Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Decedent's family (the Kings) sued Toyota and the local Toyota dealership after Decedent lost control of his Toyota, which rolled over several times. The Kings asserted that the Toyota's allegedly defective seat belt system caused Decedent's ejection from the car and his subsequent death. The jury returned a verdict in Toyota's favor, and the trial court signed a corresponding judgment. The Kings moved for a new trial, alleging that Toyota's counsel had violated the trial court's limine rulings. The trial court granted the Kings' motion. Toyota subsequently filed an original proceeding in the Supreme Court. At issue was whether an appellate court may, in an original proceeding, determine whether the reasonably specific and legally sound rationale of the trial court for ordering a new trial was actually true. The Court conditionally granted relief, holding (1) an appellate court may conduct a merits review of the basis for a new trial order after a trial court has set aside a jury verdict, and if the record does not support the trial court's rationale for ordering a new trial, the appellate court may grant mandamus relief; and (2) in this case, the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial. View "In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was working for a BP Amoco Chemical Company (BP) contractor in 2005 when BP's Texas City refinery exploded, killing fifteen workers and injuring many others. Plaintiff signed a power of attorney retaining William Wells to represent him on any claims he had against BP arising from the explosion. In order to increase the settlement in this and three other cases, Wells associated Ronald and Kevin Krist and the Krist Law Firm as additional counsel. After a settlement was obtained, Plaintiff and his wife brought this suit against Wells, the Krists, and the Krist Law Firm (collectively, Attorneys), claiming that the Attorneys failed to obtain an adequate settlement for both plaintiffs. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Attorneys, and the court of appeals affirmed, finding that Plaintiffs had not presented competent evidence of damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an affidavit did not raise a genuine issue of material fact on malpractice damages; (2) discovery disputes in the trial court did not warrant denial of summary judgment on the issue of damages; and (3) the lay testimony of Plaintiffs did not raise a genuine issue of material fact on malpractice damages. View "Elizondo v. Krist" on Justia Law

Joel Martinez died after ingesting heroin with Defendant. Plaintiff, individually and as representative of Martinez's estate, sued Defendant under wrongful death and survival statutes, alleging that Defendant was negligent in failing to call 911 immediately and in failing to disclose Martinez's heroin use to the paramedics. Defendant asserted an affirmative defense based on the common law unlawful acts doctrine, under which a plaintiff cannot recover damages if it can be shown that, at the time of the injury, the plaintiff was engaged in an illegal act that contributed to the injury. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant based on the unlawful acts doctrine. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the common law unlawful acts doctrine is not available as an affirmative defense in personal injury and wrongful death cases, as, like other common law assumption-of-the-risk defenses, it was abrogated by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 33's proportionate responsibility scheme; and (2) therefore, a plaintiff's illegal conduct not falling within the affirmative defense in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 93.001 must be apportioned rather than barring recovery completely. Remanded. View "Dugger v. Arredondo" on Justia Law

Employee was a psychiatric nurse employed by Employer, a health care provider. Employee was injured at work while restraining a psychiatric patient. Employee filed a negligence action against Employer, seeking damages for personal injuries. Employer moved to dismiss Employee's suit, asserting that the suit alleged a health care liability claim (HCLC) under the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA) and that Employee's failure to serve Employer with an expert report within the TMLA's 120-day deadline mandated dismissal of his suit. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Employee's claim that Employer provided improper security of the psychiatric patient and inadequate safety for Employee was an HCLC under the TMLA, and therefore, Employee was required to serve an expert report within 120 days of filing suit. Remanded with instructions to dismiss Employee's complaint. View "Psychiatric Solutions, Inc. v. Palit" on Justia Law

Respondents filed this health care liability action against Petitioner. The trial court awarded Respondents $9 million in actual damages and $3 million in punitive damages. The court of appeals reversed the punitive damages award. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment affirmance of the actual damages award, finding that Petitioner's liability was statutorily capped. On remand, the trial court vacated the original judgment and awarded Respondents actual damages capped according to the relevant statute plus postjudgment interest calculated from the date of the remand judgment. The court of appeals reversed the remand judgment, holding that the trial court erred by vacating its original judgment and by calculating the postjudgment interest from the date of the remand judgment rather than the date of the original judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review the trial court's remand judgment; (2) postjudgment interest must be calculated from the date of the original judgment; and (3) the trial court's order vacating the original judgment was error, but it was not reversible error. Remanded. View "Phillips v. Bramlett" on Justia Law

