Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant Kelli Mike was an employee of Leisure Village Health Care Center. Leisure Village obtained a urine sample from Plaintiff and submitted it to Defendant-Appellee Professional Clinical Laboratory, Inc. (ProLab) for processing. Plaintiff's test results came back positive for marijuana. Leisure Village reported the results to the Oklahoma Board of Nursing (the Board). The Board placed Plaintiff's nursing license on probation and later revoked it. Plaintiff filed a complaint in federal court alleging that ProLab violated the Oklahoma Standards for Workplace Drug and Alcohol Testing Act (Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 40 sec. 551-565 (West 2011)), and committed gross negligence during the drug-testing process. The district court granted summary judgment to ProLab after concluding that the civil remedy provision in the Testing Act did not apply to testing facilities and that Plaintiff failed to establish that ProLab committed gross negligence. Upon review of the trial court record, the Tenth Circuit found that a rational jury could conclude that ProLab was aware that Leisure Village previously disregarded the limits of its contract by requesting ProLab to perform an unauthorized employee drug screen, and also was aware that Leisure Village disregarded the collection procedures for forensic drug testing outlined in the Testing Act. The Court found that ProLab was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the question of causation because the foreseeability of any intervening causes was a question of fact for a jury to resolve. Because the district court resolved this claim on the causation element, which involved disputed issues of fact, summary judgment was improper. The Court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of ProLab on the Testing Act claim, but reversed the district court's judgment on the gross negligence claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Okmulgee Inn Venture, LLC (Okmulgee) leased space to a nightclub-bar and was a named insured on a liquor liability insurance policy. Okmulgee’s insurer, Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Company (Mt. Vernon), assumed a duty to defend Okmulgee against suits seeking damages for injuries covered by the policy. In 2006, three bar patrons sustained gunshot wounds during a fight at the nightclub and sued Okmulgee, alleging, among other things, that Okmulgee failed to ensure the safety of the bar’s patrons, properly train the bar's staff, or investigate the bar’s operator. The only specific allegations pertaining to alcohol were that two of the three victims were under-age but were admitted to the bar and served alcohol. Mt. Vernon refused to defend Okmulgee in these suits. Mt. Vernon asserted there was no coverage under the policy, and thus no duty to defend or indemnify, because the allegations did not indicate the injuries were caused by the selling, serving, or furnishing of alcoholic beverages. Mt. Vernon then initiated this declaratory judgment action to determine its obligations. On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled in favor of Mt. Vernon. Okmulgee insisted Mt. Vernon owed it a duty to defend because the facts showed that coverage was provided by the policy. Because the victims had yet to establish Okmulgee’s liability for any claims, the Tenth Circuit concluded after its review that the question of Mt. Vernon’s duty of indemnification was not ripe for adjudication. Mt. Vernon is obligated to defend its insured, and Okmulgee was entitled to summary judgment on the duty-of-defense issue.

Plaintiff Joseph Zbegner appealed a district court order dismissing without prejudice his claims against Allied Property and Casualty Insurance Co. (Allied) as not ripe for adjudication. Plaintiff was in an automobile accident in Boulder, Colorado in 2007. At that time he had an automobile insurance policy with Allied, which included underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage. In his complaint against Allied, Plaintiff alleged that he suffered severe injuries as a result of the accident and sustained damages exceeding $150,000. He claimed the driver of the other car was the person at fault in the accident, but was underinsured. Allstate paid Plaintiff $351.74 for property damage and offered him $2,145.00 to settle his injury claim. Plaintiff did not accept Allstate’s offer and did not resolve his claim against the driver. After Allied declined his claim, Plaintiff filed this action. Allied moved to dismiss Plaintiff's claim, asserting it could not know the amount due Plaintiff for UIM benefits until he had resolved his claim against Allstate, the driver's insurer. Because his claims were contingent on a future event, Allied contended they were not ripe for adjudication. The district court granted Allied’s motion, and dismissed Plaintiff's claims without prejudice. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Plaintiff contended the district court misconstrued Colorado law in its ripeness analysis. After careful review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court was correct in its analysis of Colorado law, and that Plaintiff's claim was not yet ripe for review.

Plaintiffs Osler and Georgia Childress appealed a district court's order that dismissed their 42 U.S.C 1983 medical-indifference case against Defendant Robert Harms. In 2006, Mr. Childress was staying at a hotel in Midvale, Utah when a motel clerk saw him staggering around his room and running into things. She called police and reported that an intoxicated guest was causing a commotion. Police arrived on the scene and arrested him. Upon Mr. Childress's arrival at the jail, nurses Robert Harms and Joel Smith examined him while he was handcuffed to a gurney. Mr. Childress denied drinking and answered questions about his military duties without difficulty, although his speech was slightly slurred. Authorities would later learn that Mr. Childress has suffered a cerebellar stroke while in custody which was originally dismissed as intoxication. The district court determined that Nurse Harms merely misdiagnosed Mr. Childress and dismissed his claims by summary judgment. On appeal, Mr. Childress argued that the district court "confuse[d] knowledge of harm with knowledge of the risk of harm." The Tenth Circuit concluded that Mr. Childress failed to establish the subjective component of "deliberate indifference," and as such, summary judgment was appropriately entered on his claim.

