Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Advance installs and services signs. It alleges that it entered into a contract to sell Optec’s electronic messaging signs to foodservice customers. Advance claims that Optec agreed not to sell directly to the foodservice companies. Rogers, a franchisee of Sonic Restaurants, was a long-time Advance customer. Advance and Optec undertook a pilot project to install signs at Sonic corporate-owned locations and Rogers’s franchises. Advance claimed that Optec violated the agreement by negotiating with Sonic directly. Advance and Optec entered a second agreement by phone, with Optec to pay Advance 12 percent of net on sales made by Optec to customers introduced by Advance. Advance sent a letter memorializing the terms; Optec made a minor change, unrelated to commission; Advance incorporated the change and returned the letter. Optec refused to sign. Following additional negotiations, Optec signed a two-year agreement with Sonic and installed signs at 1,400 locations, without Advance being involved. A jury found in favor of Advance on breach-of-contract claims and a claim for tortious interference and awarded damages of $3,444,000 for breach of the telephone agreement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that: there was no meeting of the minds for the telephone agreement; Ohio’s Statute of Frauds precluded enforcement; Advance did not prove its tortious interference claim; and that the evidence did not support the damages awards. View "Advance Sign Grp., LLC v. Optec Displays, Inc." on Justia Law

Brigance worked as a coal miner for 20 years, until he stopped working in 1994 because of shortness of breath, which prevented him from obtaining other employment. Brigance obtained Kentucky state black lung benefits, which expired after about eight years. Brigance sought federal benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act. An administrative law judge held that the claim was not barred by the Act’s three-year statute of limitations, 30 U.S.C. 932(f). The Benefits Review Board affirmed an award of benefits. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Brigance admitted that he had a medical determination of total disability (pneumoconiosis) seven years before filing his claim. View "Peabody Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp." on Justia Law

In 2008, Washburn was seriously injured when the door of an airplane hangar, T-hangar 12, blew off and hit her in the face and torso during a storm at an airpark owned by Lawrence County and operated by Attitude Aviation. Watson had leased T-hangar 12 for more than 20 years at the time of the accident; his lease made him responsible for the condition of the hangar. Attitude was never included in any of the hangar lease negotiations or lease renewals. Rejecting Washburn’s suit on summary judgment, the district court held that the County and Attitude owed no duty of care to Washburn because they had no control over the hangar. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Washburn v. Lawrence Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Crouch was piloting his Piper Lance II single-engine airplane with Hudson as passenger. After losing engine power at an altitude of 5000 feet, and finding it impossible to reach an airport, Crouch made a forced landing in a field near Bardstown. The plane’s engine was manufactured in 1978 and overhauled in 2005, with installation of a rebuilt magneto that allegedly detached, causing the crash. Both occupants survived but suffered serious permanent injuries, including paraplegia. The district court dismissed, on summary judgment, their allegations that the aircraft engine manufacturer was liable for negligently failing to warn airplane owners and operators, and failing to notify regulatory authorities, of defects in the engine and its components, finding that the allegations failed to make out a claim in avoidance of the applicable period of repose under the General Aviation Revitalization Act, 49 U.S.C. 40101. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs did not show or even allege that a revised overhaul manual contained a substantive alteration that caused harm and the evidence did not support a theory that defendants withheld information. View "Crouch v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

Dotson died in August 1998. An administrative law judge determined that his wife was entitled to survivor’s benefits under the 2010 Black Lung Amendments, Pub. Law 111-148, 1556(a)–(c). The Sixth Circuit denied the company’s petition for review of the Benefits Review Board decision. The company filed a petition for rehearing, arguing that its case involved an additional issue: whether an award of benefits should commence the month the miner died. The Sixth Circuit denied the petition. The regulation says: “Benefits are payable to a survivor who is entitled beginning with the month of the miner’s death, or January 1, 1974, whichever is later.” 20 C.F.R. 725.503(c). This language was clear before Congress enacted the Amendments, and, by its terms, the widow is entitled to benefits beginning with the month of the miner’s death: August 1998. Rejecting an argument concerning retroactive application, the court stated that “imposition of liability for the effects of disabilities bred in the past is justified as a rational measure to spread the costs of the employees’ disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor—the operators and the coal consumers.” View "McCoy Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. Dotson" on Justia Law

