Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Cynthia Dudley-Barton, Richard Ice, Richard Mason, Deana Murphy and Susan Schmitz filed a class action lawsuit against Service Corporation International (SCI) based on allegedly unlawful employment practices and policies. Plaintiffs sought to recover unpaid wages based on SCI's purported failure to compensate its employees for time spent outside of regular work hours but on company business. In making these assertions, Plaintiffs brought four claims for violation of Colorado wage and labor laws, and state claims for breach of contract, fraud, unjust enrichment, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, conversion and misrepresentation. Shortly after Plaintiffs filed their complaint, SCI removed the case to federal court. Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand. The district court granted Plaintiffs' motion, concluding that SCI had not established that the amount in controversy exceeded the $5 million jurisdictional threshold required under federal law. SCI appealed the remand to state court to the Tenth Circuit. But before SCI filed its appeal, Plaintiffs moved to dismiss their state court petition against SCI without prejudice. The Tenth Circuit subsequently granted SCI's petition for leave to appeal. The Tenth Circuit dismissed this appeal as moot.

This case arose from "an unfortunate situation" of child-on-child abuse within the foster care system. Plaintiffs J.W. and M.R.W. are a foster couple, and their now-adopted foster children were injured after an abusive foster child was placed in their home in 2002. Plaintiffs raised several state and federal claims against Utah and the state employees involved in placing the abusive child in their home. The district court dismissed several of Plaintiffs' negligence claims based on Utah's Governmental Immunity Act. As for Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claim, the court held that the caseworker and her supervisor were entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiffs had not shown a failure to exercise professional judgment on the part of the caseworker, nor had they shown any basis for holding the supervisor liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiffs challenged these decisions on appeal. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the undisputed evidence in the record reflected that there was an impermissible deviation from professional judgment on the part of the state employees. Furthermore, the Court found Plaintiffs did not set forth a valid basis for holding the employees liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Court affirmed the lower court's decisions.

Defendant Jerry Bustos' defamation case came before the Tenth Circuit. He sued under Colorado law for statements he made in 1998 that were captured on tape and aired as part of A&E Television Networks' show "Gangland: Aryan Brotherhood." Petitioner said that the appearance "devastated his popularity around the jail." The district court agreed that the show effectively called Petitioner a member of the Aryan Brotherhood, and that the statement was defamatory, but it entered summary judgment against Petitioner. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held "only that the narrow and particular defamatory statement [Defendant] chose to challenge . . . was itself substantially true as a matter of law." The Court dismissed Petitioner's claim and affirmed the lower court's judgment.

Plaintiff Geral Brown appealed a district court's order that granted summary judgment to Defendant Hartford Insurance Company (Hartford). Plaintiff sued Hartford under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) for the company's termination of his long-term disability benefits. Following his injury, Plaintiff filed for Social Security Disability benefits as required by his benefit plan, and the Social Security Administration awarded him benefits. The plan then offset the monthly benefit it paid to Plaintiff by the amount of the Social Security benefit. The Hartford denied Plaintiff's administrative appeal. After examining and weighing the evidence, the trial court granted summary judgment to the Hartford. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the plan administrator's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the district court.

Plaintiff-Appellant Misty Raley brought suit against Hyundai Motor Company (Hyundai) alleging that one of its cars was defectively designed and responsible for injuries she suffered in an accident. Before trial began, Ms. Raley filed a motion to substitute BancFirst in her place as "the real party in interest" and as sole plaintiff in this case. Ms. Raley explained that a state probate court had appointed BancFirst to serve as guardian for her and her minor children. In light of this, all "interest" in the lawsuit had been transferred to the bank, to the exclusion of her and her children. After a "lengthy" trial, Hyundai prevailed. In entering its judgment, the district court mistakenly identified Ms. Raley and not BancFirst as the losing party-plaintiff. To confuse matters further, Ms. Raley then appealed, listing herself as the plaintiff-appellant seeking to undo the judgment. For its part, BancFirst did not appeal. The court caught its error, and amended its judgment. In response, Ms. Raley filed another appeal, still listing herself as plaintiff-appellant. Again, BancFirst filed nothing. "It is this that pose[d] a problem." BancFirst joined Ms. Raley's appeal to the Tenth Circuit without having first filed a notice that it intended to appeal. Ultimately the issue on appeal to the Tenth Circuit was whether a final judgment rendered against someone else can be appealed, "especially when you aren't a named party to the lawsuit and voluntarily left the case long ago." The Court held that generally, and in this case, "the answer is no." There was no appeal from a named party in this case. "[T]he question naturally arises whether Ms. Raley might be allowed to proceed as a party to this appeal even though she was, by the time the district court rendered its rulings, no longer a named party to the district court proceedings. ... She makes no mention of this possibility" in her arguments before the Court. "Where an appellant fails to lead, we have no duty to follow." The Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Plaintiff-Appellant Jason Fowler appealed the district court's determination that the government was entitled to summary judgment on a tort action he filed against the US and an employee of the US Air Force. Mr. Fowler was injured when a car driven by Sean Garrick collided with Mr. Fowler and his motorcycle. Mr. Garrick was an active-duty member of the U.S. Air Force. Mr. Garrick was on break at the time of the collision. During breaks, the Air Force does not require employees to spend their time in specific ways. Typically when employees get a break, they go somewhere to relax. Mr. Fowler filed suit against Mr. Garrick and the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Mr. Fowler contended that the government should be liable for the collision because it was "liable for the negligent acts of its employees committed in the scope and course of their employment." Under the FTCA, the Attorney General may certify that an employee is acting within the scope of his office or employment. If the Attorney General declines to make such a certification, the employee may petition the trial court to find and certify that the employee is acting within the scope of his employment. If such certification is granted, the United States is substituted as a defendant in place of the employee, and litigation proceeds under the FTCA. The Attorney General and the trial court declined to certify that Mr. Garrick acted under the scope of his employment while on his break. The government then moved to dismiss the claim. The trial court dismissed the government from the case. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Mr. Fowler argued that the trial court erred in denying the certification necessary for him to maintain his suit against the government. Upon consideration of the arguments, the Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision. The Court concluded that summary judgment in favor of the government was improper in this case. The Court vacated the district court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff-Appellant the United States appealed the district courtâs award of attorneyâs fees and costs to the Plaintiffs-Appellees Edward and Cynthia Poche. Mr. Poche suffered from abdominal pain that was treated by three doctors. After surgery, his condition worsened, and he was transferred to the National Naval Hospital, where the United States covered his $1.13 million hospital bill. Mr. Poche sued the original treating doctors for malpractice. The United States intervened in Mr. Pocheâs lawsuit. Eventually a jury awarded Mr. Poche $1.59 million, and $380,000 to the United States. The Poches filed a motion to require the United States to pay a portion of their costs and fees. They maintained that the United States bore none of the risks or costs of the case, and would not have received a favorable jury verdict without them. The United States contended that its sovereign immunity divested the district court of jurisdiction to award fees and costs against the United States, and that, even if the district court had jurisdiction, the amount awarded was the courtâs abuse of its discretion. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the United Statesâ argument, and reversed the lower courtâs order directing it to pay the Pochesâ attorneyâs fees.