Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A 36 year-old schoolteacher sustained serious brain injuries when he was struck by a car while bicycling to work. His parents, appointed as his legal guardians, filed a products liability suit against the manufacturer of the bicycle helmet their son wore during the collision. The district court permitted the manufacturer to introduce expert testimony, based in part upon the United States Consumer Product Safety Commission's Safety Standard for Bicycle Helmets (16 C.F.R. 1203). Ultimately, experts for both sides agreed that the CPSC Standard forms the starting point for any bicycle helmet design, and that the helmet at issue satisfied the CPSC Standard in all respects. The court instructed the jury pursuant to sections 1 and 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts. The Court also instructed the jury that, in determining whether the helmet was defective, it could consider evidence of standards or customs in the bicycle helmet industry, including the CPSC Standard. The jury returned a verdict for the defense. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the jury instructions and admission of the CPSC standard represented Pennsylvania law.

This appeal involved a putative class action filed by three Pennsylvania Medicaid beneficiaries subject to the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare's (DPW) liens against future settlements or judgments. At issue was whether state agencies responsible for administering the Medicaid program have the authority to assert such liens and, if so, whether Pennsylvania's statutory framework was consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn. The court examined the text, structure, history, and purpose of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq., and held that liens limited to medical costs were not prohibited by the anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(a)-(b). Accordingly, the court upheld Pennsylvania's longstanding practice of imposing such liens. The court also held that Pennsylvania's current statutory framework, which afforded Medicaid recipients a right of appeal from the default allocation, was a permissible default apportionment scheme.

Plaintiff was unloading a railway tank car filled with sulfuric acid when its chemical contents exploded, spraying across his face and chest and inflicting severe burns. He sought damages under the common law, but the district court held that his lawsuit was preempted by the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. 5101â5128. The Third Circuit affirmed. The Act expressly preempts any common law requirement about the design of a package, container, or packaging component qualified for use in transporting hazardous materials in commerce. The tank car at issue is a container qualified for such use, regardless of whether what plaintiff was doing constituted transport or his employment status at the precise moment of his injury.

The defendants (Connelly firm) represented plaintiff in his divorce until July 2005. In July 2006 plaintiff consulted attorney, Downey, who notified the Connelly firm of a malpractice claim in October. In March 2007 plaintiff signed an agreement to file suit, but Downey did not file. In February 2008 Downey notified the plaintiff that he was terminating representation and stated that the limitations period on the malpractice claim ran out before Downey began representation. In 2009 plaintiff filed a malpractice suit against the Connelly firm, under a contract theory, and against Downey. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of all defendants. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded claims against Downey, applying the "discovery rule" rather than the occurrence rule to negligence by the Connelly firm. Although plaintiff knew that certain witnesses were not called during a 2004 hearing, he claims that he relied on the firm's assurances and did not have constructive notice of negligence until a July 2005 hearing. The question of when the limitations period began to run was for a jury.