Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant drove a car he had rented from Enterprise Rent-A-Car (Enterprise) into Plaintiff’s knee. At the time of the incident, Plaintiff was insured under a policy issued by IDS Property Casualty Insurance Company (IDS), which provided uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant, Defendant’s automobile liability insurer, and Enterprise. Plaintiff also served IDS with a copy of the summons and complaint for the purpose of bringing a claim under his uninsured motorist coverage policy. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of IDS, concluding that the rental car did not qualify as an “uninsured motor vehicle” under the policy. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the rental car was an “uninsured motor vehicle” under the policy. Remanded. View "Martin v. Powers" on Justia Law

In 2013, William Arnold was convicted in a criminal trial of one count of aggravated sexual battery and three counts of rape of a child for his rape and molestation of John Doe N. In 2011, the child’s mother, Ms. Bowen, filed a civil suit against Arnold, certain Boys and Girls Clubs and certain Big Brothers Big Sisters organizations, alleging that Arnold intentionally molested John Doe N and that the entity defendants were negligent. After the court of criminal appeals affirmed Arnold’s convictions, Bowen filed a motion for partial summary judgment against Arnold, arguing that Arnold was collaterally estopped from relitigating in the civil lawsuit the issue of whether he raped and sexually battered John Doe N. The trial court granted Bowen’s motion for partial summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Court hereby abolishes the mutuality requirement for defense and offensive collateral estoppel in Tennessee and adopts sections 29 and 85 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments; and (2) applying section 85 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments to the facts of this case, the trial court properly granted Bowen partial summary judgment against Arnold on the issue of whether he raped and sexually battered John Doe N. View "Bowen ex rel. Doe “N” v. Arnold" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed this action against Defendant, a licensed clinical social worker, alleging negligence, negligence per se, and intentional infliction of emotional distress for providing counseling services for their minor daughter without their consent. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the pre-suit notice and certificate of good faith requirements of the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act (“THCLA”). Plaintiffs responded that their claims were not subject to the THCLA’s procedural requirements because their claims sounded in ordinary negligence. The trial court dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ claims, concluding that the THCLA encompassed Plaintiffs’ claims because they related to the provision of “health care services” by a “health care provider.” The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order and remanded, concluding that the trial court erred by failing to apply the Supreme Court’s analysis in determining if Plaintiffs’ claims sounded in ordinary negligence or health care liability. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding (1) the Tennessee Civil Justice Act of 2011, which amended the THCLA, statutorily abrogated the Court’s decision in Estate of French; and (2) Plaintiff’s complaint was subject to the THCLA, which required them to provide pre-suit notice and a certificate of good faith. View "Ellithorpe v. Weismark" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a health care liability action against Defendant-health care providers. Six days before filing his complaint, Defendant sent a pre-suit notice of his potential claim to each Defendant by certified mail, return receipt requested, as permitted by Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-121(a)(1). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiff failed to file with his complaint an affidavit of the person who had sent the pre-suit notice by certified mail. The trial court dismissed the complaint. The court of appeals affirmed but noted the harsh results strict compliance produces in cases such as this one where no prejudice is alleged. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the complaint, holding (1) the statutory requirement that an affidavit of the person who sent the pre-suit notice by certified mail be filed with the complaint may be satisfied by substantial compliance; and (2) Plaintiff substantially complied with the statute in this case. View "Thurmond v. Mid-Cumberland Infectious Disease Consultants, PLC " on Justia Law

On July 28, 2012, Michael Becker was injured when a Ford truck driven by his son, Phillip Becker, struck a light pole. Michael and his wife filed suit against Ford Motor Company. On August 26, 2013, Ford filed an answer claiming that the accident was caused by a person other than Ford. On October 1, 2013, the Beckers filed a motion to join Phillip as a party to whom fault could be apportioned and a motion to file an amended complaint. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether, after a defendant asserts a comparative fault claim against a non-party tortfeasor who was known to the plaintiff when the original suit was filed, Tenn. Code Ann. 20-1-119 permits the plaintiff to amend its complaint to assert a claim directly against the tortfeasor named by the defendant. The Court held (1) application of section 20-1-119 is not restricted to tortfeasors who were unknown to the plaintiff when its original complaint was filed; and (2) therefore, the statute permits a plaintiff to file an amended complaint against the tortfeasor named by the defendant within ninety days after the filing of the answer in which the defendant first asserts a comparative fault claim against the tortfeasor. View "Becker v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

