Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In November 2004, Dr. Ashard Yousuf sued Dr. George Cohlmia and Cardiovascular Surgical Specialists Corporation (CVSS) in Oklahoma state court for defamation, tortious interference with business relations/contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress/outrage, negligence, and breach of contract. Dr. Yousuf alleged that Dr. Cohlmia made a series of false statements to local media disparaging Dr. Yousuf's professional reputation. Dr. Cohlmia denied that the statements he made were false. CVSS held a professional liability policy with Physicians Liability Insurance Company (PLICO) and two identical general commercial liability policies with American National Property and Casualty Company (ANPAC, one for each business location), each of which covered Dr. Cohlmia as an additional insured. Dr. Cohlmia demanded that both insurers provide for his defense, pursuant to their respective policies. PLICO agreed to defend the lawsuit under a reservation of rights and requested ANPAC to share in the defense. ANPAC refused, contending its policy did not cover the alleged wrongdoing and that it owed no duty to defend. ANPAC further claimed that even if it erred in refusing to defend Dr. Cohlmia, PLICO had no right to indemnification or contribution for the defense costs it incurred. ANPAC appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of PLICO in a dispute regarding ANPAC's breach of its duty to defend a co-insured. PLICO cross-appealed the district court's denial of its motion for prejudgment interest. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "Yousuf v. Cohlmia" on Justia Law

Jose Hernandez, Jr., and Salvador Hernandez were killed by a motorist while they were performing road construction in Oklahoma. Their representative sued their employer, Duit Construction Company, and the motorist and alleged a substantive due process claims against multiple Oklahoma Department of Transportation (ODOT) employees. All ODOT employees (except the director and the resident engineer on the construction project) were dismissed by the district court. The question before the Tenth Circuit in this case was whether the two remaining employees were entitled to qualified immunity. The district judge said no; but because the alleged facts revealed no constitutional violation, the Tenth Circuit reversed. View "Hernandez v. Ridley, et al" on Justia Law

Derek Braswell suffered a horrific workplace accident: while operating a press brake manufactured by Cincinnati, Inc., his right arm was crushed, and eventually had to be amputated. Despite warnings, Braswell reached into the die area to remove a jammed piece of metal. The machine's safety equipment designed to prevent this type of accident had been removed or disabled sometime prior to the accident. After his injury, Braswell filed a suit against Cincinnati on theories of strict products liability and negligence. The district court granted summary judgment for Cincinnati on the grounds that a subsequent owner had modified the press brake to create the danger and that the gated pedal on the original model made the press brake not unreasonably dangerous. The Tenth Circuit agreed that the press brake was not unreasonably dangerous: with its warnings and safety devices, the machine did not pose a danger beyond that which the ordinary operator of the machine would appreciate. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Braswell v. Cincinnati Incorporated, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Delbert Ingram appealed a district court dismissal of his claims against Defendants-Appellees Dr. Hashib D. Faruque, Dr. Yan Feng, Donna Delise, Kyle Inhofe, Lt. Michael Stevenson, and Captain Tim Collins. Plaintiff claimed Defendants had violated his rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the federal constitution by holding him in a psychiatric ward for over twenty-four hours without his consent. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that, among other things, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action, because the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) provided the sole remedy for plaintiff's claims. Upon careful consideration of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit agreed that the district court lacked subject matter to hear plaintiff's claims and affirmed. View "Ingram v. Faruque, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Richard and Susan Queen sued Defendant TA Operating, LLC for an injury Mr. Queen sustained when he slipped and fell in a parking lot operated by TA. During the court of the proceedings, the Queens filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, but did not disclose this case in its bankruptcy pleadings. TA learned of the omission and brought it to the attention of the bankruptcy trustee. The Queens amended their bankruptcy petition, providing an estimate of the value of its litigation with TA for the slip and fall. The Queens were ultimately granted a no-asset discharge in bankruptcy. TA then moved the district court to dismiss on the grounds of judicial estoppel because the Queens did not disclose the lawsuit in their bankruptcy proceedings. The district court granted TA summary judgment, and the Queens appealed, arguing the district court erred in applying judicial estoppel. Because the Queens adopted an inconsistent position that was accepted by the bankruptcy court, and because the Queens would receive an unfair advantage if not estopped from pursuing the district court action, the Tenth Circuit concluded it was not an abuse of discretion to grant TA summary judgment. View "Queen, et al v. TA Operating, LLC" on Justia Law

