Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

This negligence suit under Georgia law stemmed from an injury plaintiff suffered as he unloaded freight from a railcar in July 2005. On appeal, plaintiff asserted that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to defendants because there were triable issues as to whether defendants were negligent in failing to regularly inspect or maintain the bulkhead door. The court held that the district court was correct in granting defendants summary judgment where plaintiff presented no evidence from which a jury could infer that defendants' omissions, even if negligent, were a proximate cause of his injury, an essential element of his negligence claim under Georgia law. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Defendant and her husband (Duckworths) purchased two automobile policies and one motorcycle insurance policy from plaintiff (State Farm) where all three insurance contracts contained "anti-stacking" provisions that precluded recovery of uninsured motorist benefits under any policy other than that covering the damaged vehicles. The Duckworths subsequently moved to Florida, where the husband was struck and killed by an uninsured motorist while driving the motorcycle covered under the Maryland policy. State Farm consequently brought this action in the district court, seeking a declaratory judgment that it had satisfied its contractual obligations to the husband's estate. At issue before the district court was the applicability of the public policy exception to Florida's choice of law rule in disputes over contract terms. The district court declared that State Farm had satisfied its contractual obligations to the husband's estate and dismissed defendant's counterclaims. Taking into account all of the undisputed facts, and assuming that defendant informed a State Farm representative that the Duckworths' move from Maryland to Florida would be "permanent," the court held that State Farm still did not receive reasonable notice sufficient to trigger the public policy exception. The court held that, even if defendant informed the representative as alleged, her later actions overwhelmingly indicated to State Farm that the Duckworths' move was not necessarily permanent and that, consequently Maryland law would continue to govern the Duckworths' policies. Therefore, the issue of fact upon which defendant's appeal rested was immaterial and, as State Farm was deprived of reasonable notice, judgment as a matter of law was proper.

This case arose when plaintiffs filed a nationwide consumer class action against Life of the South Insurance Company (Life of the South). At issue was whether Life of the South had a right to enforce against plaintiffs the arbitration clause in the loan agreement, between plaintiffs and the car dealership where they purchased their vehicle, where the loan agreement lead plaintiffs to enter into a separate credit life insurance contract with Life of the South. The court held that the loan agreement did not show, on its face or elsewhere, an intent to allow anyone other than plaintiffs, the car dealership, and Chase Manhattan, and the assignees of the dealership of Chase Manhattan, to compel arbitration of a dispute and Life of the South was none of those. The court also held that because the only claims plaintiffs asserted were based on the terms of their credit life insurance policy with Life of the South, which did not contain an arbitration clause, equitable estoppel did not allow Life of the South to compel plaintiffs to arbitrate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Life of the South's motion to compel arbitration.

Plaintiff was employed full time with Able Body Temporary Services, Inc. (Able Body), a labor broker in the business of furnishing its day-laborer employees to clients on a temporary basis. Able Body supplied its client, Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. (FMT), with day-laborers, including plaintiff, for longshore services. Plaintiff was subsequently injured on the job and received benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. 901 et seq. Plaintiff, seeking to supplement his workers' compensation benefits, brought this negligence action against FMT, claiming that the negligence of FMT's employees caused his injury. At issue was whether the district court erred in holding that FMT was plaintiff's employer and that section 905(a) of the LHWCA precluded his negligence claim. The court held that because all the elements necessary for a borrowed-employment relationship were satisfied in light of the undisputed evidence, FMT was plaintiff's borrowing employer for purposes of the LHWCA and consequently, plaintiff's negligence claim was barred by section 905(a). Therefore, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Plaintiff was injured in a single-car accident when driving a vehicle manufactured by defendant and subsequently filed an action against defendant, alleging claims for failure to warn, strict liability, and negligence arising from the defective design of the car. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant with respect to all of plaintiff's claims. The district court held that plaintiff's failure to warn claim failed because it was undisputed that she had not read the warnings and therefore, the content of the warnings could not constitute a proximate cause of the accident. Consequently, the court held that plaintiff's failure to warn claim failed because plaintiff did not challenge that aspect of the district court's ruling and therefore, waived the issue. In light of plaintiff's commencement of the suit more than ten years from the date of the first sale of the vehicle, the court did not think that a reasonable trier of fact could find that defendant exhibited willful and wanton conduct when the vehicle in question performed safely according to reputable mainstream sources. Accordingly, the court held that there was no error in the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant on either the failure to warn claim or the negligent design claim.

