Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Rafael Casados suffered a fatal, work-related injury while working for two employers that both had workers' compensation coverage. Casados' parents sued one of the employers. At issue was whether workers' compensation was the exclusive remedy to Casados' parents, which would bar their suit against Port Elevator. Because Port Elevator had a workers' compensation policy, Casados was an employee, he suffered a work-related injury, and the jury failed to find Port Elevator grossly negligent, the Texas Workers' Compensation Act (TWCA), Tex. Lab. Code 406, provided that the exclusive remedy was against the employer's insurer - not the employer. Accordingly, the claim at issue in this appeal was barred. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered judgment for Port Elevator.

This case arose when Norma Sandoval and her sister, Nora Martinez, jointly filed suit against SCI alleging fraud, deceptive trade practices, and other tort claims arising from their respective interment rights and services contracts for family burial plots at Mont Meta Memorial Park. Martinez's contract allowed the court to appoint an arbitrator, while Sandoval's contract required the American Arbitration Association (AAA) to appoint the arbitrator if the parties could not reach a mutual agreement. The trial judge severed the cases and then appointed an arbitrator for Martinez's case. Over the objection of SCI, the trial court also appointed the same arbitrator to arbitrate Sandoval's case. At issue on appeal was whether SCI allowed a lapse or mechanical breakdown in the contractual process for selection of an arbitrator, thereby validating the trial court's intervention to appoint the arbitrator. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by appointing an arbitrator instead of following the agreed-upon method of selection outlined in the contract. As a matter of law, the two-month delay in the selection of an arbitrator in this case, by itself, did not establish a lapse or failure of the parties to avail themselves of the contractual selection method. Accordingly, without hearing oral argument, the court conditionally granted SCI's petition for writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its prior order appointing David Calvillo as arbitrator.

This case involved a property dispute between the parties over easements and right-of-ways on plaintiffs' property. Defendant contended that the tort claims against it were barred by the two-year statute of limitations and that the declaratory judgment against it was unwarranted. The court held that plaintiffs' common-law tort claims were barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations and the estoppel effect of the alleged fraudulent concealment ended in December 2002. Because plaintiffs did not file suit until more than two years after this date, their claims were time-barred. The court agreed that claims for declaratory judgment were moot because defendant had removed its cable lines from plaintiffs' properties prior to trial. Accordingly, the court granted defendant's petition for review and reversed the court of appeals' judgment.

This case involved two related oil and gas mineral lease disputes that were jointly tried. At issue was whether limitations barred the Marshalls' (respondents and lessors) fraud claim against BP America Production Co., et al. (the lessee and operator), and whether Vaquillas Ranch Co., Ltd., et al. (lessors) lost title by adverse possession after Wagner Oil Co. (successors-in-interest) succeeded to BP's interests, took over the operations, and produced and paid Vaquillas royalties for nearly twenty years. The court held that because the Marshalls' injury was not inherently undiscoverable and BP's fraudulent representations about its good faith efforts to develop the well could have been discovered with reasonable diligence before limitations expired, neither the discovery rule nor fraudulent concealment extended limitations. Accordingly, the Marshalls' fraud claims against BP were time-barred. The court further held that by paying a clearly labeled royalty to Vaquillas, Wagner sufficiently asserted its intent to oust Vaquillas to acquire the lease by adverse possession.

LTTS Charter School ("LTTS") was an open-enrollment school that retained C2 Construction, Inc. ("C2") to build school facilities at a site Universal Academy had leased. C2 filed a breach of contract suit and Universal Academy filed a plea to the jurisdiction claiming immunity from suit. The trial court denied the plea and Universal Academy brought an interlocutory appeal under Section 51.014(a)(8) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. In the court of appeals, C2 moved to dismiss the interlocutory appeal, arguing that Universal Academy was note entitled to one because it was not a governmental unit under the Torts Claims Act ("Act"), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 101.001(3)(D). At issue was whether an open-enrollment charter school was a governmental unit as defined by Section 101.001(3)(D) and thus, able to take an interlocutory appeal from a trial court's denial of its plea to the jurisdiction. The court held that open-enrollment charter schools were governmental units for the Act purposes because the Act defined government unit broadly to include any other institution, agency, or organ of government derived from state law; the Education Code defined open-enrollment charters schools as part of the public school system, which were created in accordance with the laws of the state, subject to state laws and rules governing public schools and, together with governmental traditional public schools, have the primary responsibility for implementing the state's system of public education; and the Legislature considered open-enrollment charter schools to be governmental entities under a host of other laws outside the Education Code. Accordingly, because Universal Academy was a governmental unit under the Act, the court of appeals had jurisdiction to hear its interlocutory appeal under Section 51.014(a)(8).

Petitioner sued respondent after her son accidently set fire to her six-year-old daughter's dress with a J-26 model BIC lighter, alleging that the daughter's injuries were the result of manufacturing and design defects in the lighter. At issue was whether the design defect claim was preempted by federal law and the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that a design defect in the lighter was a producing cause of the fire that burned the daughter. The court held that the manufacturing defect claim was not preempted by federal law because the court of appeals found an alternative ground for liability, and the court need not determine whether a claim based solely on respondent's failure to comply with its internal specifications would be preempted. The court also held that petitioner presented legally sufficient evidence that the lighter did not meet manufacturing specifications but failed to prove that the deviation was a producing cause of the daughter's injuries. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered judgment for respondent.

Marcos Guerra was buried at Mont Meta Memorial Park cemetery in a plot that had been sold to someone else. When his family refused the cemetery's request that it be allowed to move the body to another burial plot, the cemetery did so anyway. Guerra's family members subsequently sued defendants, the corporation that owned and operated the cemetery and its parent corporation. At issue was whether the evidence was sufficient to support jury findings that defendants were liable for actions of the cemetery's employees and whether plaintiffs suffered compensable mental anguish because Guerra's body was disinterred and moved to another grave without permission. Also at issue was whether evidence of other lawsuits against defendants was properly admitted. The court held that there was legally insufficient evidence to support either the liability findings or mental anguish findings. The court also held that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of other lawsuits, verdicts, and judgments and that such evidence was harmful and required the case to be remanded for a new trial. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, rendered judgment in part, and remanded for a new trial in part.

Petitioner Allen Keller Company, a general contractor, was working under contract to the local government to construct a portion of roadway. The contract required strict compliance with its terms, and the company had no discretion to vary any terms. Respondents brought suit against the county, engineers and driver of the car for the wrongful death of their daughter when the car she rode in slid on the rain-slick portion of road completed by the Petitioner several months earlier. The car rolled into a river, and the daughter was caught inside. Since the accident, guard rail was installed on the portion of road completed by Petitioner. Respondents maintained their claims against Petitioner, but settled with all other parties. The trial court granted Petitioner summary judgment, but the appellate court reversed, holding that Petitioner did not prove it had not proximately cause the accident that lead to the daughter's death. On review, the Supreme Court found Petitioner owed Respondents no duty to warn of the dangerous conditions in the design of the road because Petitioner had no discretion in altering terms of road's design specifications. On review, this Court reversed the appellate court's decision in favor of Petitioner.