Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs' father was killed in an auto accident when the driver of a vehicle in which he was a passenger, attempted to flee police officers. Asserting federal constitutional and state tort claims, plaintiffs filed suit in Rhode Island state court against the officers, the city, the police department, and the police chief in his official capacity. The district court dismissed constitutional claims and declined to remand to state court. Following a trial, the court entered judgment for defendants as a matter of law. The First Circuit affirmed, upholding the court's exercise of supplemental jurisdiction and exclusion of deposition testimony of the driver. That he was in prison did not render him automatically "unavailable." The court was within its discretion in denying a continuance to secure his presence.

A federal jury awarded Fortin $125,000 in damages against a police officer after finding that the officer negligently used force in arresting Fortin in 2007. In a post-judgment ruling, the district court reduced the award to $10,000, the maximum set by the Maine Tort Claims Act for the personal liability of government employees, Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, 8104-D. On appeal, Fortin argued that the MTCA cap is inapplicable here because the officer was covered by an insurance policy that triggered a higher limit under the Act. The First Circuit determined that the issues were unresolved under state law and certified two questions to the Maine Supreme Court. Whether Fortin is limited to recovery of $10,000 depends on the unexplored relationship among several provisions of the MTCA governing damage awards against government employees. Analysis may also require determining what interpretive rule should be applied to ambiguous insurance policies providing MTCA liability coverage.

In the early 1980s, two women were murdered, apparently for domestic reasons. Their bodies were found in 2000 and Flemmi, a member of a Boston gang, confessed. The families filed claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), 2401(b), 2671, 2675, alleging that the government was negligent in using and protecting Flemmi and his criminal associate, Bulger, as informants. The court awarded damages and sanctions against the government for misconduct. The First Circuit affirmed the finding of liability and award of damages, upholding a finding of causation under the Massachusetts' Wrongful Death Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 229, sect. 2. The court remanded with respect to sanctions.

In the 1970s, the decedent worked as a bookmaker in Boston and was involved with Bulger's Winter Hill gang. In 1979, decedent was charged with murder. While out on bail, he offered to cooperate with police in the investigation of an drug conspiracy involving Bulger. His attorney met with Boston Police and FBI agent Connolly to discuss this offer. Unbeknownst to decedent and his attorney, Bulger was a top echelon FBI informant and Connolly was his primary handler. Connolly and others were protecting Bulger from prosecution so that he could continue supplying information. Roughly three weeks later, decedent was murdered. Several years later, after a series of investigations disclosed leaks to Bulger, his estate filed a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), 2401(b), 2671, 2675. The court awarded $1.15 million. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the administrative claim was filed after the statute of limitations had run and that there was insufficient admissible proof that the leak occurred and that Bulger killed decedent; and that the estate failed to meet its burden for liability based on conscious pain and suffering. Whatever they suspected, the family did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the claim until 1999.

Plaintiff suffered a hand injury while operating a hand saw manufactured by defendant, while working at a construction site. A jury awarded plaintiff $1.5 and, although it found plaintiff to be 35 percent at fault, the finding did not reduce the award because it also found breach of implied warranty of merchantability. The First Circuit affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient to support the verdict and rejecting an argument that plaintiff had argued impermissible "categorical liability" rather than presenting an alternative, safer design. Statements by plaintiff's counsel, about "sending a message" and corporate earnings, did not mandate a new trial.

Plaintiff, left paralyzed from the chest down after an accident at work, sued the company that built a specialized trailer for his employer. A jury rejected negligence and implied warranty of merchantability claims. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion when it instructed the jury that a defendant who manufactures a product according to buyer specifications could not be liable under either a negligence or implied warranty theory unless the design defect was so obvious it would not have been reasonable for the defendant to manufacture according to the design.

The city and stopped paying full reimbursement of certain medical expenses for former firefighters and police officers who had retired on disability pensions. The retirees alleged that the decision violated state statutes, constituted an ultra vires act, contradicted principles of equity, and offended the Due Process Clause.The district court entered summary judgment against all but three of the plaintiffs and resolved the remaining claims after trial. The First Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rulings. The state injured-on-duty statute does not require the benefit and there was no evidence that the city ever authorized such a benefit on a global basis or made specific promises to retirees, other than the three that went to trial.

The plaintiff was awarded $450,000 for injuries suffered when she was hit by a car registered to the company, driven by an intoxicated individual. The First Circuit affirmed, first holding that the court had diversity jurisdiction. The company is a citizen of Puerto Rico and testimonial evidence supported a finding that the plaintiff was a citizen of California at the time of the accident. The trial court correctly barred evidence that the intoxicated driver owned the vehicle and that the plaintiff had consumed alcohol. The company had stipulated to its ownership of the vehicle and the plaintiff was not driving, but standing outside her disabled car, at the time of the collision. The judge correctly refused to instruct the jury on contributory or comparative negligence and correctly denied a new trial request based on a closing argument remark that the defendant had been deported to Mexico.

The worker is a Massachusetts resident, whose services were obtained through a temporary labor firm's offices in Massachusetts, and was injured while working for a construction company at the Newport Naval Station. The temporary firm, which maintains workers compensation insurance, filed a Rhode Island workers compensation claim on behalf of the worker, but without his knowledge. The worker received benefits for 17 weeks, then sought Massachusetts benefits. A Massachusetts administrative law judge ordered the Massachusetts insurance company to assume responsibility for future payments. The district court entered summary judgment, rejecting the worker's suit against the construction company and a co-worker. The First Circuit reversed and remanded. Applying Massachusetts choice-of-law rules, the court concluded that the states' laws conflict and that Massachusetts law applies because that state has a more significant connection to the parties and the occurrence. Massachusetts prohibits suits against direct employers only; Rhode Island prohibits suit against "special employers" who contract with a general employer for the worker's services. The immunity of co-employees derives from employer immunity and does not apply in this case.