Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

This case arose when plaintiff sought workers' compensation from Wal-Mart's carrier after she suffered a lower-back injury on July 28, 1997. At issue was whether a claim for a bad faith denial of workers' compensation benefits was untimely brought by plaintiff. The court held that plaintiff's original claim was barred by Mississippi's three-year statute of limitations. Her new allegations as to a continuing violation and other instances of bad faith did not state a claim. Thus, the district court properly dismissed the entirety of her second amended complaint.

C&MI was a company that recycled hazardous compounds used by manufacturers and Honeywell was one of its clients. An employee of Honeywell died from exposure to toxins released from a container that C&MI had mislabeled as holding a non-toxic refrigerant. It actually contained highly toxic industrial waste. C&MI subsequently entered into a written agreement with the government by which it agreed to plead guilty to negligent endangerment that resulted in death. The sentence included a $1,000,000 fine and a restitution award of $2,000,000. The court held that there was no evidence to support either amount. Therefore, the court modified the fine and vacated the restitution order, affirming the judgment.

In a consolidated appeal, plaintiffs contended that the district court erred in denying their motions to remand and in dismissing their workplace safety claims as time-barred. Plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that Dresser failed to properly monitor and mitigate exposure to loud noise at Dresser's industrial facility and that these failures led to long-term hearing loss. The court concluded that Dresser owed plaintiffs duties under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and simultaneously owed non-negotiable, independent duties under Louisiana tort law. These duties formed the bases for two distinct types of claims - contract and tort - either of which plaintiffs could have brought before the district court. Plaintiffs chose to sue in tort, without reference to the CBA, and their claims could be adjudicated by sole resort to Louisiana tort law. Applying the Supreme Court's construction of section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185(a), the district court was without jurisdiction and therefore erred in denying the motions to remand and in granting the motions to dismiss. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and remanded.

Plaintiff was dismissed from the East Baton Rouge police training program after falling asleep in class and purportedly making inappropriate sexual comments. Plaintiff subsequently demanded a name-clearing hearing from the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff but was denied. Plaintiff then brought federal and state law claims against the Sheriff for his failure to grant the hearing and for potentially defamatory statements made regarding plaintiff's dismissal. Because plaintiff had failed to present competent summary judgment evidence, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff.

Plaintiff, an employee of the Railroad for nearly 40 years, filed suit under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. 51 et seq., claiming that the injuries to his knees, diagnosed after his retirement, were partly the result of the Railroad's negligence. A jury found such a connection and awarded damages. The court held that the evidence was insufficient on causation where no evidence was introduced to connect the worker's specific condition to the work that he performed. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for entry of judgment.

In this Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), case arising out of medical malpractice that led to the death of Melissa Busch, the United States and Ms. Busch's family members, plaintiffs, cross-appealed the district court's judgment. The case arose out of repeated medical misdiagnoses that led to the untimely death of Ms. Busch from synovial foot cancer. The court held that the district court did not err in finding the Government fully liable for the damages award because the Government did not present adequate evidence of NE Methodist's liability. The district court also did not err in concluding that Ms. Busch was not comparatively negligent because the evidence showed that Ms. Busch acted as a reasonable prudent person of her same training and experience would have acted in similar circumstances. The court held, however, that the district court did err in its assessment of plaintiffs' claim for household services. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

This case involved the Corps' dredging of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO), a shipping channel between New Orleans and the Gulf of Mexico, as well as levees alongside the channel and around the city. The Corps' negligence in maintaining the channel, grounded on a failure to appreciate certain hydrological risks, caused levees to fail and aggravated the effects of 2005's Hurricane Katrina on the city and its environs. Claimants filed hundreds of lawsuits and this opinion concerned three groups of bellwether plaintiffs, all suing the United States for flood damages. The district court found that neither the Flood Control Act of 1928 (FCA), 33 U.S.C. 702, nor the discretionary-function exception (DFE) to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2680(a), protected the government from suit; the district court found that three plaintiffs had proven the government's full liability and four had not. Another group of plaintiffs (Anderson plaintiffs) had their cases dismissed on the government's motion, the district court finding both immunities applicable. A different group (Armstrong plaintiffs) were preparing for trial of their own case against the government. The government appealed its losses in Robinson; the losing Robinson plaintiffs cross-appealed. The Anderson plaintiffs also appealed. On the theory that a favorable ruling might moot the pending Armstrong trial, the government petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus to order the district court to stay trial until the court issued an opinion in Robinson and Anderson. The three cases have been consolidated on appeal. The court held that the district court's careful attention to the law and even more cautious scrutiny of complex facts allowed the court to uphold its ruling in full, excepting the court's minor restatement of FCA immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgments in Robinson and Anderson, denying the government's petition for writ of mandamus to stay the Armstrong trial.

This case arose when claimant served plaintiff with a complaint, alleging that his injuries were caused by the unseaworthiness of the M/V St. Andrew and by the negligence of plaintiff and its employees. Claimant became entangled in a line and was pulled into a mooring bit, seriously injuring his left leg. Following a state court trial, claimant won a judgment in excess of $750,000 and plaintiff subsequently appealed. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of its limitation act as untimely. Because a challenge to the timeliness of a limitation action was a challenge to the district court's subject matter jurisdiction and because plaintiff had notice claimant was mounting such a challenge in his motion to dismiss, the district court did not err by construing plaintiff's motion as a Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the six-month deadline was triggered when claimant delivered his complaint to plaintiff on April 28, 2009, and that plaintiff's January 18, 2010 petition was untimely filed. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it opted not to hold an evidentiary hearing on claimant's motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Christopher M. Loften died from a rare disease called Toxic Epidermal Necrolysis (TEN) after taking Motrin. Lofton's wife and children brought suit against defendants asserting that Motrin caused the disease and defendants had failed to warn consumers about the risk of these severe autoimmune allergic reactions. At issue on appeal was whether the district court correctly found that federal law preempted Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 82.007(b)(1), which required plaintiffs to assert, in failure to warn cases, that a drug manufacturer withheld or misrepresented material information to the FDA. The court held that section 82.007(b)(1) required a Texas plaintiff to prove fraud-on-the-FDA to recover for failure to warn and this requirement invoked federal law supremacy. Therefore, because the court concluded that section 82.007(b)(1) was a fraud-on-the-FDA provision analogous to the claim considered in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., the court held that it was preempted by the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. 301 et seq., unless the FDA itself found fraud. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants.

The parents of a National Guardsman killed in an electrocution accident in Iraq brought suit against a civilian contractor who they claimed was responsible. Plaintiffs argued that Iraqi law governed the limitations period within which the suit needed to be brought but the district court held both that Iraqi law was not sufficiently proven and that the claims were barred by Louisiana's one-year prescriptive period. The court reversed and remanded, determining that Iraqi law was sufficiently proven. By operation of Louisiana Civil Code Article 3549, the Iraqi three-year prescription period applied. Based on what had been introduced, that period did not expire prior to suit and CPA Order 17 did not prevent this suit. Whether parents were proper parties, and any other issues beyond what the court had identified, were for further reconsideration on remand.