Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a health care liability action against Defendant, a physician. Plaintiff's original complaint was filed prior to the effective date of the pre-suit notice requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-121. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his original action. Plaintiff subsequently filed his action after the effective date of section 29-26-121. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that Plaintiff's second action was barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff responded that (1) his pre-suit notice commenced his new action prior to the expiration of the one-year saving statute; and (2) alternatively, section 29-26-121 extended the saving statute by 120 days. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff's action was commenced by the filing of his second health care liability complaint rather than by providing pre-suit notice; and (2) a plaintiff who files his initial action prior to the effective date of section 29-26-121 dismisses his original action, properly provides pre-suit notice, and refiles his action after the effective date of section 29-26-121 is entitled to the 120-day extension. View "Rajvongs v. Wright" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants in California state court for business-related torts. Plaintiff then voluntarily dismissed his complaint and re-filed his action in the federal district court, alleging several federal securities law violations. The federal court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state-law claims. Thereafter, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his complaint and filed the present action in a Tennessee state court, pleading three of the state-law claims that formed the basis for his two previously dismissed lawsuits. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that Plaintiff's claims were barred by Plaintiff's second voluntary dismissal in federal court. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a plaintiff's second voluntary dismissal of supplemental state-law claims filed in federal court does not preclude the plaintiff from later re-filing an action based on the same claims in Tennessee state court. Remanded. View "Cooper v. Glasser" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a healthcare liability suit against several healthcare providers (collectively, Defendants). Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on Plaintiff's noncompliance with Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-121(a)(2)(E), which requires that a plaintiff's pre-suit notice to a healthcare provider include a HIPAA complaint medical authorization in order to permit the healthcare provider to obtain complete medical records from all other providers that are being sent a notice. The trial court denied Defendants' motion, concluding that Plaintiff's noncompliance with section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) was excused by extraordinary cause. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the complaint, holding that Plaintiff was required to substantially comply with section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E), and Plaintiff's failure to comply was not excused by extraordinary cause. View "Stevens ex rel. Stevens v. Hickman Cmty. Health Care Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a negligence claim against Anderson County for injuries he received during an altercation with another inmate while he was in custody at the Anderson County Detention Facility. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed the staff at the facility was negligent in classifying and housing him and in failing to release him in a timely manner. The trial court (1) found the County was not negligent in its classification or housing of Plaintiff, but (2) breached its duty in failing to timely release Plaintiff. The trial court awarded Plaintiff damages and assessed fifty-five percent of the fault to the County and forty-five percent to Plaintiff. The court of appeals affirmed. In so holding, the court of appeals added its own specific finding that Plaintiff's injury was reasonably foreseeable as a result of being left in a cell with dangerous men an unreasonable amount of time after the release order was given. The Supreme Court reversed in part and vacated the damages award, holding that the County was not liable for failing to release Plaintiff in a timely manner because the injuries he suffered as a result of the delay were not reasonably foreseeable. View "King v. Anderson County" on Justia Law

A mother sued Ford Motor Company on behalf of her six-year-old son, whose spine was fractured in a car wreck, alleging that the defective design of the seatbelt in the vehicle caused her son's permanent paralysis and other injuries. The jury returned a $43.8 million verdict for compensatory damages. Ford's share of the verdict, based on its degree of fault, was $6,570,000. Ford filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the verdict was excessive. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals, however, determined that the verdict was excessive and remanded the case with a suggestion of remittitur from $43.8 million to $12.9 million. The suggested remittitur would reduce Ford's share of the verdict to $1,935,000. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the jury's verdict, holding (1) the court of appeals had the authority to suggest a remittitur even though Ford did not request it; but (2) the court of appeals erred in remitting the verdict to $12.9 million, as the jury's verdict was supported by material evidence and was within the range of reasonableness. Remanded. View "Meals ex rel. Meals v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Certain amplified music concerts were conducted on farm land in a rural county. The county board of zoning appeals later ordered the business owners who hosted the concerts to limit the concerts to one per year, but the business owners defied the order. Plaintiff, a neighborhood property owner, filed suit seeking to enforce the zoning authority's decision and to abate the concerts as a common-law nuisance. The trial court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding (1) the concerts were exempted from local land use regulations because they qualified as "agriculture"; and (2) the Tennessee Right to Farm Act (Act) precluded nuisance liability. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the concerts were not "agriculture" for the purpose of the zoning laws; and (2) the Act did not apply to the music concerts, and Plaintiff presented a prima facie case of common-law nuisance. Remanded. View "Shore v. Maple Lane Farms, LLC" on Justia Law

