Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued defendant, a bail bondsman, and others, alleging civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983, as well as various state law tort claims. The claims stemmed from defendant's efforts to apprehend a fugitive in and around plaintiff's home. A jury found in plaintiff's favor on her section 1983, trespass, and assault claims. Defendant appealed, challenging the jury's verdict and damages award. The court held that defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity where neither history nor policy supported extending the defense to bail bondsmen. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion that plaintiff's consent was involuntary and the court affirmed the verdict on the 1983 claim. The court further held that there was a sufficient basis to support the jury's conclusion that plaintiff was in reasonable fear of bodily harm. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion regarding the actual damages award and found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to leave the punitive damages award undisturbed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff, Jeremy Mayfield, a professional race car driver, appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint against NASCAR for conduct arising out of a positive drug test. Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, asserting claims for defamation, violation of North Carolina's disability statute, unfair and deceptive trade practices, breach of contract, and negligence, when one of the defendants, Brian France, held a press conference where he indicated that plaintiff had been suspended because he took a "performance enhancing" or "recreational" drug. The court found that the district court properly dismissed the case and there was no abuse of discretion in denying plaintiff's motions to reconsider and to amend. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff, a minor, sustained serious injuries at birth due to the negligence of medical professionals who attended her delivery. As a result of plaintiff's injuries, DHHS, through the state Medicaid program, paid more than $1.9 million in medical and health care expenses on her behalf. Plaintiff instituted a medical malpractice action in state court and eventually settled the action for a lump some of approximately $2.8 million. The settlement agreement did not allocate separate amounts for past medical expenses and other damages. DHHS subsequently asserted a statutory lien on the settlement proceedings pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat 108A-57 and 59 (third-party liability statues), which asserted that North Carolina had a subrogation right and could assert a lien upon the lesser of its actual medical expenditures or one-third of the medicaid recipient's total recovery. Plaintiff brought the instant action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking to forestall payment under federal Medicaid law known as the "anti-lien provision," 42 U.S.C. 1396p. The court was persuaded that the unrebuttable presumption inherent in the one-third cap on the state's recovery imposed by the North Carolina third-party liability statutes was in fatal conflict with federal law. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment in favor of the Secretary and remanded for further proceedings.

A Pentagon police officer allegedly assaulted plaintiff, a contract security officer assigned to the Pentagon, while they were stationed at a security checkpoint for Pentagon employees. Plaintiff sued the United States for assault under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2680(h), and the district court granted summary judgment to the United States. The court held that section 2680(h) waived the United States' sovereign immunity regardless of whether an officer was engaged in an investigative or law enforcement activity when he committed an assault. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, a citizen of the Philippines, brought suit against defendants for damages arising from severe injuries he sustained aboard the M/V Asian Spirit in the Chesapeake Bay near Baltimore. Plaintiff's complaint alleged multiple clams against defendants, including unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, breach of contract, violation of the Seaman's Wage Act, 46 U.S.C. 10313(i), and negligence under general maritime law and the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104. The court affirmed the district court's judgment that the Arbitration Clause at issue was enforceable and that plaintiff must arbitrate his claims against defendants in the Philippines. Nevertheless, the court vacated the dismissal of the case and remanded for reinstatement thereof, for assessment of the injunction request, for entry of a stay pending arbitration to ensure that plaintiff would have an opportunity at the award-enforcement stage for judicial review of his public policy defense based on the prospective waiver doctrine, and for such other and further proceedings.

In this case, a subcontractor to a subcontractor to a prime contractor with a federal agency brought a procedural due process claim against that agency and tort actions against a separate contractor for allegedly causing the termination of his at-will consulting agreement. The court concluded that plaintiff's case involved both the wrong defendants and the wrong claims. Because permitting these claims to go forward would reward artful pleading and impermissibly constitutionalize state tort law, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants.

This case arose from the FAA's decision to suspend the airworthiness certification of a helicopter leased by plaintiff for his flight instruction business. Plaintiff brought suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671, et seq., alleging that he suffered financial harm as a result of the FAA's negligence in first issuing an airworthiness certificate to the helicopter. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, finding that the FAA inspector's original certification of the aircraft fell under the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. In view of the fact that the discretionary function exception required the dismissal of plaintiff's action, the court need not reach the government's contention that the misrepresentation exception to the FTCA applied as well. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff commenced this action under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, alleging that he was a seaman in the employ of defendants and that he had been injured in the course of his employment by their negligence. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff had not adequately demonstrated that (1) he was a seaman and (2) his injury occurred during the course of his employment as a seaman. The court concluded that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim where it generally had federal question jurisdiction over Jones Act claims and plaintiff's complaint in particular alleged a colorable Jones Act claim in that it was not "so substantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions . . . , or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy." Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

In this case, an insurer sought a declaratory judgment that it was required to indemnify its insured for no more than 40% of a state court judgment because it had covered its insured for no more than 40% of the time in which the state court plaintiff was exposed to lead poisoning. The district court agreed that the insurer was responsible for only a portion of the judgment, notwithstanding the fact that its insured was held jointly and severally liable for the entire judgment in the underlying state proceeding. Plaintiff challenged the district court's decision to allocate the insurer's liability on a pro rata basis. Plaintiff next argued that even if pro rata allocation was appropriate, the district court should have used the date of her first elevated blood lead level rather than her date of birth to calculate her period of exposure. The insurer challenged the district court's refusal to reduce its period of coverage to 22 months. Applying Maryland law, the court affirmed the district court's judgment with respect to plaintiff's arguments. With respect to the matter raised by the cross-appeal, the court reversed. The principle underlying the court's decision was that an insurance company could not be held liable for periods of risk it never contracted to cover. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part.

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's holding that her common law tort claims against Medtronic were preempted by the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA), as interpreted by Riegel v. Medtronic. On appeal, plaintiff argued that because the device in question allegedly failed to operate in accordance with the terms of its premarket approval, her claims paralleled federal requirements and therefore should avoid preemption. Because the medical pump at issue was undisputedly designed, manufactured, and distributed in compliance with its FDA premarket approval, and plaintiff's common law claims exceeded or differed from, rather than paralleled, federal requirements, the court held that each of her specific claims for negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty were preempted.