Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Employee, a truck driver, was injured in the course and scope of his employment when his vehicle left the road and turned over. Employer denied Employee's claim for workers' compensation benefits, contending that the accident and resulting injuries were the direct result of Employee's willful violation of Employer's safety rules. The trial court found that Employee had willfully and intentionally disregarded the safety rules and entered judgment for Employer. Employee appealed, contending that the trial court erred because the evidence did not establish the perverseness of his conduct, a necessary element of the misconduct affirmative defense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in finding that Employee willfully and intentionally violated Employer's safety rules, where Employee did not give a credible explanation regarding his failure to comply with the rules, and Employer offered strong proof of its strong emphasis on compliance with the safety rules.

Plaintiff, who had purchased a truck from an automobile dealership, filed a products liability suit in 2007 against the manufacturer and the dealership, as Seller. Later, Plaintiff entered a voluntary nonsuit as to Seller and proceeded only against the manufacturer. Over one year later, the manufacturer declared bankruptcy. In 2009, Plaintiff again sued Seller, alleging negligence and strict liability in tort. Seller filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals denied the appeal. The Supreme Court granted Seller's application for permission to consider the application of the saving statute to the circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiff could proceed under the strict liability claim because that cause of action did not accrue until the manufacturer was judicially declared insolvent; and (2) because the second suit alleged acts of negligence on the part of Seller, an exception to the statutory rule prohibiting products liability suits against sellers, and could have been brought in 2007, the statute of limitations was a bar to recovery under that theory. Remanded for trial.

During a trial of Plaintiffs' premises liability claim, the trial court excluded as hearsay a portion of the testimony of Defendant's expert. The expert would have testified that he consulted an authoritative source whose interpretation of the applicable building code was consistent with that of the testifying expert. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court erred because the expert's testimony was admissible pursuant to Tenn. R. Evid. 703, but (2) the trial court's error was harmless. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court, holding (1) the court of appeals improperly applied an amended version of Rule 703 that was not in effect at the time of trial, and (2) the trial court properly excluded as hearsay portions of the proffered testimony of the testifying expert.

A father and his sixteen-year-old son were sued after the son was involved in an accident while driving a vehicle owned, insured, and provided to him by his father. The basis for the suit against the father was the family purpose doctrine, which imposes vicarious liability on the owner of a vehicle for the negligent operation of the vehicle by a family member. The trial court granted summary judgment to the father, finding that the family purpose doctrine did not apply. The court of appeals reversed and granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, ruling that the family purpose doctrine applied as a matter of law. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, holding that while two of the essential elements of the family purpose doctrine were met in this case, a genuine issue of material fact remained as to the last element. Remanded for trial.

Employee suffered a work-related injury and sought benefits. The benefit review conference at the Department of Labor and Workforce Development (DOL) ended in an impasse after a dispute about the degree of Employee's medical impairment. Employee filed suit. Subsequently, Employer filed an application for medical impairment rating (MIR) with the DOL, seeking the appointment of an independent medical examiner pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 50-6-204(d)(5). The trial court granted Employee's motion to quash the MIR, holding that the statute was established for the purpose of resolving workers' compensation claims while the claim was before an administrative body, and therefore, DOL had relinquished jurisdiction when the benefit review process reached an impasse. The trial court then adopted the higher of the disputed impairment ratings. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the constitutional separation of powers question was not properly presented, argued, or litigated before the trial court; and (2) whether the Employer may attempt to resolve the dispute of degree of medical impairment by seeking the opinion of an independent medical examiner pursuant to the statute was an issue for the Employee, Employer, and Attorney General to address on remand.

Plaintiff was injured while driving his employer's tow truck. Plaintiff filed suit against the driver of the other car involved in the accident, and later sought to invoke his employer's uninsured motorist policy in an amount equal to the liability coverage for bodily injury. The employer's insurer filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking to limit uninsured motorist coverage to the amount listed in the policy rather than the amount fixed by statute. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, directing that the insurer's motion for partial summary judgment be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when the insured signs an application indicating the selection of uninsured motorist coverage lower than the liability limits but neglects to initial a provision designed to confirm the selection of coverage less than the standard provided by statute, the requirement under Tenn. Code Ann. 56-7-1201(a)(2) that the selection be in writing has been satisfied.

At issue in this case was the applicable standard that courts should use in determining whether a medical expert is qualified to testify as an expert witness in a medical malpractice case. Donna Shipley filed a medical malpractice action against two doctors and a hospital, alleging various claims for medical negligence. The trial court granted the hospital and one doctor summary judgment. After disqualifying Shipley's medical experts, the trial court granted summary judgment to the remaining defendant, Dr. Williams, and dismissed Shipley's case. The court of appeals upheld the trial court's decision to disqualify Shipley's medical experts but reversed the grant of summary judgment on Shipley's negligence claims. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the trial court's judgment disqualifying Shipley's medical experts; (2) reversed the judgment of the court of appeals in part and reinstated summary judgment in Dr. Williams' favor on one of Shipley's negligence claims; and (3) vacated the trial court's order granting summary judgment on Shipley's remaining claims. Remanded.

While Alicia Howell worked on an assembly production line at Nissan North America, she was diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. After surgery, Howell and Nissan settled Howell's workers' compensation claim for her carpal tunnel injuries. When Howell attempted to return to work, she was told she would be returning to the fast-paced assembly line. Howell resigned and was hired at minimum wage for a temporary staffing agency. Howell then filed a petition for reconsideration of her earlier settlement. The trial court held that Howell was eligible for reconsideration of her workers' compensation benefits because she did not have a meaningful return to work and awarded her a twenty-five percent permanent partial disability rating to each upper extremity. The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appeals panel and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the appeals panel erred in holding that Howell had a meaningful return to work and her decision to resign rather than returning to work was unreasonable, and (2) the trial court's award was not excessive.

Employee injured her right shoulder in the course of her employment with Employer. Employee received medical treatment, during which time she continued to work for Employer. Employee filed a complaint in chancery court seeking workers' compensation benefits from her Employer. At trial, the parties contested the extent of Employee's anatomical impairment and permanent disability. The medical evidence at trial consisted of the testimony of two physicians, and through their testimony, the parties introduced Employee's medical records generated by other treating physicians. The physicians assigned varying degrees of impairment to the body as whole. The trial court eventually chose the evaluating physician's impairment, who assigned a seventeen percent impairment, and awarded Employee 25.5 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Employer appealed, arguing that the evaluating physician's rating did not comply with the American Medical Association Guides and that the award was therefore excessive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by accepting the evaluating physician's impairment rating as the basis of the disability award.

After Employee sustained an injury, he filed a worker's compensation action against Employer. The result was a court-approved workers' compensation settlement. Employee's authorized treating physician later recommended medical treatment. After Employer's utilization review provider denied approval of the proposed treatment, Employer filed a motion for an independent medical examination, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 50-6-204(d)(1), which is required if reasonable. The trial court found Employer's request to be unreasonable and denied the motion. On appeal, the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) Employer had good faith reasonable basis for questioning both the causation and the necessity of the proposed treatment and for filing a motion for a physical examination of Employee; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Employer's request for a medical examination of Employee was unreasonable. Remanded.