Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In this employer retaliation case, a broad-form jury question allowed the jury to find liability based on a legal theory that was jurisdictionally barred and thus could not support liability. The trial court entered a judgment reinstating Employee to her position and awarding her damages and attorney's fees. Employer appealed, arguing that the jury charge allowed a finding of liability based on invalid legal theories. The court of appeals concluded that Employer waived its objection. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Employer properly preserved its objection; and (2) because the Court could not determine whether the jury relied on the invalid theory, the case was remanded for a new trial. View "Tex. Comm'n on Human Rights v. Morrison" on Justia Law

In this appeal from a summary judgment dismissal of a direct and collateral attack, Petitioner contended that the underlying judgment was void and subject to collateral attack at any time. In this regard, Petitioner argued that the trial court rendering the default judgment never acquired personal jurisdiction over it because the service of process was defective. Alternatively, Petitioner argued that its adversary's extrinsic fraud prevented it from learning about the underlying default judgment and that limitations was thereby tolled, making its direct attack through a bill of review timely. The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment, concluding that the underlying default judgment was not void and that there was no evidence of extrinsic fraud that would toll limitations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the alleged defects in service of process were not sufficient to render the default judgment void, but (2) summary judgment was improperly granted because there was some evidence of extrinsic fraud. Remanded. View "PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera" on Justia Law

An employee (Employee) of the Austin Independent School District (AISD), a self-insured governmental entity, was injured on the job. AISD acknowledged that Employee had been injured but disputed whether the compensable injury extended to two alleged conditions. A hearing officer sided with Employee on the contested issues, as did the administrative appeals panel. In the district court, Employee filed a counterclaim seeking attorney fees. AISD filed a nonsuit, leaving only the counterclaim for fees. After a jury trial, Employee won a judgment on the verdict that included pre-nonsuit and post-nonsuit attorney fees. The court of appeals found (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the pre-nonsuit fee award, but (2) the post-nonsuit fee award could not stand. AISD brought a petition for review in the Supreme Court, arguing for the first time that governmental immunity from suit barred the award of attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the defense of sovereign immunity may be raised for the first time on appeal; and (2) AISD was immune from Employee's claim for attorney fees. View "Manbeck v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether, for purposes of Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 16.068, an action for cargo damage against a common carrier, brought under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, relates back to an action for breach of an agreement to settle the cargo-damage claim. The answer depended on whether the cargo-damage claim was, in the words of section 16.068, "wholly based on a new, distinct, or different transaction or occurrence" than the breach-of-settlement claim. A divided court of appeals held that the cargo-damage claim did not relate back and was therefore barred by limitations. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment for the plaintiff, holding that the cargo-damage claim and the breach-of-settlement claim both arose out of the same occurrence, and therefore, the cargo-damage claim was not barred by limitations. View "Lexington Ins. Co. v. Daybreak Express, Inc." on Justia Law

After being seriously injured in an accident by a U-Haul truck, Plaintiff sued several U-Haul corporate entities and an independent dealer on theories of negligence and gross negligence, alleging that the accident was the result of a systematic pattern of poor inspection and repair practices, and incompetence. A jury found U-Haul International (UHI) and U-Haul Company of Texas (UHT) both negligent and grossly negligent and East Fork Enterprises negligent. The trial court awarded approximately $45 million in damages, including more than $23 million in punitive damages against UHI and UHT. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's exemplary damages award against UHI and affirmed in all other respects. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court of appeals and remanded the negligence claims for a new trial against all defendants, as the admission of certain evidence was an abuse of discretion that probably led to the rendition of an improper verdict; and (2) rendered a take nothing judgment on the gross-negligence claims against UHI and UHT. Remanded for a new trial on the negligence claims against the defendants. View "U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Waldrip" on Justia Law

In this health care liability claim, the trial court denied Rusk State Hospital's challenge to the plaintiffs' expert reports. The hospital filed an interlocutory appeal from that ruling. On appeal, the hospital, for the first time, asserted it was immune from suit. The court of appeals refused to consider the immunity issue because it had not been presented to the trial court. After addressing the merits of the hospital's challenge to the expert reports, the court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred by refusing to consider the immunity claim because immunity from suit implicates courts' subject-matter jurisdiction; but (2) the case was properly remanded, as (i) the pleadings and record neither established a waiver of the hospital's immunity nor conclusively negated such a waiver, and (ii) the hospital had not shown conclusively that either the plaintiffs had a full, fair opportunity in the trial court to develop the record as to immunity and amend their pleadings, or that if the case was remanded and the plaintiffs were given such an opportunity they could not show immunity had been waived. View "Rusk State Hosp. v. Black" on Justia Law

This case involved the duties and standard of care of an oil and gas operator under an exculpatory clause in a joint operating agreement (JOA). Based on language in the exculpatory clause in the JOA, the trial court instructed the jury to find that to find a breach of the JOA the operator's conduct must have risen to the level of gross negligence or willful misconduct. The jury found the operator, Petitioner, breached his duties under the JOA to the working interest owners. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) the gross negligence and willful misconduct instruction should not have been included in the charge because the case centered around a breach of contract; but (2) there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings that Petitioner breached his duty as operator when measured against the elements of breach of contract. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the exculpatory clause in the JOA established the standard for the claims against Petitioner; and (2) there was legally insufficient evidence that Petitioner was grossly negligent or acted with willful misconduct. View "Reeder v. Wood County Energy, LLC" on Justia Law

Two female patients sued a medical doctor, the professional association bearing his name, and a clinic, alleging the doctor assaulted the patients by groping their breasts while examining them for sinus and flu symptoms. Although they maintained the claims were not health care liability claims (HCLCs), the patients served the doctor and professional association with reports from a physician who, based only on the assumption that allegations in the plaintiffs' pleadings were true opined that the defendant doctor's alleged actions did not fall within any appropriate standard of care. The trial court denied Defendants' motions for dismissal on the suit on the basis that the claims were HCLCs and that the reports were deficient. The court of appeals affirmed without considering the reports' adequacy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA) creates a rebuttable presumption that a patient's claims against a physician or health care provider based on facts implicating the defendant's conduct during the patient's care, treatment, or confinement are HCLCs; and (2) the record did not rebut the presumption as it related to the TMLA's expert report requirements, nor were the expert reports served by the plaintiffs adequate under the TMLA. Remanded. View "Loaisiga v. Cerda" on Justia Law

In Plaintiff's negligence against United Scaffolding, a jury assigned fifty-one percent responsibility for Plaintiff's injuries to United. The trial court subsequently granted Plaintiff's motion for a new trial in the interest of justice and fairness. After the trial court amended its order, United sought mandamus relief, arguing that the amended order failed to provide adequate reasoning for granting the motion for new trial. The Supreme Court conditionally granted the writ of mandamus, holding (1) because the trial court's order was premised solely "in the interest of justice," it did not provide a reasonably specific explanation of the court's reasons for setting aside the jury verdict; and (2) the trial court need not render judgment on the jury verdict. View "In re United Scaffolding, Inc." on Justia Law

The Texas Tort Claims Act imposes a lesser duty of care on the government when a premises liability claim does not involve a special defect. Plaintiff sued City, claiming that its negligence in creating and failing to repair, or warn of, a street's dangerous condition caused her to have an accident while bicycling. City moved for summary judgment, arguing that the street's condition was not a special defect but rather an ordinary premises defect of which Plaintiff was aware and the City was not. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the condition was a special defect. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the case, holding (1) the condition in this case was not a special defect; and (2) City was not liable for an ordinary premises defect because Plaintiff had no evidence that City knew about this hazard before her accident. View "City of Denton v. Paper" on Justia Law