Plaintiff challenged the denial of his claims for long-term disability benefits by defendant, who served as both the administrator of claims and the payor of benefits in the long-term disability plan in which defendant participated. At issue was whether there was a conflict of interest where defendant was both administrator and payor of benefits of the plan governed by ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1001-1461. The court found that defendant considered the medical information submitted by plaintiff's doctors and relied upon the advice of several independent medical professionals to conclude that plaintiff failed to make a sufficient showing of disability under the plan and, even where plaintiff's own doctors offered different medical opinions than defendant's independent doctors, the plan administrator could give different weight to those opinions without acting arbitrarily or capriciously. Therefore, the court held that a reasonable basis supported defendant's benefits decisions and that the conflict of interest did not render the decisions arbitrary or capricious.

Plaintiff brought this diversity action in district court against defendant, a medical device manufacturer, alleging that the SurgiWrap, a product designed and produced by defendant, used in her surgical procedure had a manufacturing defect that caused it to perform in a manner other than as intended, and seeking relief under Georgia products liability law. At issue was whether the district court erred in limiting the testimony of her physicians and in granting summary judgment for defendant. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the testimony of her treating physicians in light of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the strictures of Daubert. The court also held that plaintiff failed to produce evidence, expert or otherwise, from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the SurgiWrap implanted in her abdomen contained a manufacturing defect. Accordingly, the district court correctly entered summary judgment for defendant.

Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action against its insurer to determine whether its professional liability policy issued to plaintiff provided coverage for plaintiff's erroneous disbursement of client funds from its trust account. At issue was whether the district court properly granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment denying coverage where the district found no coverage under the policy. The court held that plaintiff's erroneous transfer of its clients' trust funds to a third party was an act or omission in the conduct of its professional fiduciary duties to its clients that would give rise to a claim of negligence against it by those clients and for which it would have been liable for damages. Such a claim for a negligent act or omission was covered by the plain terms of the policy issued by the insurer to plaintiff. Accordingly, the entry of summary judgment for insurer was reversed and the case remanded for entry of summary judgment for plaintiff. The district court's award of costs against plaintiff was also reversed.

Plaintiffs sued defendant under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671-80, alleging that the negligence of defendant's employees caused the death of Michelle Evette McCall. The central issue presented on appeal was whether Florida's cap on noneconomic medical malpractice damages violated the Florida or United States Constitutions. Plaintiffs also appealed the district court's application of that statutory cap. The court held that the district court did not err in applying the cap where the court's independent review of the trial record confirmed that no evidence at trial singled out a specific nonpractitioner for negligent conduct. The court also held that Florida's statutory cap passed muster under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States, as well as the Takings Clause of Article X, 6(a) of the Florida Constitution, where the legislature identified a legitimate government purpose in passing the statutory cap, namely to reduce the cost of medical malpractice premiums and healthcare, and Florida's choice of a per incident cap on noneconomic damages was rationally related to that end and where plaintiffs were not deprived of a vested right. The court further held that, because no Florida Supreme Court decisions provided controlling guidance to resolve plaintiffs' other challenges to the cap on noneconomic medical malpractice damages under the state's constitution, the court granted, in part, plaintiffs' motion to certify questions to the Florida Supreme Court.

The children of three former union leaders murdered in Colombia in 2001 sued appellee alleging that it hired paramilitaries from the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia to assassinate their fathers in violation of the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), 28 U.S.C 1350, the Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA"), 28 U.S.C. 1350, and the wrongful death laws of Colombia. The children alleged that the murders of their fathers caused them damages including emotional harm, loss of companionship, and loss of financial support. At issue was whether the children possessed constitutional standing and a cause of action under these statutes. The court held that the children easily satisfied Article III standing requirements and clearly have a stake in the controversy that was real enough and concrete enough to entitle them to be heard in a federal district court concerning their TVPA and ATS claims. The court also held that the children have adequately pled a cause of action cognizable under the ATS and the TVPA. The court further held that it could not conclude that the children were also parties to the Drummond I suit and, as a result, reversed and remanded the district court's dismissal of the children's TVPA claims to the extent that it concluded on a motion to dismiss where the doctrine of res judicata precluded the children from proceeding with the case.