Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, survivors of a tenant killed by the criminal act of another tenant, filed suit against Defendant housing authority. Plaintiffs alleged Defendant was negligent in failing to evict the other tenant at the first instance of violent behavior. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment claiming federal regulations preempted Plaintiffs' negligence claim and that it was immune from suit under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (the GLTA). The trial court denied summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) Plaintiffs' negligence suit was not preempted by federal law; and (2) Defendant's failure to evict was an operational decision and Defendant was not entitled to immunity under the GTLA. Remanded.

At issue in this consumer protection case was which Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure applied to a motion that sought relief from a default judgment of liability on a counter-complaint, where the motion was filed within thirty days of entry of the default, the trial court did not expressly direct the entry of judgment on the counter-complaint pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02, and neither liability on the original complaint nor damages on the counter-complaint were determined. The trial court entered default judgment in favor of the consumer on her counterclaims against Discover Bank and awarded the consumer damages. The court of appeals upheld the default judgment, vacated the award of damages, and remanded the case for a new hearing on damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Rule 54.02, rather than Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, applies in this situation, but the same test applies to motions seeking relief from default judgment, under either rule, on the basis of "excusable neglect"; and (2) actual damages are recoverable for loss of available credit under Tennessee Consumer Protection Act where the plaintiff suffers a demonstrable loss of credit, proximately caused by the defendant, resulting in actual harm.

Employee, a certified nursing assistant, sustained an injury while working. Six months later, Employee returned to work with significant restrictions on the use of his right arm. After two weeks of training for a different position, Employee resigned. Employee later made a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The trial court held that Employee did not have a meaningful return to work and applied a multiplier of six to the assigned impairment rating. A special workers' compensation panel reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in ruling that Employee had not made a meaningful return to work and reducing the award to one-and-one-half times the impairment rating. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence demonstrated that Employee did have a meaningful return to work.

A victim of alleged child sexual abuse purportedly perpetrated by one of the priests of the Catholic Diocese of Memphis in the 1970s filed suit against the Bishop of the Diocese, seeking monetary damages. The Diocese moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine deprived state courts of subject mater jurisdiction and that the victim's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court denied the Diocese's motion. The court of appeals held (1) the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred state courts from considering the victim's negligent hiring and retention claims but not the negligent supervision claims; and (2) the statute of limitations had run on the victim's claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the state courts had subject matter jurisdiction over the victim's claims; and (2) the victim's claims were not barred by the statute of limitations. Remanded.

Plaintiffs filed a personal injury suit against The Royal Group. The Royal Group filed an answer alleging the comparative fault of Aaron Rents. Plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint adding Aaron Rents as a defendant. The one-year statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiffs' cause of action, however, had expired before The Royal Group filed its answer naming Aaron Rents. As a result, Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint within ninety days of The Royal Group's answer, relying on Tenn. Code Ann. 20-1-119. Aaron Rents thereafter alleged fault against Fulmarque. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a second amended complaint, naming Fulmarque as a defendant. The trial court eventually granted summary judgment in favor of Fulmarque, concluding (1) the action was barred by the statute of limitations, and (2) the ninety-day window provided by section 20-1-119 was not triggered by Aaron Rents' answer alleging comparative fault against Fulmarque. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding that section 20-1-119 does not afford successive ninety-day windows during which a plaintiff may file an amended complaint naming a nonparty defendant as a comparative tort-feasor.

Employee fell and struck both knees on a concrete landing in the course of his employment with Employer. Employee's left knee required surgery and his right knee received limited medical treatment. The treating physician assigned eight percent permanent impairment to the left leg. Employee's evaluating physician assigned thirteen percent impairment to the left leg and twenty percent impairment to the right leg. The trial court adopted the evaluating physician's opinions and awarded fifty percent permanent partial disability to both legs. The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err (1) by finding that Employee sustained a permanent injury to the right knee; (2) by adopting the impairment rating of the evaluating physician for Employee's right and left knee injury; and (3) in awarding fifty percent permanent partial disability to both legs, where Employee had significant activity restrictions as a result of the injury.

Employee, a truck driver, was injured in the course and scope of his employment when his vehicle left the road and turned over. Employer denied Employee's claim for workers' compensation benefits, contending that the accident and resulting injuries were the direct result of Employee's willful violation of Employer's safety rules. The trial court found that Employee had willfully and intentionally disregarded the safety rules and entered judgment for Employer. Employee appealed, contending that the trial court erred because the evidence did not establish the perverseness of his conduct, a necessary element of the misconduct affirmative defense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in finding that Employee willfully and intentionally violated Employer's safety rules, where Employee did not give a credible explanation regarding his failure to comply with the rules, and Employer offered strong proof of its strong emphasis on compliance with the safety rules.

Plaintiff, who had purchased a truck from an automobile dealership, filed a products liability suit in 2007 against the manufacturer and the dealership, as Seller. Later, Plaintiff entered a voluntary nonsuit as to Seller and proceeded only against the manufacturer. Over one year later, the manufacturer declared bankruptcy. In 2009, Plaintiff again sued Seller, alleging negligence and strict liability in tort. Seller filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals denied the appeal. The Supreme Court granted Seller's application for permission to consider the application of the saving statute to the circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiff could proceed under the strict liability claim because that cause of action did not accrue until the manufacturer was judicially declared insolvent; and (2) because the second suit alleged acts of negligence on the part of Seller, an exception to the statutory rule prohibiting products liability suits against sellers, and could have been brought in 2007, the statute of limitations was a bar to recovery under that theory. Remanded for trial.

During a trial of Plaintiffs' premises liability claim, the trial court excluded as hearsay a portion of the testimony of Defendant's expert. The expert would have testified that he consulted an authoritative source whose interpretation of the applicable building code was consistent with that of the testifying expert. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court erred because the expert's testimony was admissible pursuant to Tenn. R. Evid. 703, but (2) the trial court's error was harmless. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court, holding (1) the court of appeals improperly applied an amended version of Rule 703 that was not in effect at the time of trial, and (2) the trial court properly excluded as hearsay portions of the proffered testimony of the testifying expert.

A father and his sixteen-year-old son were sued after the son was involved in an accident while driving a vehicle owned, insured, and provided to him by his father. The basis for the suit against the father was the family purpose doctrine, which imposes vicarious liability on the owner of a vehicle for the negligent operation of the vehicle by a family member. The trial court granted summary judgment to the father, finding that the family purpose doctrine did not apply. The court of appeals reversed and granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, ruling that the family purpose doctrine applied as a matter of law. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, holding that while two of the essential elements of the family purpose doctrine were met in this case, a genuine issue of material fact remained as to the last element. Remanded for trial.