Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued the hospital (Hospital) where she gave birth to a newborn and the two doctors who assisted in delivery, alleging that Hospital was liable for injuries to the newborn because of its own direct negligence as well as its vicarious liability for the negligence of the two doctors. Plaintiff served Hospital with three expert reports, all of which Hospital objected to. The trial court determined that when the three reports were read in concert, Plaintiff had met the requirements of the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA). The court of appeals concluded Plaintiff's reports were adequate as to the vicarious liability claim but remanded to the trial court to consider granting an extension to cure other deficiencies. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals' judgment as to the adequacy of the reports regarding the claim that Hospital was vicariously liable for the doctors' actions; and (2) did not address whether the court of appeals erred by remanding the case for the trial court to consider granting an extension of time for Plaintiff to cure deficiencies, as the expert reports satisfied the TMLA requirements as to one theory of liability alleged against Hospital. View "TTHR Ltd P'ship v. Moreno" on Justia Law

The Medlens' dog Avery escaped the family's backyard and was picked up by animal control. Before the Medlens could retrieve Avery, shelter worker Carla Strickland mistakenly placed Avery on the euthanasia list, and Avery was put to sleep. The Medlens sued Strickland for causing Avery's death and sought damages for Avery's "intrinsic value." The trial court dismissed the suit with prejudice, concluding that Texas law barred such damages. The court of appeals reversed, becoming the first Texas court to hold that a dog owner may recover intangible loss-of-companionship damages in the form of intrinsic or sentimental-value property damages. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether emotional-injury damages were recoverable for the negligent destruction of a dog. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under established legal doctrine, recovery in pet-death cases is, barring legislative reclassification, limited to "loss of value, not loss of relationship." View "Strickland v. Medlen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that while she was a patient at a hospital, a hospital nurse, who was temporarily placed with the hospital by a staffing service, assaulted her. Plaintiff sued under the Texas Medical Liability Act, asserting that the staffing service was directly and vicariously liable for the nurse's conduct. The staffing service filed a motion to dismiss because the patient's expert reports did not specify how the service was directly negligent. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that because the reports supported a theory of vicarious liability against the staffing service, the lack of a description supporting direct liability was not fatal to Plaintiff's maintaining her cause of action. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) an expert report that adequately addresses at least one pleaded liability theory satisfies the statutory requirements, and the trial court must not dismiss in such a case; and (2) Plaintiff demonstrated that at least one of her alleged theories, vicarious liability, had expert support, and therefore, the trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss. View "Certified EMS, Inc. v. Potts" on Justia Law

Doctor examined Patient to determine whether she met the criteria for involuntary hospitalization for psychiatric care. Doctor decided she did not and released her. Three days later Patient committed suicide. Patient's sons (Plaintiffs) sued Doctor for negligence in failing to involuntarily hospitalize Plaintiff. The jury found against Doctor and awarded damages of $200,000. The trial court rendered judgment on the verdict, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment in favor of Doctor, holding that because there was no evidence that Patient's involuntary hospitalization by Doctor probably would have prevented her death, the evidence was legally insufficient to support the finding that his negligence proximately caused her death. View "Rodriguez-Escobar v. Goss" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a personal injury settlement between Plaintiff, a minor, and Ford Motor Company. Acting on his own initiative, the pretrial judge appointed an attorney (Attorney) to represent Plaintiff's interest in the settlement. Plaintiff's mother (Mother), as next friend of Plaintiff, unsuccessfully challenged - through a motion to reconsider and later a writ of mandamus - the appointment of Attorney as Plaintiff's guardian ad litem. The pretrial judge ultimately rendered a judgment approving the settlement and ordering Ford to pay $40,000 to Attorney in guardian ad litem fees and expenses. The court of appeals (1) affirmed the pretrial judge's appointment of Attorney as guardian ad litem, finding that Mother's responsibilities toward Plaintiff constituted the conflict necessitating the appointment of Attorney as guardian ad litem; and (2) affirmed the ad litem fee award. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion by appointing a guardian ad litem, as there was no conflict of interest between Plaintiff and Mother; and (2) any services rendered by Attorney after the time the pretrial judge considered Mother's motion to reconsider were not necessary and thus not compensable. Remanded for a determination of Attorney's fee award. View "Ford Motor Co. v. Stewart, Cox, & Hatcher, PC" on Justia Law

Respondent sued Petitioner for providing deficient geotechnical engineering services. Respondent attached to its petition an affidavit it believed complied with Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 150.002, which required that Respondent in this case file an affidavit attesting to the claim's merit. The trial court denied Petitioner's motion for dismissal on the ground that the affidavit was deficient, and Petitioner appealed. Before the appeal could be decided, Respondent nonsuited its claims against Petitioner. The court of appeals held that the nonsuit mooted the appeal. Petitioner brought a petition for review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Respondent's nonsuit did not moot Petitioner's appeal. Remanded. View "CTL/Thompson Tex., LLC v. Starwood Homeowner's Ass'n" on Justia Law

Petitioners, several homeowners, filed an action against a gas company, alleging that noise and odor emanating from the company's compressor station caused a permanent nuisance. The company responded by asserting that because the homeowners' complaints predated their lawsuit by six years, the statute of limitations barred their action. After a jury trial, the trial court entered judgment for the homeowners, finding that a permanent nuisance, which began just before the lawsuit was filed, diminished property values. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in finding that some evidence supported the jury's finding in the accrual date; but (2) the conclusory and speculative testimony offered at trial did not support a finding of diminished property values. Remanded for a new trial on liability and damages. View "Natural Gas Pipeline of Am. v. Justiss " on Justia Law

This special defect case involved a concrete guardrail. Jose Perches was killed while navigating an underpass. Perches's parents sued the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT). The trial court denied TxDOT's immunity-based jurisdictional plea. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that although the Percheses had not shown an immunity waiver for their negligent maintenance and implementation claims, they pleaded sufficient facts to demonstrate TxDOT's waiver of immunity with respect to their special defect claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and rendered judgment dismissing the Percheses' claims under the Texas Tort Claims Act, holding (1) concrete guardrails placed in accordance to plan cannot constitute a special defect under the Act, and therefore, under the Act, the State's sovereign immunity was not waived; and (2) the Percheses did not plead sufficient facts demonstrating a waiver of immunity under the Act with respect to their premise liability claims. Remanded. View "Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Perches" on Justia Law

Respondent injured his back while working, and his employer's workers' compensation insurer, Texas Mutual Insurance Company (TMIC), accepted the injury as compensable. Three years later when it was discovered that Respondent had herniated lumbar intervertebral discs, TMIC disputed whether they were causally related to the original injury. The Texas Department of Insurance Division of Workers' Compensation determined that the disc herniations were related to the original injury and ordered TMIC to pay medical benefits, which it did. Respondent later sued TMIC for damages caused by its delay in paying benefits. The trial court rendered judgment for Respondent, and the court of appeals affirmed. Based on the Court's recent decision in Texas Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ruttiger, the Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment for TMIC. View "Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morris" on Justia Law

The Texas Department of Criminal Justice Community Justice Assistance Division (TDCJ) brought this interlocutory appeal from the denial of its plea to the jurisdiction as to claims for damages related to actions of two county substance abuse treatment facility officers. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment dismissing the claims against TDCJ for want of jurisdiction, holding (1) the claims against TDCJ based on the use of tangible property involved intent to accomplish intentional torts, and its plea to the jurisdiction as to those claims should have been granted; and (2) TDCJ's plea as to the remaining claims also should have been granted because there was no allegation that those claims resulted from the use of tangible property. View "Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice v. Campos" on Justia Law