The New Mexico Supreme Court recognized a new tort called "malicious abuse of process," which subsumed causes of action for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Nanodetex Corporation and two of its principals (the Insureds) were successfully sued for malicious abuse of process. They then sought indemnification from Carolina CasualtyInsurance Company, which covered the Insureds under a management liability policy (the Carolina Policy). Carolina denied the claim, relying on an exclusion in the policy for losses arising from claims for "malicious prosecution." It sought a declaratory judgment that it was not liable for the damages arising from the malicious-abuse-of-process judgment. On Carolina's motion for summary judgment, the district court agreed with Carolina and also rejected the Insureds' counterclaims. The Insureds appealed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit reversed the declaratory judgment, holding that the term "malicious prosecution" in the exclusion does not encompass all claims of malicious abuse of process, but only claims whose elements are essentially those of the common-law cause of action for malicious prosecution. Because the judgment against the Insureds in the tort case was affirmed on appeal on a claim that was not substantially the same as common-law malicious prosecution, the exclusion in the Carolina Policy did not apply. View "Carolina Casualty Insurance v. Nanodetex Corporation, et al" on Justia Law

In a social security disability or Supplemental Security Income (SSI) case, an administrative law judge (ALJ) must evaluate the effect of a claimant's mental impairments on her ability to work using a "special technique" prescribed by the Commissioner's regulations. At the second step of a five-step analysis, the ALJ must determine whether the mental impairment is "severe" or "not severe." If "not," then the ALJ must determine and discuss them as part of his residual functional capacity (RFC) analysis at step four. A question that is frequently encountered in social security disability appeals cases is how much further discussion of a non-severe impairment is required at step four? The Tenth Circuit found that in assessing the claimant's RFC, the ALJ must consider the combined effect of all of the claimant's medically determinable impairments; the Commissioner's procedures do not permit the ALJ to simply rely on his finding of non-severity as a substitute for a proper RFC analysis. In this case, the ALJ found that Petitioner's alleged mental impairments were medically determinable but non-severe. He then used language suggesting he had excluded them from consideration as part of his RFC assessment, based on his determination of non-severity. Under the regulations, however, a finding of non-severity alone would not support a decision to prepare an RFC assessment omitting any mental restriction. The ALJ's specific conclusions he reached in this portion of his analysis were unsupported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's affirmance of the ALJ's decision and remand to the district court with instructions to remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings at step four. View "Wells v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Carmen Talavera suffered a stroke while visiting a store, incurring permanent disabilities that she attributed to the medical malpractice of personnel at the Southwest Medical Center (SWMC). Plaintiff brought claims against a number of the medical personnel defendants alleging that they should have diagnosed and immediately treated her stroke symptoms with blood-clotting therapy or proceeded with early surgical intervention to prevent damage caused by swelling in her brain. The district court granted summary judgment finding Plaintiff failed to demonstrate their negligence caused her injuries. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not err. Plaintiff failed to: establish a dispute of fact that she would have qualified for blood-clotting therapy, or show that any doctor owed her a duty of care when this therapy was still a viable treatment option. View "Talavera v. Wiley, et al" on Justia Law

During a seventy-two-hour involuntary mental health hold, Ian Wittner was injected with Haldol. He died following the injection. His parents sued defendants the medical center and the treating doctor under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, and the parents appealed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that defendants were not state actors for the purposes of section 1983, and vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment. The Court reversed the district court's denial of defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion, affirmed the denial of the parents' Rule 59(e) motion, and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of defendants. View "Wittner, et al v. Banner Health, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Shannon Cavanaugh suffered a serious head injury after she was tasered by a Woods Cross City police officer. She sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The jury found for the City and the officer who tasered her. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Plaintiff argued the trial court erred: (1) in refusing to exclude certain testimony from the officer concerning his beliefs prior to using the taser; (2) in refusing to grant Plaintiff a new trial due to insufficient evidence she was an immediate threat; (2) in refusing to instruct the jury on what constitutes "resisting arrest;" and (4) refusing to submit Plaintiff's excessive force question to the jury. Rejecting all of Plaintiff's ground for appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court. View "Cavanaugh v. Woods Cross City, et al" on Justia Law