Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

On July 28, 2012, Michael Becker was injured when a Ford truck driven by his son, Phillip Becker, struck a light pole. Michael and his wife filed suit against Ford Motor Company. On August 26, 2013, Ford filed an answer claiming that the accident was caused by a person other than Ford. On October 1, 2013, the Beckers filed a motion to join Phillip as a party to whom fault could be apportioned and a motion to file an amended complaint. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether, after a defendant asserts a comparative fault claim against a non-party tortfeasor who was known to the plaintiff when the original suit was filed, Tenn. Code Ann. 20-1-119 permits the plaintiff to amend its complaint to assert a claim directly against the tortfeasor named by the defendant. The Court held (1) application of section 20-1-119 is not restricted to tortfeasors who were unknown to the plaintiff when its original complaint was filed; and (2) therefore, the statute permits a plaintiff to file an amended complaint against the tortfeasor named by the defendant within ninety days after the filing of the answer in which the defendant first asserts a comparative fault claim against the tortfeasor. View "Becker v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

After Plaintiff filed a health care liability action against Defendant, the General Assembly enacted Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-121 and -122, which implemented pre-suit notice and certificate of good faith requirements. Plaintiff subsequently dismissed her original action and filed two successive actions. The second action did not comply with sections 29-26-121 and -122, but the third action complied with the statutes. Plaintiff filed a motion to consolidate her second and third actions. Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff’s second action should be dismissed for failure to comply with the notice and certificate of good faith requirements and that her third action should be dismissed based on the doctrine of prior suit pending. The trial court denied the motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court granted Defendant’s application for extraordinary appeal. During the pendency of the appeal, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her second action. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that Plaintiff’s third complaint was timely filed because Plaintiff properly provided pre-suit notice of her claim prior to filing her third action and was entitled to a 120-day extension in which to refile her complaint. Remanded. View "Cannon ex rel. Good v. Reddy" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an employee of the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC), filed this defamation claim against the State and the TDOC. After Plaintiff was demoted for violating the State's travel billing policy, the TDOC Commissioner responded to media inquires about Plaintiff's demotion. The Tennessee Claims Commission denied the State's motion for summary judgment in which the State argued that the Commissioner had an absolute privilege to make the allegedly defamatory statements to the media. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State was absolutely immune from Plaintiff's defamation claims that related to the Commissioner's statements in response to media inquiries about Plaintiff's demotion. View "Jones v. State" on Justia Law

