Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs were involved in a vehicular accident with Bart Allen, an employee of Gator Sign Company, whose vehicle hit plaintiffs' car from behind when they stopped to make a left turn. Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on liability was granted, but a jury trial was conducted on damages, resulting in a verdict for plaintiffs for $38,500. Plaintiffs claimed that the district court should have granted their motion for a new trial. The court held that because the district court properly allowed the jury to consider defendants' medical expert witness's testimony, and with that testimony the record contained adequate support of the verdict, the court affirmed the judgment based on the damage award.

Plaintiff, who was incarcerated in the custody of TDCJ-CID, sought damages under 48 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that her constitutional rights were violated when her ovary and lymph nodes were removed without her consent during a radical hysterectomy. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the physicians who performed the surgery, holding that they were entitled to qualified immunity. In light of the circumstances, the court could not say that the law was, or was at the time of defendants' conduct, clearly established such that a reasonable official in the physicians' positions would understand that their conduct violated plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Noting that the law governing claims involving unwanted medical treatment in the prison context was far from certain, the court held that plaintiff failed to rebut defendants' entitlement to qualified immunity on her Fourteenth Amendment claim and summary judgment was appropriate. The court disposed of plaintiff's other claims and affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Two insurers disputed whether their respective insurance policies required them to defend the insured against allegations regarding an accidental death. Both insurers sought a declaratory judgment from the district court that their policies did not cover the underlying lawsuit. Alma Batie, daughter of Darline Rigsby, sued Preferred Ambulance in Texas state court on behalf of herself and as a representative of Rigsby's estate (the underlying lawsuit). After the district court ruled that each insurer must provide primary coverage for the accident, both insurers appealed. The court held that, for purposes of defining the scope of each insurer's duty to defendant, both Western World and National Casualty must provide primary coverage of the underlying lawsuit. Neither the exclusions in their respective policies nor the "other insurance" provision in the Western World policy limited either insurer's duty to defendant. Accordingly, to the extent that National Casualty had paid more than half of the defense costs in the underlying lawsuit to this point, it was entitled to contribution from Western World.

In a wrongful death action arising out of a helicopter crash, the sole issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in applying Louisiana's wrongful death statute rather than Florida's wrongful death statute. Decedent lived in Florida, he boarded the helicopter in Louisiana, and the helicopter struck a bird and crashed seven minutes after takeoff in Louisiana. Eight of the nine individuals on board were killed including decedent. The court agreed with the district court's analysis that Louisiana had the most significant relationship with the occurrence and the parties. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of his state-law claims against Stryker under Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that a hip replacement product manufactured by Stryker malfunctioned and caused him injury. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's strict liability, design defect, negligence, and Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), Tex. Bus. Comm. Code 17.41 et seq., claims to the extent they were premised on a failure to warn or a marketing defect; affirmed as to plaintiff's breach of express warranty claims; and reversed and remanded the following: (1) plaintiff's strict liability and negligence claims, to the extent they were based on manufacturing defects that violated the FDA's Current Good Manufacturing Practices or are inconsistent with Stryker's manufacturing processes or procedures that were approved by the FDA; (2) his claim for breach of an implied warranty to the extent it relied on the failure to comply with the FDA's requirements; and (3) his DTPA claim, to the extent that it relied on a breach of an implied warranty.

Plaintiffs, Mississippi and Alabama residents, brought a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671-2680, action against the Government for injuries allegedly related to their exposure to elevated levels of formaldehyde contained in the component materials of the Emergency Housing Units (EHUs) provided to them by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The district court concluded that the Mississippi and Alabama emergency statutes barred suit against a "private person under similar circumstances" and granted the Government's motion to dismiss. Because the Mississippi and Alabama emergency statutes abrogated the tort liability of a private person who voluntarily, without compensation, allowed his property or premises to be used as a shelter during or in recovery from a natural disaster, the Government's voluntary, cost-free provision of the EHUs to disaster victims, in connection with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, was also immunized conduct under the FTCA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment dismissing plaintiffs' FTCA claims against the Government for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and held that plaintiffs' remaining questions did not warrant certification.

This interlocutory appeal arose out of the deaths of two civilian drivers in a United States military supply-truck convoy in Iraq when insurgents attacked in April 2004. State tort claims were brought by or on behalf of spouses and family members of the decedents against KBR. KBR contended that the district court erred in denying its motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment in which it argued that the Defense Base Act (DBA), 42 U.S.C. 1651-54, provided plaintiffs exclusive remedy and preempted all state tort claims that have been asserted. The court concluded that the DBR preempted plaintiffs' state law claims and therefore did not consider whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the alternative grounds on which KBR sought dismissal.

Plaintiffs, Matthew Cantrell's family, filed suit against the City of Murphy and several of its officers after 21-month-old Matthew died of accidental hanging when he was found tangled up in a soccer net in the back yard of his home. This was an interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the officers deprived Matthew of his due process rights under DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, where plaintiffs failed to establish that the officers had a special relationship with Matthew when they separated him from his mother. The court also held that because the officers had probable cause to detain Matthew's mother, the district court did not err in granting the officers summary judgment on this portion of plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, an engineer aboard defendant's dive vessel, challenged the denial of his claims under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, et seq., and general maritime law and of his costs. Defendant challenged the amount plaintiff was awarded for cure and his being awarded attorney's fees, including the amount. Based on the court's review of the record, the court held that the denial of plaintiff's Jones Act and general maritime law claims were not clearly erroneous. In regard to plaintiff's challenge of the district court's application of the collateral-source rule in determining the amount of cure awarded him, the court held that, regardless of what plaintiff's medical providers charged, those charges were satisfied by the much lower amount paid by his insurer. Consequently, the district court erred by awarding the higher, charged amount. The court also held that the district court clearly erred in finding defendant arbitrary and capricious in denying maintenance and cure to plaintiff. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's Rule 54(d) motion for costs.

This insurance coverage case arose out of an underlying personal injury lawsuit brought by Michael Parr against Gilbane Building Company. Gilbane, a general contractor, sought defense and indemnification from Admiral Insurance Company based on an insurance policy held by Empire Steel Erectors, a subcontractor. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court determined that Admiral owed a duty to defend and indemnify. As a preliminary matter, the court held that Gilbane qualified as an additional insured. The court held that, pursuant to the strict eight-corners rule, Admiral had no duty to defend where the petition did not affirmatively allege any facts implicating the negligence of either Empire or Parr. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Gilbane on the duty to defend. The court held, however, that the district court did not clearly err in determining that Admiral owed Gilbane a duty to indemnify for the cost of its settlement with Parr and the district court's summary judgment on that matter was affirmed.