics proposed by Plaintiffs. The nonresident defendant sought mandamus relief, which the court of appeals granted, concluding that the trial court erred in compelling discovery on topics that touched both jurisdictional and merits issues. The Supreme Court directed the court of appeals to vacate its mandamus order, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion merely by compelling discovery on jurisdictional topics; (2) the standard for trial courts to apply is that the information sought must be essential to prove at least one part of the plaintiff's theory of personal jurisdiction; and (3) general principles that limit the scope of discovery apply equally to jurisdictional discovery. View "In re Christianson Air Conditioning & Plumbing, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court dismissing this suit brought under the Death on the High Seas Act and maritime law, see 46 U.S.C. 30301 et seq., for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the issue presented were capable of judicial management without interfering with the military's judgment.A private contractor maintained a fleet of older Navy helicopters. In 2014, one of the helicopters crashed during a training exercise, killing three service members and injuring two others. Plaintiffs, the families of the deceased service members and one of the survivors, sued the contractor. The trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that questions of military judgment rendered the case nonjusticiable. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the political question doctrine did not deprive the state courts of jurisdiction over this case. View "Preston v. M1 Support Services, L.P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief and ordered the trial court to vacate its order denying ExxonMobil's discovery requests, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in that ExxonMobil lacked an adequate remedy on appeal.Nearly sixty plaintiffs sued ExxonMobil seeking millions of dollars in reimbursement for past medical expenses arising from a fire and explosion at ExxonMobil's Baytown Olefins Plant. During discover, ExxonMobil sought discovery of the services Plaintiffs received from certain medical providers. The trial court denied ExxonMobil's ensuing motion to enforce its requested discovery and granted Plaintiffs' motions for protection. ExxonMobil subsequently sought mandamus relief. The Supreme Court granted the requested relief, holding that because the trial court abused its discretion by denying ExxonMobil's discovery requests and ExxonMobil had no appellate remedy, ExxonMobil was entitled to mandamus relief. View "In re Exxon Mobil Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court conditionally granted Relator's mandamus petition seeking relief from an order of the trial court compelling Relator to produce a certain witness for oral deposition, holding that the trial court abused its discretion.Jay Adashera, an employee of a wholesale granite purveyor, died when two 400-pound granite slabs fell off a contractor's truck at his workplace. His survivors sued the granite company and the truck owners, Lazaro Cabrera, for negligence and wrongful death. The survivors obtained a default judgment against Cabrera and then added claims against Texan Millwork, Inc., the company who had hired Cabrera to fabricate the slabs into countertops. At issue was whether Cabrera was an independent contractor and not an employee of Texan Millwork at the time of the accident. To secure Cabrera's testimony, the survivors filed a motion to compel Texan Millwork to produce Cabrera, "its agent and/or employee" for deposition. The trial court granted the motion to compel, and the court of appeals granted Texan Millwork's petition for mandamus relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted the petition, holding that because there was no evidence of retention, employment, or control at the time discovery was sought, the trial court erred in compelling Texan Millwork to produce Cabrera for an oral deposition. View "In re Texan Millwork" on Justia Law