Decedent died following complications that arose when she received anesthesia. Decedent's husband (Plaintiff) filed suit against various health care providers, including Defendant, which contracted with the hospital to provide anesthesia services to its obstetric patients. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant was vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its corporate owner and president, a medical doctor, who was on call the night Decedent received the anesthesia but refused to come to the hospital to administer the anesthesia. Defendant failed to raise the statute of repose as a defense to the vicarious liability claim. After a jury trial, the trial court set aside the verdict for Defendants and granted a new trial. Defendant then moved to amend its answer to assert a repose defense and to dismiss the case based on the statute of repose. The trial court denied Defendant's motions, ruling that Defendant had waived the statute of repose defense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to timely raise the statute of repose as an affirmative defense. View "Pratcher v. Methodist Healthcare Memphis Hosps." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a claim against a county hospital (Hospital) alleging that the negligence of the hospital and its employees caused the death of their son. The claim was filed fifteen months after Plaintiffs' son's death. Hospital, a governmental entity, filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the claim was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations of the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA). Plaintiffs argued that their complaint was timely filed because Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-121(c) extends the GTLA statute of limitations by 120 days. The trial court denied Hospital's motion to dismiss but granted an interlocutory appeal. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 120-day extension provided by section 29-26-121(c) did not apply to Plaintiffs' claim brought under the GTLA. Remanded for entry of an order dismissing the complaint. View "Cunningham v. Williamson County Hosp. Dist." on Justia Law

A concrete truck collided with a shuttle bus used to transport passengers between an airport and a rental car facility. A passenger who was injured during the collision and his wife filed an action against the bus owner, bus manufacturer, manufacturer of the bus windows, and franchisor of the rental car business. Plaintiffs based their claims in negligence and products liability, arguing that the bus was unsafe because it did not have passenger seatbelts, had windows made of tempered glass, and provided perimeter seating instead of forward-facing rows. A jury found Plaintiffs had sustained damages but assessed 100 percent of the fault to the corporate owner of the concrete truck, which had previously settled with Plaintiffs. On appeal, the court of appeals held that federal law preempted the seatbelt and window-glass claims and ruled that the trial court erred by failing to grant a directed verdict on the perimeter-seating claim. The Supreme Court remanded. On remand, the court of appeals affirmed its prior judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the seatbelt and window-glass claims were not preempted by federal law; and (2) the evidence sufficiently demonstrated causation in fact as to the perimeter-seating claim. Remanded. View "Lake v. The Memphis Landsmen, LLC" on Justia Law

When the nursing staff at the assisted living facility where Mable Farrar lived did not give Farrar an over-the-counter medicine for constipation as often as her doctor had prescribed, Farrar became constipated. Thereafter, Farrar's doctor notified the staff at the facility to give Farrar three to four enemas each day. A facility nurse gave Farrar only two enemas in three days. Farrar subsequently died of a perforated colon. Farrar's daughters filed a wrongful death action against the nurse who gave the enemas, the director of nursing at the facility, the owner of the facility, and the facility's management company. The jury found the management company fifty percent at fault based on its failure to provide sufficient personnel at the facility. The court of appeals reversed the jury verdict against the management company, finding that there was no material evidence that staffing deficiencies proximately caused Farrar's death. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the jury verdict, holding that material evidence supported the jury's finding that the management company's conduct was a substantial factor in causing Farrar's death. Remanded for review of the award of punitive damages. View "Wilson v. Americare Sys., Inc." on Justia Law