The family of a nursing home patient filed this action against the nursing home for, inter alia, medical negligence, negligence per se, breach of contract, and retaliation. Plaintiffs asserted the retaliation claim under the Texas Health & Safety Code, which creates a cause of action against a nursing facility that retaliates against a resident or family member who makes a complaint concerning the facility. Defendants moved to dismiss all of the claims pursuant to the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA) because the expert report was deficient. The trial court dismissed all of Plaintiffs' claims except for the retaliation claim, concluding that the claim was not a health care liability claim (HCLC) for which the TMLA requires a supporting expert report. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment with respect to the retaliation claim, holding that because the retaliation claim was based on the same factual allegations on which one of Plaintiffs' HCLCs was based, the claim should have been dismissed for lack of a sufficient expert report. View "PM Management-Trinity NC, LLC v. Kumets" on Justia Law

After an investigation into allegations that Doctor had self-prescribed medications, the Board placed Doctor on probation. A media outlet subsequently aired an investigative broadcast suggesting that Doctor was disciplined for operating on patients while taking drugs. Doctor and his professional association (collectively Plaintiffs) sued Media Defendants for defamation. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that under McIlvain v. Jacobs, none of Defendant's statements were actionable as a matter of law because the media outlet accurately reported third-party allegations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Doctor raised a genuine issue of material fact as to the truth of falsity of the broadcast with evidence that he was not disciplined for taking drugs and had never performed surgery while taking them; and (2) therefore, Defendants could could avail themselves of the truth defense. Remanded. View "Neely v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed this action against Defendants for negligence based on an undertaking theory and for premises liability after he suffered personal injuries at a party at Defendants' residence. The trial court rendered summary judgment for Defendants as to Plaintiff's negligence claim. The court of appeals reversed, finding that summary judgment was improper because Defendants' summary judgment motion only addressed social host liability and failed to address the negligent-undertaking theory. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendants' summary judgment motion specifically addressed Plaintiff's negligent-undertaking claim by arguing that Graff v. Beard forecloses the assumption of any duty, i.e., an undertaking, by a social host under the facts of this case. View "Nall v. Plunkett" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, as next friends of their daughter (Daughter) sued Hospital for injuries sustained by Daughter following her premature birth. One hundred and sixteen days after filing their original petition, Plaintiffs nonsuited their claim. Plaintiffs later filed a new lawsuit against Hospital and other health care providers and served an expert report on Hospital. Hospital objected to the report as untimely and moved to dismiss the claim against it. The trial court overruled the objection and denied the motion to dismiss. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Plaintiffs timely served their expert report. At issue on appeal was the Texas Medical Liability Act's (TMLA) expert-report requirement, which requires a claimant to serve an expert report on health care providers against whom the claim is asserted 120 days after the original petition is filed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a claimant's nonsuit of a health care liability claim before the expiration of the 120-day period tolls the expert-report period until suit is refiled. View "CHCA Woman's Hosp., LP v. Lidji" on Justia Law

In a letter sent to colleagues and others, Defendant, a physician, accused a fellow physician, Plaintiff, of lacking veracity and speaking in half truths. The trial court granted a directed verdict that the letter was defamatory per se. A jury awarded Plaintiff $90,000 in actual damages for mental anguish and loss of reputation and $85,000 in exemplary damages. The court of appeals affirmed the damages award. The Supreme Court reversed, rendering judgment that Plaintiff taking nothing, where (1) the statements did not defame the physician per se, and thus, the Court could not presume damages for mental anguish and loss of reputation, and consequently, Plaintiff was required to prove actual damages; (2) there was no evidence of mental anguish that rose to the level of a substantial disruption in daily routine or a high degree of mental pain and distress; (3) there was no evidence of loss of reputation because there was no indication that any recipient of the defamatory letter believed in its statements; and (4) because Plaintiff did not establish actual damages, he could not recover exemplary damages. View "Hancock v. Variyam" on Justia Law