Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

This cross-appeal arose out of the trial and retrial of plaintiff's claim against his former employer and his supervisor for tortious interference with a job offer from another firm. Upon retrial, the second jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor and awarded substantive monetary damages. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in granting the new trial where the verdict, predicated almost entirely on the jury's assessment of credibility, could not be said to have been either egregious or a serious miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the court reversed the order of the district court, vacated the judgment entered on the basis of the second verdict, and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to reinstate the first verdict and to enter judgment in defendant's favor in accordance with that verdict.

Plaintiff alleged that Chase willfully and maliciously provided false information about his finances to Equifax, a consumer credit reporting agency. Chase removed the suit to federal court and moved for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that plaintiff's claims were preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681t(b)(1)(F). Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of his state common law tort claims. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the FCRA preempted plaintiff's state law claims against Chase.

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's judgment dismissing for want of subject matter jurisdiction plaintiff's complaint seeking exoneration from or limitation of liability pursuant to the Exoneration and Limitation of Liability Act (Limitation Act), 46 U.S.C. 30501 et seq. Plaintiff initiated this limitation proceeding following an accident that took place when defendant intended to go fishing as a passenger aboard plaintiff's fishing vessel, slipped and fell on a ramp leading from the marina to a floating dock that passengers were required to traverse in order to access the vessel. The court held that defendant's accident did not occur on or over navigable waters and so this action fell outside the traditional scope of federal admiralty jurisdiction. The court also held that the Limitation Act did not provide an independent jurisdictional basis for petitions that arose from incidents not occurring on or over navigable waters. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

This case stemmed from the use of the pesticide dichlorovinyl dimethyl phosphate (DDVP) to kill many types of insects. The NRDC sought review of an EPA order overruling the NRDC's objections to, inter alia, the EPA's risk assessments for the pesticide and denying NRDC's requests for a public evidentiary hearing. Because the EPA conducted certain DDVP risk assessments without using a tenfold children's safety factor that Congress provided should presumptively apply, and the EPA failed to explain why it did not apply this margin of safety, the court granted the NRDC's petition for review in part, vacated the EPA's order in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff appealed pro se an order dismissing his complaint against defendants for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff alleged that medical care providers, Christopher Aiken and Dr. James Hohensee, at the Niagara County Jail, were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's medical needs during his incarceration at the jail. Plaintiff also appealed from a judgment dismissing his claims against the remaining defendants, alleging that excessive force on the part of corrections officers, Paul Curcione, Jeff Chawer, and Sergeant Tammy Williams. The court held that plaintiff's complaint fell short of alleging a deliberate indifference on the part of Nurse Practitioner Aikin and Dr. Hohensee to his serious medical needs. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed the complaint without leave to amend where issues of medical judgment could not be the basis of a deliberate indifference claim where evidence of deliberate indifference was lacking. The court also held that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Williams for plaintiff's failure to exhaust the requisite administrative review process as to Williams. The court further held that the exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a), was satisfied by an untimely filing of a grievance if it was accepted and decided on the merits by the appropriate prison authority. Therefore, plaintiff had met the exhaustion requirement of his original filing and the district court's contrary determination was erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and vacated in part, remanding for further proceedings.

This case arose when plaintiff, by her mother and natural guardian, brought a medical malpractice action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346, 2401, 2671-2680, claiming that the injury plaintiff sustained at birth might have been caused by her doctor. At issue was whether plaintiff's claim was "forever barred" by the FTCA's two-year statute of limitations period. The court held that, because plaintiff failed to comply with the two-year limitations period set out in section 2401(b) and because equitable tolling, even if available, was unwarranted, the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint as untimely was affirmed.

Defendant pleaded guilty to transporting and possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1), and (a)(5)(B). The district court sentenced defendant to 121 months' imprisonment and ordered him to pay restitution to finance future counseling costs of one of the victims depicted in the images and videos. On appeal, defendant challenged the restitution order and his sentence. The court agreed with defendant that, based on the facts in this case, defendant's possession of the victim's images was no a substantial factor in causing her loss. The court held, however, that the district court committed no procedural or substantive error in imposing the sentence of imprisonment. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Petitioners appealed the decision and order of the Department of Labor Benefits Review Board reversing the ALJ's dismissal of respondent's claim for benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 901-50, as extended by the Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. 1651-54, as untimely. The Board determined that the ALJ's principal finding on the issue of timeliness was not supported by substantial evidence. The court held that because the ALJ's factual finding with respect to constructive awareness was not supported by substantial evidence, the Board did not overstep the limits of its appellate jurisdiction when it reversed the finding. Accordingly, the order of the Board was affirmed.

This action for breach of contract and related tort claims had its origin in a February 9, 2006 Credit and Security Agreement, wherein defendant agreed inter alia to provide plaintiff with a revolving line of credit. Plaintiff subsequently appealed from a judgment of dismissal entered by the district court, contending that the district court erred in relying on releases executed in favor of defendant, most recently in a forbearance agreement to dismiss its claims because its complaint pleaded that these releases were induced by economic duress. The court held that plaintiff failed to plead plausibly that defendant made a "wrongful threat," an essential element of economic duress. Rather, the conduct alleged to have caused duress evidences only the exercise of defendant's legal rights under the parties' original contract and subsequent agreements. Therefore, to the extent that those rights included defendant's exercise of "reasonable discretion" in various areas, plaintiff's allegations failed as a matter of law to plead actions exceeding the scope of such discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgement of dismissal.

This case arose when plaintiffs alleged that they suffered injury caused by a defectively designed transmission of an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) manufactured by Recreative Industries, Inc. (Recreative) on the basis of a design originally created by Borg-Warner Automotive, Inc. (Borg-Warner). Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Borg-Warner and the district court's dismissal of the suit against Recreative on the basis of forum non conveniens. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Borg-Warner where Borg-Warner had sold all rights to the design at issue twenty-six years before manufacture of the machine that caused plaintiffs' injuries; during that time, Borg-Warner had no ability to learn from experience whether its design was causing injuries, no ability to conduct safety tests, and no possibility of improving the design to diminish the risk of harm; and therefore, imposing strict liability on Borg-Warner in these circumstances would not reasonably serve the central rationale for strict liability. The court also held that there was no abuse of discretion in dismissing the suit against Recreative under the doctrine of forum non conveniens where plaintiffs were residents and citizens of Scotland, the accident occurred in England, the ATV remained in England, both nonparty witnesses to the accident were British citizens residing in England, and Recreative was subject to British courts.