Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court dismissing this wrongful death action, holding that the Recreational Land Use Act, Va. Code 29.1-509, did not provide Defendants with immunity under the circumstances of this case.Shawn Nicely was visiting his grandparents, Richard and Anna Funkhouser, when Gina Shoemaker was visiting her mother, Dorothy Nesselrodt, a neighbor of the Funkhousers. According to the complaint, the Funkhousers gave Nicely permission to shoot targets on their property in the direction of Nesselrodt's home. One of the bullets did penetrate the walls of Nesselrodt's house, striking and killing Shoemaker. The circuit court dismissed this case brought by the administrator and personal representative of Shoemaker, concluding that the Funkhousers did not owe Nesselrodt or her visitors a duty and that the immunity afforded to landowners under the Act foreclosed this suit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) landowners have a limited duty in tort to prevent activity on their property that could harm other persons not on the property; and (2) the Act did not immunize the Funkhousers. View "Shoemaker v. Funkhouser" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the trial court that James Charles St. John must pay attorney fees to the person he defrauded, holding that the circuit court did not err.St. John befriended his neighbor, Ernest Stuart Elsea, II. St. John subsequently persuaded Elsea to transfer his extensive firearm collection to a firearm trust that St. John established and controlled and had Elsea sign a durable power of attorney. St. John then induced Elsea to sign a codicil to his will naming St. John and St. John's partner as beneficiaries. Elsea filed a complaint seeking an accounting and a recovery of the firearms, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, and alleging fraud an undue influence. The circuit court rejected counts one and two but ordered St. John to either return the firearms to Elsea or pay Elsea the value of the firearms. The circuit court then ordered St. John to pay attorney's fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly awarded fees under Prospect Development Co. v. Bershader, 258 Va. 75 (1999). View "St. John v. Thompson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court entering summary judgment in favor of the Commonwealth and dismissing Plaintiff's complaint alleging that he was injured while falling down stairs negligently maintained by the Department of Corrections (DOC), holding that the circuit court erred.On appeal, Plaintiff challenged the three independent grounds relied upon by the circuit court in sustaining the Commonwealth's plea in bar and granting summary judgment. Among other things, Plaintiff argued that he exhausted his administrative remedies under the Virginia Tort Claims Act, and therefore, sovereign immunity did not bar his civil action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the initial grievance and all later appeals are properly submitted when the inmate timely places them into the prison mailing system, and therefore, the circuit court erred in concluding that grievance appeals are submitted for purposes of exhaustion when they are received by the DOC; and (2) the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on the issues of primary and contributory negligence. View "AlBritton v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this personal injury case, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $3,000, plus interest, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff's motion in limine seeking to introduce evidence regarding the defense's expert witness's financial relationship with State Farm.Plaintiff was injured when she was hit from behind by Defendant. Plaintiff brought this suit seeking $150,000 in damages. State Farm insured Defendant at the time of the accident. Dr. William Andres, an orthopedic surgeon, was engaged as the defense's expert witness. Before trial, Plaintiff filed a motion in limine seeking to introduce evidence of Dr. Andrews' previous relationship with State Farm. The court denied the motion. After trial, Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the circuit court's exclusion of evidence of Dr. Andrews' relationship with State Farm violated the Supreme Court's ruling in Lombard v. Rohrbaugh, 262 Va. 484 (2001). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court misinterpreted Lombard as holding that a party must demonstrate a "direct relationship" between an expert and an insurance company before cross-examining the expert on previous payments from the insurance company. View "Graves v. Shoemaker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded the judgment of the trial court in this civil case against Appellant based upon a finding that she had violated Va. Code 8.01-40.4 by unlawfully disseminating images of Appellee, holding that further factual findings were required on the issue of whether the voluntary-payment doctrine mooted Sheehy's appeals of the now fully satisfied judgment.Appellant filed two appeals after the trial court entered judgment. While the appeals were pending, the judgment was paid in full. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the voluntary-payment doctrine mooted Appellant's appeal. The Supreme Court temporarily remanded the case to the trial court for factual findings on the voluntary-payment issue, holding that it was necessary for the circuit court to make findings of fact for deciding the motion to dismiss the pending appeals. View "Sheehy v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission finding that Claimant suffered a compensable injury to her right shoulder, holding that the court of appeals erred in applying the legal standard for determining whether Claimant suffered a compensable "injury by accident" to her shoulder.Claimant, a math teacher, slipped on a puddle on her classroom floor and fell on her right side. Claimant filed claims for an award of benefits by the Commission, claiming that the fall injured her right shoulder. The Commission ruled that Claimant established a compensable injury by accident to her shoulder. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the court of appeals erred in applying the standard for determining whether Claimant had suffered an injury by accident to her shoulder. View "Alexandria City Public Schools v. Handel" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the misidentification of a defendant in a complaint was a misnomer, not a misjoinder, and therefore, the filing of a new complaint to correct the error after a nonsuit was not barred by the statute of limitations.Calvin Hampton, who was injured in a car accident, filed a negligence complaint seeking damages. The complaint identified the driver of the other vehicle as Michael Meyer. Later, however, Hampton learned that Noah Meyer, and not his father Michael, had been driving the vehicle at the time of the collision. Hampton subsequently obtained an order nonsuiting his complaint. Hampton then filed a new complaint asserting that, under this Court's decision in Richmond v. Volk, 291 Va. 60 (2016), the use of the wrong name in his complaint was merely a misnomer rather than a misjoinder. Noah filed a plea in bar asserting that the new complaint was time-barred. The circuit court sustained the plea in bar, ruling that naming Michael in the original complaint was a misjoinder, not a misnomer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the misidentification of the driver in the original complaint were merely a misnomer, not a misjoinder; and (2) therefore, under Volk, the new complaint was not barred by the statute of limitations. View "Hampton v. Meyer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing a suit for wrongful death against Virginia medical providers on the basis that Plaintiff had received a personal injury settlement against Kentucky medical providers concerning the same injury, holding that the circuit court erred in granting the motions to dismiss.Plaintiff, the husband of the decedent, filed wrongful death and personal injury actions in a Virginia circuit court and a Kentucky circuit court, asserting that the decedent died as a result of medical professions in both states failing to identify and treat the decedent's mesenteric ischemia. Plaintiff settled with the Kentucky defendants for an undisclosed amount, and the Kentucky circuit court dismissed all claims in the Kentucky action. The circuit court subsequently granted the Virginia defendants' motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in dismissing the case on the grounds that Plaintiff elected a remedy when he settled the Kentucky personal injury action and that Plaintiff's wrongful death action was barred by Va. Code 8.01-56; and (2) none of the doctrines of claim-splitting, double recovery, or judicial estoppel supported the circuit court's granting of the motions to dismiss. View "Green v. Diagnostic Imaging Associates" on Justia Law

In this action in which Plaintiff alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation against the Commonwealth's attorney, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's ruling that the conduct alleged was insufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress but reversed the circuit court's ruling that Defendant was absolutely immune from Plaintiff's defamation claim.After she was fired, Plaintiff, a former administrative assistant in the Commonwealth's attorney's office, filed this complaint against Chadwick Seth Baker, the Commonwealth's attorney for Dickenson County, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation. Baker filed a demurrer and motion to dismiss. The circuit court sustained Baker's demurrer, ruling that termination of at-will employment did not give rise to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and that Baker enjoyed absolute immunity regarding the defamation claim. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) absolute immunity does not apply to a Commonwealth's attorney's allegedly defamatory statements about why he made the decision to fire an employee; and (2) Plaintiff did not adequately plead a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. View "Viers v. Baker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting Defendants' demurrers to Plaintiff's claims alleging that various professionals who participated in custody and visitation proceedings tortiously interfered with her parental rights, holding that the tort of interference with parental rights did not extend to the facts alleged by Plaintiff.Plaintiff, the mother of three children, challenged the proceedings resulting an order awarding sole legal and physical custody of the children to their father. In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged tortious interference with parental rights and defamation. Plaintiff alleged that professionals such as the children's guardian ad litem, counselors, and therapists conspired, lied, and acted maliciously to deprive her of the rightful custody of her children. Plaintiff further alleged that one of the therapists defamed her. The circuit court granted the defendants' demurrers to the claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the allegations made in the complaint did not give rise to a cause of action for tortious interference with parental rights; and (2) the circuit court properly dismissed the defamation claims against the therapist. View "Padula-Wilson v. Landry" on Justia Law