After Plaintiff filed a health care liability action against Defendant, the General Assembly enacted Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-121 and -122, which implemented pre-suit notice and certificate of good faith requirements. Plaintiff subsequently dismissed her original action and filed two successive actions. The second action did not comply with sections 29-26-121 and -122, but the third action complied with the statutes. Plaintiff filed a motion to consolidate her second and third actions. Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff’s second action should be dismissed for failure to comply with the notice and certificate of good faith requirements and that her third action should be dismissed based on the doctrine of prior suit pending. The trial court denied the motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court granted Defendant’s application for extraordinary appeal. During the pendency of the appeal, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her second action. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that Plaintiff’s third complaint was timely filed because Plaintiff properly provided pre-suit notice of her claim prior to filing her third action and was entitled to a 120-day extension in which to refile her complaint. Remanded. View "Cannon ex rel. Good v. Reddy" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an employee of the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC), filed this defamation claim against the State and the TDOC. After Plaintiff was demoted for violating the State's travel billing policy, the TDOC Commissioner responded to media inquires about Plaintiff's demotion. The Tennessee Claims Commission denied the State's motion for summary judgment in which the State argued that the Commissioner had an absolute privilege to make the allegedly defamatory statements to the media. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State was absolutely immune from Plaintiff's defamation claims that related to the Commissioner's statements in response to media inquiries about Plaintiff's demotion. View "Jones v. State" on Justia Law

Jan McCool attempted to get medication at a Wal-mart Super Center, but Wal-Mart employees refused to fill McCool's medical prescriptions because they believed she was intoxicated. McCool became belligerent when her prescriptions were not filled, and the pharmacy employees ordered her out of the store. McCool's vehicle subsequently struck Jolyn Cullum in the Wal-Mart parking lot. Cullum, who had gone to Wal-Mart to shop for groceries, sued Wal-Mart for negligence. The trial judge granted Wal-Mart's motion to dismiss, concluding that Wal-Mart did not have a legal duty to control McCool after she left the store. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Wal-Mart owed Cullum a duty of care to protect her from McCool. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court erred by granting the motion to dismiss because (1) the foreseeability of harm and the gravity of harm to Cullum outweighed the burden placed on Wal-Mart to protect Cullum against that harm; and (2) therefore, Cullum's complaint contained sufficient allegations which, taken as true, established that Wal-Mart owed a duty of care to Cullum. Remanded. View "Cullum v. McCool" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a health care liability action against Defendant, a physician. Plaintiff's original complaint was filed prior to the effective date of the pre-suit notice requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-121. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his original action. Plaintiff subsequently filed his action after the effective date of section 29-26-121. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that Plaintiff's second action was barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff responded that (1) his pre-suit notice commenced his new action prior to the expiration of the one-year saving statute; and (2) alternatively, section 29-26-121 extended the saving statute by 120 days. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff's action was commenced by the filing of his second health care liability complaint rather than by providing pre-suit notice; and (2) a plaintiff who files his initial action prior to the effective date of section 29-26-121 dismisses his original action, properly provides pre-suit notice, and refiles his action after the effective date of section 29-26-121 is entitled to the 120-day extension. View "Rajvongs v. Wright" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants in California state court for business-related torts. Plaintiff then voluntarily dismissed his complaint and re-filed his action in the federal district court, alleging several federal securities law violations. The federal court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state-law claims. Thereafter, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his complaint and filed the present action in a Tennessee state court, pleading three of the state-law claims that formed the basis for his two previously dismissed lawsuits. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that Plaintiff's claims were barred by Plaintiff's second voluntary dismissal in federal court. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a plaintiff's second voluntary dismissal of supplemental state-law claims filed in federal court does not preclude the plaintiff from later re-filing an action based on the same claims in Tennessee state court. Remanded. View "Cooper v. Glasser" on Justia Law