Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

This personal injury suit arose from an automobile accident involving Jeffrey Callicutt and the Manns. The Manns sued Jeffrey's parents (the Callicutts) within the one-year statute of limitations. The Manns amended their complaint to name, as additional defendants, Appellees. Thereafter, Appellees filed dispositive motions in which they contended that the one-year statute of limitations had expired before they were named as parties. The trial court granted Appellees' dispositive motions in a non-final order. Less than one week later, the Callicutts named Appellees as comparative tortfeasors in their amended answer. The Manns named Appellees as additional tortfeasors within ninety days of the Callicutts' amended answer. The Manns subsequently filed a second amended complaint, alleging the same claims against the same defendants. The trial court granted Appellees' dispositive motions attacking the second amended complaint as barred by the one-year statute of limitations. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the dismissal of a defendant pursuant to a written order not made final renders that defendant "not a party to the suit" for purposes of Tenn. Code Ann. 20-1-119; and (2) thus, the court of appeals erred in upholding the trial court's dismissal of Appellees from the suit.

Employee viewed the bodies of co-workers who had died as a result of work accidents on two separate occasions in February and April 2008. On June 23, 2008, Employee was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) caused by the two incidents. On June 23, 2009, the employee requested a benefit review conference. Employer filed a complaint to determine the amount of workers' compensation benefits due. Employer subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment contending that the statute of limitations commenced on the date of the second accident and that the claim was therefore barred. Employee contended that the statute did not begin to run until the date of his diagnosis and that his claim was timely. The trial court granted Employer's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the limitations period did not commence until Employee was diagnosed as having PTSD on June 23, 2008; and (2) the statute of limitations therefore did not bar Employee's claim.

In these consolidated cases, the primary issue was whether there was liability insurance coverage for Plaintiffs' injuries resulting from an altercation on the premises of Insured's bar and restaurant. Insurer denied coverage and declined to defend Insured based on its determination that there was no coverage under the terms of the policy. The trial court entered an order finding that the altercation was covered under both the commercial general liability and liquor liability provisions of the policy. The court of appeals ruled that the liquor liability coverage agreement provided coverage for the judgments but that the commercial general liability agreement provided no coverage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) based on the clear terms of the policy agreement, there was no liability coverage because the incident arose from an assault and battery, which was an excluded cause, and because there was no nonexcluded concurrent cause to provide coverage; and (2) estoppel by judgment did not apply to collaterally estop Insurer from arguing the lack of coverage.

In these consolidated cases, the primary issue was whether there was liability insurance coverage for Plaintiffs' injuries resulting from an altercation on the premises of Insured's bar and restaurant. Insurer denied coverage and declined to defend Insured based on its determination that there was no coverage under the terms of the policy. The trial court entered an order finding that the altercation was covered under both the commercial general liability and liquor liability provisions of the policy. The court of appeals ruled that the liquor liability coverage agreement provided coverage for the judgments but that the commercial general liability agreement provided no coverage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) based on the clear terms of the policy agreement, there was no liability coverage because the incident arose from an assault and battery, which was an excluded cause, and because there was no nonexcluded concurrent cause to provide coverage; and (2) estoppel by judgment did not apply to collaterally estop Insurer from arguing the lack of coverage.

The trial court awarded workers' compensation benefits to an injured lineman who had violated a rule requiring the use of protective gloves while in a bucket lift. The employer appealed, contending that the statutory defenses of willful misconduct and, more particularly, the willful failure or refusal to use a safety appliance or device precluded recovery. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed the case, holding that because the evidence established that the employee admitted his knowledge of a regularly enforced safety rule, understood the rationale for the rule, and willfully failed to comply, the injuries he suffered because of the rule violation were not compensable.

In this appeal, Defendants sought a review of the trial court's decision to award Plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages based on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of inadequate maintenance of the cemetery where Plaintiff's son was buried. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiff had failed to present sufficient proof establishing that she had suffered a serious mental injury, which was a required element of her claim. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals and reversed the judgment of the trial court awarding Plaintiff compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys fees, holding that Plaintiff failed to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress because she provided no evidence that she or anyone else suffered serious mental injuries as a result of Defendants' conduct.

Plaintiffs, survivors of a tenant killed by the criminal act of another tenant, filed suit against Defendant housing authority. Plaintiffs alleged Defendant was negligent in failing to evict the other tenant at the first instance of violent behavior. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment claiming federal regulations preempted Plaintiffs' negligence claim and that it was immune from suit under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (the GLTA). The trial court denied summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) Plaintiffs' negligence suit was not preempted by federal law; and (2) Defendant's failure to evict was an operational decision and Defendant was not entitled to immunity under the GTLA. Remanded.

At issue in this consumer protection case was which Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure applied to a motion that sought relief from a default judgment of liability on a counter-complaint, where the motion was filed within thirty days of entry of the default, the trial court did not expressly direct the entry of judgment on the counter-complaint pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02, and neither liability on the original complaint nor damages on the counter-complaint were determined. The trial court entered default judgment in favor of the consumer on her counterclaims against Discover Bank and awarded the consumer damages. The court of appeals upheld the default judgment, vacated the award of damages, and remanded the case for a new hearing on damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Rule 54.02, rather than Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, applies in this situation, but the same test applies to motions seeking relief from default judgment, under either rule, on the basis of "excusable neglect"; and (2) actual damages are recoverable for loss of available credit under Tennessee Consumer Protection Act where the plaintiff suffers a demonstrable loss of credit, proximately caused by the defendant, resulting in actual harm.

Employee, a certified nursing assistant, sustained an injury while working. Six months later, Employee returned to work with significant restrictions on the use of his right arm. After two weeks of training for a different position, Employee resigned. Employee later made a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The trial court held that Employee did not have a meaningful return to work and applied a multiplier of six to the assigned impairment rating. A special workers' compensation panel reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in ruling that Employee had not made a meaningful return to work and reducing the award to one-and-one-half times the impairment rating. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence demonstrated that Employee did have a meaningful return to work.

A victim of alleged child sexual abuse purportedly perpetrated by one of the priests of the Catholic Diocese of Memphis in the 1970s filed suit against the Bishop of the Diocese, seeking monetary damages. The Diocese moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine deprived state courts of subject mater jurisdiction and that the victim's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court denied the Diocese's motion. The court of appeals held (1) the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred state courts from considering the victim's negligent hiring and retention claims but not the negligent supervision claims; and (2) the statute of limitations had run on the victim's claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the state courts had subject matter jurisdiction over the victim's claims; and (2) the victim's claims were not barred by the statute of limitations. Remanded.