Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals
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Plaintiff sued Brink, and others, claiming that he was raped while in jail when he was nineteen years old and that the rape occurred as a result of ineffective locks on cell doors. Brink argued on interlocutory appeal that the district court erred in concluding that the statute of limitations began running against plaintiff at the moment the torts occurred. The court concluded that the Mississippi Code clearly distinguished between the concepts of emancipation and the disability of infancy, as well as the implications of each, and Mississippi cases did not illustrate an intent to deviate from this clear distinction. Therefore, the court held that the statute of limitations did not begin to run against plaintiff until he reached the age of majority. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Baker v. RR Brink Locking Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

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This case stemmed from a dispute involving a Master Services Agreement (MSA) between BHP and Deep Marine. At issue on appeal was whether Underwriters could enforce BHP's contractual insurance, defense, and indemnity obligations to Deep Marine after Deep Marine's bankruptcy discharge. The court concluded that, even assuming arguendo that the MSA required indemnification against liability and that Deep Marine will eventually be held liable, Underwriters still could not prevail because BHP's indemnification obligation runs only to Deep Marine; Deep Marine would not, and could not, incur any loss in the Duval action, so Underwriters could not seek indemnification from BHP; because BHP had agreed to continue providing Deep Marine with a nominal defense, Underwriters would not have a breach of contract claim against BHP; the additional insured and primary insurance requirements do not apply BHP's self-insurance; BHP's only obligation was an indemnification obligation to Deep Marine; unlike Underwriters, it had no secondary liability to injured tort victims, like Duval; and Duval had no claim against BHP and, therefore, tender under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(c) was improper. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Duval v. Northern Assurance Co." on Justia Law

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Appellees, the Rubins, requested that the district court issue a Writ of Garnishment against the assets of Hamas and HLF after obtaining a judgment against Hamas for damages resulting from a terrorist attack in an outdoor pedestrian mall in Jerusalem. The district court executed the writ but the Rubins could not execute against HLF's assets because those assets had been restrained under 21 U.S.C. 853 to preserve their availability for criminal forfeiture proceedings. The district court subsequently denied the government's motion to dismiss the Rubins' third-party petition under section 853(n) to assert their interests in the restrained assets and vacated the preliminary order of forfeiture. The district court held that the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA), Pub. L. No. 107-297, title II, 201, 116 Stat. 2337, allowed the Rubins to execute against HLF's assets not withstanding the government's forfeiture proceedings. The court reversed, holding that section 853(n) did not provide the Rubins with a basis to prevail in the ancillary proceeding; TRIA did not provide the Rubins a basis to assert their interest in the forfeited property; TRIA did not trump the criminal forfeiture statute; and the in custodia legis doctrine did not preclude the district court's in personam jurisdiction over HLF. View "United States v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief, et al." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, the wife and children of the decedent, filed suit against defendants after the decedent died in the hospital after being administered a transdermal pain patch. On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's joinder of several non-diverse defendants and the district court's remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1447(e). The court joined its sister circuits and held that section 1447(d) precluded appellate review of a remand order issued pursuant to section 1447(e). Moreover, appellate review of the district court's joinder ruling was barred. Accordingly, the court dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Fontenot, et al. v. Johnson & Johnson, et al." on Justia Law

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KEC appealed from the district court's order denying its motion for a declaration and specific performance of the obligations of BorgWarner under the Master Settlement Agreement, the Merger Agreement, and the Cooperation Agreement. This case arose when plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that KEC, BorgWarner, and others improperly disposed and negligently disposed of substances containing toxic chemicals at the Crystal Springs site, where KEC owned a facility manufacturing transformers, and such negligence resulted in injuries to plaintiffs. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court because the terms of the Merger Agreement and Cooperation Agreement were not incorporated into the Master Settlement Agreement, and BorgWarner fulfilled its obligations under the Master Settlement Agreement. View "Alford, et al v. Kuhlman Corp." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all wrongful death beneficiaries, filed a product liability and wrongful death action against defendants. At issue on appeal was whether the Supreme Court's recent decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro rendered the court's stream-of-commerce approach to personal jurisdiction improper. The court found that the application of the stream-of-commerce approach in this case did not run afoul of McIntyre's narrow holding and, therefore, affirmed the district court's interlocutory order finding personal jurisdiction and denying dismissal. View "Ainsworth v. Moffett Engineering, Ltd." on Justia Law

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This matter arose from the multidistrict litigation (MDL) related to allegations that the Emergency Housing Units (EHUs) provided by FEMA in Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita contained materials which emitted dangerous levels of formaldehyde. This appeal involved only the Louisiana plaintiffs. The court held that the district court did not err in holding that plaintiffs' negligence claims regarding the use of EHUs were barred by the discretionary-function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims that FEMA negligently responded to formaldehyde complaints under the Louisiana Good Samaritan provision of the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 29:733:1. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' gross negligence claim under the misrepresentation exception to the FTCA. View "In Re: FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Products Liability Lit." on Justia Law

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While serving time in the county jail, plaintiff labored in a county work program under the sheriff's supervision. At issue was whether plaintiff was covered under the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Act (MWCA), Mississippi Code 47-5-417, -567, and thus was entitled to compensation benefits for injuries sustained while he was on work detail. The county and the medical corporation that treated plaintiff sought reimbursement of medical expenses from the Mississippi Public Entities Workers' Compensation Trust (MPE), the provider of workers' compensation insurance from the county. The court concluded as a matter of law that the county had no enforceable contract to hire plaintiff, a prerequisite of coverage, and therefore, the court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of MPE. View "Vuncannon, et al v. United States" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff sued Transocean to recover maintenance and cure for a back injury allegedly sustained on the job. The district court awarded summary judgment to Transocean on its counterclaim to recover benefits it already paid to plaintiff, concluding that Transocean's successful McCorpen v. Central Gulf Steamship Corp. defense automatically established its right to restitution - a right of action never before recognized in maritime law. The court concluded that, though most courts have accepted McCorpen, Transocean's attempt to invoke the case as an affirmative right of recovery finds virtually no support, and the court was not inclined to accede. Accordingly, the court rejected Transocean's claim, and reversed and remanded the district court's judgment. View "Boudreaux v. Transocean Deepwater, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit in Texas state court seeking relief under general maritime law, the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 901-950, and Texas tort law. Plaintiff claimed that he suffered severe emotional distress from witnessing his friend's death as a result of an accident on a jack-up rig attached to the Outer Continental Shelf. The district court denied plaintiff's motion for remand and granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that the suit was properly removed to federal court under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act's, 43 U.S.C. 1331-1356, grant of original federal question jurisdiction, regardless of whether maritime law provided the substantive rule of decision, and regardless of the citizenship of the parties. Because plaintiff could not show a genuine issue of material fact with respect to his claims under either Texas or maritime law, the court affirmed the district court's orders denying remand and granting summary judgment to defendants. View "Barker, Jr. v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., et al" on Justia Law