Plaintiff Steven Lucas filed suit against Liberty Life Assurance Company of Boston (Liberty Life), asserting that the company violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) when it denied his claim for long term disability benefits. Finding that the denial of benefits was not arbitrary and capricious, the district court entered judgment in favor of Liberty Life. Plaintiff appealed the district court's decision. Plaintiff was an employee of the Coca-Cola Company. Liberty Life both administered and insured Coca-Cola's long-term disability benefits plan. Under the plan, it has discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits. Plaintiff suffered a work-related injury requiring spinal surgery and, after a short period back on the job, stopped working. He filed a claim for long-term disability benefits in August 2005. In September 2007, Liberty Life terminated Plaintiff's benefits after determining that he was not eligible for continued benefits under the "any occupation" provision: while he might not be capable of performing his own occupation, he was capable of performing some occupation comparable to his former position. Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal with Liberty Life, but the company upheld the denial of benefits. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Liberty Life's decision was supported by substantial evidence, and that Plaintiff failed to show that it was arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's decision.

Payne County Jail Administrator Brandon Myers appealed a district court's order that denied his motion for summary judgment that asked for qualified immunity. While held as a pretrial detainee at the Payne County Jail, Plaintiff John David Palmer suffered from an infection of the flesh-eating methicillin-resistent staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) bacteria. The jail's medical transport officer took Plaintiff to Dr. Daniel Hill who did not diagnose Plaintiff as having MRSA, but drained the boils Plaintiff had developed, administered an injection of an antibiotic, and prescribed two more antibiotics for oral use at the jail. Dr. Hill advised that Plaintiff should return in two days for a follow-up visit, but warned that if Plaintiff developed a fever, he should be taken to the hospital. Ultimately, Plaintiff developed a fever, his condition worsened, and he alleged in his complaint against prison officials that their inattention or delay in taking him to the hospital caused him tremendous suffering and caused him to accumulate $24,000 in medical bills. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to deny Mr. Myers qualified immunity.

The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act provides that individuals adjudged to be sexually violent predators due to a mental abnormality or personality disorder shall be committed to the custody of the secretary of social and rehabilitation services for control, care and treatment until such time as the person's mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that the person is safe to be at large. Appellant Timothy Burch was a sexually violent predator committed to the Sexual Predator Treatment Program (SPTP) at Larned State Hospital. He and other Larned residents initiated this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 to challenge the adequacy of the SPTP provided at Larned. The other residents voluntarily dismissed their claims, but Appellant filed an amended complaint, insisting the SPTP is inadequate to treat his condition and provide a realistic opportunity for his release. In addition, Appellant alleged that Defendants improperly punished him by, among other things, interfering with his educational endeavors, revoking his work privileges, and reducing his treatment classification level through manipulation of his treatment progress scores. In a fifty-two page opinion, the court analyzed Appellant's allegations, distilled his claims, and concluded he was not entitled to relief. As is relevant to this appeal, the court determined that most of Appellant's claims failed to adequately allege Defendants' personal participation in the claimed misconduct. As for the rest of his claims, the court discussed the unique principles and standards governing the KSVPA and concluded that Appellant failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. Regarding the claims of inadequate treatment, the court ruled that Appellant enjoyed no substantive due process right to treatment culminating in his release. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's "thorough and well-reasoned order. The court accurately analyzed Mr. Burch's claims and correctly determined that he was not entitled to relief."

Plaintiff-Appellant Christie Helm appealed a district courtâs order granting summary judgment in favor of the State of Kansas (the State) on her claim for sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Helm sued the State after she was allegedly sexually harassed over a period of almost ten years by Judge Frederick Stewart, a State district judge for whom Helm served as an administrative assistant. The district court determined that the State was entitled to summary judgment because Helm fell within the "personal staff" exemption to Title VIIâs definition of "employee" and thus did not qualify for the protections afforded by the statute. Alternatively, the court ruled that summary judgment for the State was proper on the basis of the "Faragher/Ellerth" affirmative defense to employer liability for a supervisorâs sexual harassment of a subordinate. In September 1998, Helm was hired to fill an administrative-assistant position. Judge Stewart began sexually harassing Helm shortly after she was hired. Upon review of the trial court record, the Tenth Circuit held that the "Faragher/Ellerth" defense precluded vicarious liability against the State of Kansas for Judge Stewartâs alleged actions. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the district court without reaching the question whether the "personal staff" exemption removed Helm from the purview of Title VII.

Plaintiffs Russell and Jennifer Johnson blamed Liberty Mutual for failing to hold onto a pair of tail lights that they said would have helped them win a personal injury lawsuit they wanted to bring. Plaintiffs never asked Liberty Mutual to keep the tail lights, never mentioned their intent to sue, and allowed years to pass without a word. In their case against Liberty Mutual, they faulted the company for failing "to divine their hidden (and perhaps not yet formed) intentions." Upon review of the record by the Tenth Circuit, the Court concluded that because Plaintiffs could not identify a statutory or contractual basis for their claim, "they ask[ed the Tenth Circuit] to create one for them in the common law of tort." But the Court held the common law doesnât require such "uncommon foresight," and affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss their case.

Shortly after Plaintiff Mark Rimbert's father began taking Prozac, he killed his wife and himself. Plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against Defendant Eli Lilly, the manufacturer of Prozac. Defendant moved for summary judgment on various grounds and to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff's sole expert witness on the question of causation. The motions were denied by the district judge initially assigned the case. Once the case was reassigned, Defendant moved for reconsideration. The second district judge granted Defendant's motion to exclude Plaintiff's expert witness. The court then entered summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that without the expert's testimony, Plaintiff had no case. Plaintiff brought this appeal to the Tenth Circuit, arguing that the district court erred by excluding the testimony of his expert. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order excluding the testimony, but reversed the order granting summary judgment. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.