Dodd, an African-American mail carrier for the U.S. Postal Service, was the subject of an investigation for failing to deliver mail. He was arrested and held for seven days before charges were dismissed. He filed suit, alleging claims of false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and of race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court dismissed Dodd’s FTCA claim because it determined that the claim was preempted by the Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. 2301, and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on Dodd’s Title VII claim because Dodd failed to make a prima facie showing of discrimination. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to the FTCA claim, noting that the Civil Service Reform Act does not apply to postal employee, but affirmed with respect to the Title VII claim. View "Dodd v. Potter" on Justia Law

In 2004, El Camino executed equipment leases with Cyberco, a corporation held out to be a computer sales and consulting business. Cyberco actually operated under several names and was engaged in fraud. Its affiliate, Teleservices, a shell corporation, was represented as an arms-length computer manufacturer. The equipment to be leased by El Camina, which likely never existed, was allegedly manufactured by Teleservices and delivered to Cyberco, which released payment to Teleservices. In 2002, Huntington established a banking relationship with Cyberco. Cyberco used its accounts to deposit funds from El Camino. Huntington investigated a series of overdrafts. Ultimately Cyberco elected to undergo a “gradual migration” from Huntington, and Huntington agreed to credit extensions for Cyberco during the transition. El Camino purchased more than $25 million in computer equipment. El Camino sued Huntington for conversion, aiding and abetting conversion, aiding and abetting fraud, and unjust enrichment. The district court granted summary judgment on the first three claims, concluding that El Camino could not establish the requisite level of knowledge to sustain aiding and abetting and conversion claims. It later dismissed the unjust enrichment claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that findings, in a related bankruptcy case, that Huntington did not act in good faith, were irrelevant. View "El Camino Res., LTD. v. Huntington Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law

Howard has been employed as an underground face coal miner with CRCC since 2005 and has filed seven prior discrimination complaints under the Mine Act, 30 U.S.C. 815(c)(1), alleging that: CRCC assigned him undesirable jobs because of his demanding nature; CRCC reduced the workforce to fabricate justifications to terminate him; and CRCC failed to protect his truck from vandalism in the parking lot. After Howard suffered an injury at work, CRCC fired him, stating that restrictions imposed by a physician made him unable to perform any job available at CRCC. An ALJ found discrimination and that the justification was pretextual. The Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission denied review. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Howard’s seven-percent impairment was found to be minimal and unthreatening for his continued employment at the coal mine by all of his treating physicians; only after CRCC sent an overbroad job description and a brief clarification questionnaire did on doctor find that Howard should not return to work. View "Cumberland River Coal Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n" on Justia Law

Berrien worked for a civilian contractor (TECOM) at a military base in Michigan. He was fatally injured by a gutter that fell from the liquor store on the base while he was working alone, behind the store. The district court awarded $1.18 million in damages for failure to warn, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1). The Sixth Circuit reversed. Because the Act does not waive the immunity of the United States for acts of independent contractors, liability could only be based on the negligence of government employees. There was no evidence that government employees actually knew of the dangerous condition of the liquor store, so that, under applicable Michigan law, any liability for failure to warn an invitee of a dangerous condition would have to have been based on a negligent failure to discover the dangerous condition. Even though the United States retained the right to conduct spot checks under its contract with TECOM, this right does not subject it to FTCA liability. View "Berrien v. United States" on Justia Law

Judge, who worked as an airline baggage handler and ramp agent for 20 years, underwent surgery to repair an aortic valve and a dilated ascending aorta. He applied for disability benefits under a group insurance policy issued by MetLife. MetLife denied benefits, finding that Judge was not totally and permanently disabled under the terms of the Plan. After exhausting internal administrative procedures, Judge sued to recover benefits under 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B), the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The district court granted judgment on the administrative record in favor of MetLife. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that MetLife applied the wrong definition of “total disability,” erred in failing to obtain vocational evidence before concluding that Judge was not totally and permanently disabled, erred in conducting a file review by a nurse in lieu of having Judge undergo independent medical examination, and that there was a conflict of interest because MetLife both evaluates claims and pays benefits under the plan. View "Judge v. Metro. Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law