Jan McCool attempted to get medication at a Wal-mart Super Center, but Wal-Mart employees refused to fill McCool's medical prescriptions because they believed she was intoxicated. McCool became belligerent when her prescriptions were not filled, and the pharmacy employees ordered her out of the store. McCool's vehicle subsequently struck Jolyn Cullum in the Wal-Mart parking lot. Cullum, who had gone to Wal-Mart to shop for groceries, sued Wal-Mart for negligence. The trial judge granted Wal-Mart's motion to dismiss, concluding that Wal-Mart did not have a legal duty to control McCool after she left the store. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Wal-Mart owed Cullum a duty of care to protect her from McCool. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court erred by granting the motion to dismiss because (1) the foreseeability of harm and the gravity of harm to Cullum outweighed the burden placed on Wal-Mart to protect Cullum against that harm; and (2) therefore, Cullum's complaint contained sufficient allegations which, taken as true, established that Wal-Mart owed a duty of care to Cullum. Remanded. View "Cullum v. McCool" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a health care liability action against Defendant, a physician. Plaintiff's original complaint was filed prior to the effective date of the pre-suit notice requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-121. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his original action. Plaintiff subsequently filed his action after the effective date of section 29-26-121. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that Plaintiff's second action was barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff responded that (1) his pre-suit notice commenced his new action prior to the expiration of the one-year saving statute; and (2) alternatively, section 29-26-121 extended the saving statute by 120 days. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff's action was commenced by the filing of his second health care liability complaint rather than by providing pre-suit notice; and (2) a plaintiff who files his initial action prior to the effective date of section 29-26-121 dismisses his original action, properly provides pre-suit notice, and refiles his action after the effective date of section 29-26-121 is entitled to the 120-day extension. View "Rajvongs v. Wright" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants in California state court for business-related torts. Plaintiff then voluntarily dismissed his complaint and re-filed his action in the federal district court, alleging several federal securities law violations. The federal court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state-law claims. Thereafter, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his complaint and filed the present action in a Tennessee state court, pleading three of the state-law claims that formed the basis for his two previously dismissed lawsuits. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that Plaintiff's claims were barred by Plaintiff's second voluntary dismissal in federal court. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a plaintiff's second voluntary dismissal of supplemental state-law claims filed in federal court does not preclude the plaintiff from later re-filing an action based on the same claims in Tennessee state court. Remanded. View "Cooper v. Glasser" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a healthcare liability suit against several healthcare providers (collectively, Defendants). Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on Plaintiff's noncompliance with Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-121(a)(2)(E), which requires that a plaintiff's pre-suit notice to a healthcare provider include a HIPAA complaint medical authorization in order to permit the healthcare provider to obtain complete medical records from all other providers that are being sent a notice. The trial court denied Defendants' motion, concluding that Plaintiff's noncompliance with section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) was excused by extraordinary cause. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the complaint, holding that Plaintiff was required to substantially comply with section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E), and Plaintiff's failure to comply was not excused by extraordinary cause. View "Stevens ex rel. Stevens v. Hickman Cmty. Health Care Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a negligence claim against Anderson County for injuries he received during an altercation with another inmate while he was in custody at the Anderson County Detention Facility. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed the staff at the facility was negligent in classifying and housing him and in failing to release him in a timely manner. The trial court (1) found the County was not negligent in its classification or housing of Plaintiff, but (2) breached its duty in failing to timely release Plaintiff. The trial court awarded Plaintiff damages and assessed fifty-five percent of the fault to the County and forty-five percent to Plaintiff. The court of appeals affirmed. In so holding, the court of appeals added its own specific finding that Plaintiff's injury was reasonably foreseeable as a result of being left in a cell with dangerous men an unreasonable amount of time after the release order was given. The Supreme Court reversed in part and vacated the damages award, holding that the County was not liable for failing to release Plaintiff in a timely manner because the injuries he suffered as a result of the delay were not reasonably foreseeable. View "King v. Anderson County" on Justia Law

A mother sued Ford Motor Company on behalf of her six-year-old son, whose spine was fractured in a car wreck, alleging that the defective design of the seatbelt in the vehicle caused her son's permanent paralysis and other injuries. The jury returned a $43.8 million verdict for compensatory damages. Ford's share of the verdict, based on its degree of fault, was $6,570,000. Ford filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the verdict was excessive. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals, however, determined that the verdict was excessive and remanded the case with a suggestion of remittitur from $43.8 million to $12.9 million. The suggested remittitur would reduce Ford's share of the verdict to $1,935,000. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the jury's verdict, holding (1) the court of appeals had the authority to suggest a remittitur even though Ford did not request it; but (2) the court of appeals erred in remitting the verdict to $12.9 million, as the jury's verdict was supported by material evidence and was within the range of reasonableness. Remanded. View "Meals ex rel. Meals v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Certain amplified music concerts were conducted on farm land in a rural county. The county board of zoning appeals later ordered the business owners who hosted the concerts to limit the concerts to one per year, but the business owners defied the order. Plaintiff, a neighborhood property owner, filed suit seeking to enforce the zoning authority's decision and to abate the concerts as a common-law nuisance. The trial court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding (1) the concerts were exempted from local land use regulations because they qualified as "agriculture"; and (2) the Tennessee Right to Farm Act (Act) precluded nuisance liability. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the concerts were not "agriculture" for the purpose of the zoning laws; and (2) the Act did not apply to the music concerts, and Plaintiff presented a prima facie case of common-law nuisance. Remanded. View "Shore v. Maple Lane Farms, LLC" on Justia Law